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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation explores some key challenges the Mexican government and 
international organizations such as the World Bank may face when implementing 
climate change adaptation initiatives in coastal lagoon communities in the 
Mexican state of Tabasco, in the Gulf of Mexico.  My analysis of the 
government’s climate change adaptation initiatives, scientists’ explanations, and 
fishers’ views on local environmental changes is based on political ecology 
approaches to environmental narratives, and critical literature on climate change. 
It outlines the interaction among three environmental narratives: that produced by 
the Mexican government and its allies who are re-orienting environmental 
programs into climate change adaptation programs; scientific narratives on 
coastal environmental processes including coastal erosion; and the narrative 
produced by poor fishers who are dependent on lagoon and coastal resources 
for their livelihoods, and who blame the off shore oil industry for most of their 
environmental problems. Scientific accounts of coastal environmental change 
tend to support more the position of fishers than the government, which produces 
a need for the government to be selective in how it uses science to justify its 
adaptation programs. The dissertation then examines the challenges that state 
initiatives of this type face when they interact with local environmental politics 
involving fishers and the state-owned oil industry. While fishers blame the oil 
industry for environmental problems, government adaptation programs seek to 
enrol fishers and the oil industry together as vulnerable to the local effects of 
climate change such as coastal erosion and increased frequency of hurricanes. I 
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discuss how through processes of simplification, state agencies render complex 
political issues into technical problems, but how, in light of local conflicts, climate 
change adaptation interventions become highly political on the ground. I also 
argue that climate change policy analysis must be done in light of past and failed 
state interventions in Tabasco, which have resulted in what scholars have called 
a “harmful development” for fishers and ecosystems (Tudela, 1989).  
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CHAPTER 1. RESEARCH PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The objective of this dissertation is to analyze climate change adaptation 
narratives in Mexico; it discusses the framings and perceptions different actors 
attach to this issue. My research aims to understand how this problem is 
understood and explained and how these interpretations are translated into a 
range of initiatives and projects. Rather than explain what climate change and 
adaptation actually “are,” this research analyzes how government officials, 
scientists and fishers understand climate change and adaptation, and the kind of 
actions those framings are leading to.   
Internationally, there is consensus that there is climate change, that these 
changes are already substantial, but that the precise nature of future climate 
change is not easily predicted. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) explains climate change as a problem caused by human activities 
through the emission of greenhouse gasses that are changing the climate and 
inducing negative impacts on society (Beck, 2011, p. 300). The IPCC approach 
to climate change has three characteristics: (i) it is an impact-based approach in 
which (ii) the main problem is long-term climate change and (iii) its spatial scale 
is global. This organization defines climate change as follows:  
Climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be 
identified (e.g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or 
the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, 
typically decades or longer. Climate change may be due to natural 
internal processes or external forces such as modulations of the solar 
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cycles, volcanic eruptions and persistent anthropogenic changes in the 
composition of the atmosphere or in land use (IPCC, 2013, p. 1450). 
 
To some degree, there is consensus that two courses of action are 
required: mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation has been clearly defined as 
anthropogenic intervention through the implementation of policies to reduce 
emissions and enhance sinks (IPCC, 2001, p. 716).  However, the literature on 
adaptation reflects the multiple and contested nature of institutional and funding 
frameworks. The definition of the IPCC – adopted in government narratives – is 
that adaptation is 
the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects. In 
human systems, adaptation seeks to moderate harm or exploit beneficial 
opportunities. In natural systems, human intervention may facilitate 
adjustment to expected climate and its effects (IPCC, 2014, p. 1).  
 
Some scholars emphasize the ecological dimension of adaptation, defining it as 
“any response that increases a population's probability of survival” (Berkes & 
Jolly, 2001, p. 2).  
This research focuses on three particular networks: national and provincial 
governments, the community of scientists working on climate change and fishers 
from five coastal communities in the Gulf of Mexico. I use a narrative analysis 
approach to discuss climate change policies and projects, as well as scientists’ 
and fishermen’s explanations and understandings of environmental changes. 
Analysis of narratives (Roe, 1995; Forsyth, 2003; Fairhead & Leach, 2000 and 
1995; Batterbury, Forsyth & Thomson, 1997) highlights how particular actors 
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understand and frame problems. It allows us to scrutinize what and who are 
included or excluded (Gasper & Apthorpe, 1996, p. 8) or what aspects are being 
distinguished or avoided in the story lines of such frameworks. This is a 
methodological approach that helps us analyze how problems get defined and 
the sort of political consequences these definitions convey (Hajer, 1995, p. 2). 
This approach critically examines the way evidence is gathered and the types of 
solutions actors propose to problems (Scoones, 1997). 
My research makes a close inquiry into how written and non-written 
narratives define problems, attribute responsibilities, explain solutions, and 
elaborate on ideas about the role of subjects of government. In my view, the 
analysis of narratives is important because different discourses, definitions, and 
questions lead to various policy prescriptions that impact people’s lives, since 
they lead to specific ways of: 
setting agendas; defining goals; characterising options; posing questions; 
prioritizing issues; deciding context; setting baselines; drawing boundaries; 
discounting time; choosing methods; including disciplines expertise or 
informal knowledge, and handling uncertainties (Leach, Scoones & 
Stirling, 2010, p. 371).  
 
In this research I do not analyze narratives in themselves, in isolation, as 
“self-contained dialogue” (Zimmermer, 2004, p.111). Rather, I look at the 
structuring factors shaping narratives: the historical political economy of local 
communities and the social space (Bourdieu, 1989) in which narratives emerge. I 
elaborate on Bourdieu’s ideas regarding agents’ points of view, which are 
determined by their positions within social space (Bourdieu, 1989). As this 
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sociologist explains, social constructions are “not carried out in a social vacuum 
but subjected to structural constraints” that need to be identified and grasped 
(Bourdieu, 1989, p. 18). 
Even though this dissertation looks at three sets of actors, I 
disproportionately focus on government narratives, since they have a dominant 
role in defining and framing the topic. Therefore, the networks I rely on to analyze 
my research questions are unequal, since government projects, policies and 
initiatives – drawing on international cooperation frameworks, financing 
institutions and governments – are the dominant actors promoting adaptation 
initiatives and mobilizing funding resources. Governments’ definitions and 
diagnoses of the research problem are based on scientific narratives; however, 
as I discuss in this dissertation, government officials are key actors in using, re-
framing and presenting the climate change problem on their own. 
Scientists have played an important role in promoting climate change 
within the government agenda. However, it is necessary to analyze their 
narratives separately from government narratives since they show scientists’ 
need to legitimate their participation in such government initiatives while at the 
same time actively engaging in boundary work so they separate their positions 
and perspectives from the governments’. Analysis of their narratives sheds light 
on processes of coproduction and the complex interactions of science and policy.  
In this dissertation I present scientists’ explanations and positions as if 
they have a singular, unified position about the topics I discussed with them in 
the interviews. When I discuss “scientists’ explanations” I recognize the existence 
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of different positions and views among them. However, it is important to state 
that in my interviews, they mostly coincided in their opinions about the topics we 
discussed. I did not identify any counternarrative or alternative position to 
analyze in my research.  
Fishers’ understandings of local environmental changes coincide with 
scientific analyses of coastal ecosystem dynamics. However, this is not to say 
that their views are shaped by scientific discourses; rather, their explanations 
reflect more their local environmental knowledge, which is informed by their 
experience living in these ecosystems and, by their ancestral knowledge of 
fishing and other coastal activities. Their views on environmental changes are 
also strongly determined by their conflict-driven relations with the state-owned oil 
company that has impacted fishers’ natural ecosystems, their social relations, 
politics and economy.  
In chapter 3, I discuss the existence of different types of fishers, with 
differentiated material and political resources and interests. In that chapter I also 
explain that I do not conceive “local communities” as a homogeneous entity. 
However, despite of this plurality of actors, in this dissertation I refer to “fishers’ 
views” when they explain their positions about the topics I discussed with them in 
interviews. I used this term because in relation to my topic, I identified more 
commonalities and coincidence than dissent among them. As I was told by some 
of the fishers I interviewed, fishers maintain unified positions and interests when 
it comes to protecting their interests. Therefore, it is not completely odd that 
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fishers expressed unified views regarding the problems they have and what they 
identified as the agents and processes causing them. 
Finally, it is important to clarify that in my research I do not look at global 
climate change discourses in themselves, at how they originate in the IPCC or in 
other international mechanisms such as the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol. Neither do I 
explore the interconnections between them and national government climate 
change discourses. These are topics and research questions that are beyond the 
reach of my dissertation. Although I use direct sources, I do not explore in depth 
these organizations’ assumptions and the analysis scholars have done of the 
different controversies around these global frameworks on themes such as 
transnational governance, posing questions such as “who governs and on whose 
behalf, how they govern and the implications of those practices of governing, in 
social and environmental terms” (Newell, 2008, p. 528); the problems and 
conceptual definitions that arise from the policy implications of “misdefining” 
climate change (Pielke, 2005; Hulme, 2008); institutional analysis of the IPCC 
and its trajectory (Agrawala, 1998; Hulme & Mahony, 2010), among others. 
Instead, I mostly discuss these global frameworks through my analysis of how 
Mexican governments present them in official documents.  
This dissertation contributes to the field of environmental sociology. 
Specifically, it contributes to literature that analyzes how environmental problems 
are constructed and to discussions that criticize the apolitical nature of global 
narratives that highlight the existence of “common” interests and views on global 
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problems, overlooking power relations among unequal actors. It also contributes 
to political economy perspectives within environmental sociology that emphasize 
global inequalities, as well as the effects of capitalism and state interventions on 
disadvantage populations.  
My research also contributes to the field of development studies by 
characterizing the emergence of a new re-oriented climate change narrative that 
conveys new goals, ideals, social representation and ways of framing existing 
development problems under a climate change approach. Finally, another 
contribution is specific to the Mexican scholarship, by introducing a critical 
perspective on the topic of adaptation that is until now nonexistent in Mexico. 
This chapter is organized as follows: In the next section I discuss the 
research problem and main arguments developed in the dissertation. In the third 
section I discuss the theoretical perspectives used in the research, and at the 
end I describe the organization of the dissertation.  
 
1.2 The Research Problem and Main Arguments 
In a regional meeting on climate change a Latin American government official 
presented a paper entitled “If We Adapt to Climate Change We Will Develop,” a 
very suggestive title that raises questions about the way governments are 
framing and understanding both climate change adaptation and development. 
For the representative of the United Nations for Development in Mexico, 
adaptation means “not only a better development, but a different development” 
(UNDP, 2012). The coupling of adaptation-development has been a core topic of 
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analysis and discussion in international organizations, governments, academic 
institutions and non-governmental organizations that are discussing how to better 
design and implement adaptation projects that also attend to poverty reduction 
and vulnerability to climate change. It is within these climate change narratives 
that development concepts, processes and practices are reframed. Development 
is conceived as the process of transition or transformation toward a society more 
“adaptive” to climate change – replicating past teleological development goals. It 
is through the articulation of these discourses that new goals emerge, such as 
enhancing the “adaptive capacity” of both human and natural ecosystems. 
Climate change is explained as a dual phenomenon that on one hand imposes 
impacts and challenges to ecosystems, populations and economies, and on the 
other hand represents an “opportunity” to explore and exploit. However, in this 
framework, poor countries carry a double burden. Not only are they poor, but 
living in such conditions makes their population unable to cope and adapt to 
climate change impacts. Climate change discourse perpetuates the classic First-
Third World divide but now based on a set of abilities countries should acquire to 
be on one side or the other of the adaptive/non-adaptive divide. Leatherman and 
Nicholls (1995), for example, state that worldwide Bangladesh “is often cited as a 
major loser to accelerated sea-level rise, and it is considered one of the most 
vulnerable countries to climate change” (p. 11). The existence of losers implicitly 
conveys the idea of the existence of winners in a climate change setting where 
only some countries are or would be able to exploit the “opportunities” climate 
change will bring to some people and territories. Only some countries, with a 
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certain set of capacities, will better adapt to a range of climate change impacts. 
The divide implicitly refers to the existence of certain intrinsic capacities that are 
strongly determined by countries’ geographic locations – locations that determine 
their climatic conditions and their orography and hydrology. These are factors 
that contribute to a greater or lesser extent to countries’ exposure to hydro 
meteorological events that are expected to increase under climate change 
conditions. The divide also refers to a set of extrinsic qualities such as a lack of 
policies, planning and technology. As in past development crusades, the need to 
cope with the impacts of climate change is the driving force for the call for “global 
responses” that are translated into a wide range of actions from research to 
funding and other cooperative efforts. 
 This dissertation is a product of the analysis of critical perspectives on 
climatic and environmental changes that highlight the need to understand and 
critically analyze the concepts and practices these narratives are promoting, their 
meanings, and their consequences. I take up political ecologists’ arguments that 
narratives of environmental change “are not neutral from society, but reflect the 
needs and agendas of societies and regimes that constructed them” (Batterbury 
et al., 1997, p. 130). My approach is also based on sociological analyses of 
power that explain how narratives (words, names) are expressed through social 
constructs and perceptions. Narratives “construct social reality as much as they 
express it, [and] are the stake par excellence of political struggle, which is a 
struggle to impose the legitimate principle of vision and division” (Bourdieu, 1989, 
p. 21).  
10 
 
 In what follows I explain the research questions, the key arguments and 
the theoretical approaches that will help frame and understand the research 
problem. 
 
Research Questions and Arguments 
The overarching research question is: What are the implications of using global 
frameworks to explain local environmental changes? To address this broad 
question on climate change adaptation narratives, I focus the analysis on four 
sub-questions: 
1.  How do these global frameworks manifest in coastal communities in the Gulf 
of Mexico?  
2.  What consequences do those framings entail, and for whom? 
3.  How are these discourses shaping new development narratives? 
4.  How do scientists and fishers’ narratives explain environmental changes in 
coastal communities? How do they contest and challenge the assumptions in 
government climate change narratives? 
In what follows I discuss these questions by explaining the core 
arguments I develop in the dissertation. 
 
a) De-politicizing Contentious Political Issues 
In response to these questions, I argue that climate change narratives in Mexico 
are reframing historical development problems under an approach that 
emphasizes the need to adapt to climate change impacts. Climate change is 
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being positioned as an important issue that is causing or has the potential to 
impact a wide range of problems. Emphasis is on how people can face impacts, 
diverting the discussion of how to address the conditions that are in the first place 
determining the magnitude of climate or non-climate related impacts on peoples, 
communities and ecosystems. I argue that in Mexico, climate change adaptation 
narratives could be understood as framings that de-politicize contentious political, 
economic and environmental problems on the ground. They overlook the broader 
political economy of environmental changes. 
In an interview, a scientist explained that climate change “apparently is a 
politically ‘neutral’ topic.”1 She explained that governments can argue for the 
need to design government interventions in the name of climate change – e.g. 
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions – without facing any resistance from 
the population. She added that unlike other environmental problems, such as the 
ones that involve Canadian mining companies or international corporations like 
Nestlé – where local communities have resisted economic projects that intend to 
exploit their local resources – climate change as a topic used by governments is 
more easily able to navigate social resistance. The government position against 
greenhouse gas emissions might not easily be questioned or labeled as a highly 
contentious “political” issue.  
This dissertation, however, demonstrates the highly political nature of 
climate change interventions. This observation emerged as a result of a close 
analysis of local political, economic and environmental processes in coastal 
                                                 
1 Interview with a scientist from the Atmospheric Sciences Center, National University of Mexico, 
Mexico City, June 5, 2012. 
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communities, which illustrate the existence of local contentions among powerful 
actors over territory and its resources. Climate change adaptation narratives, I 
argue, become highly political to the extent that they define the nature of local 
environmental changes – coastal erosion – and propose solutions that involve 
resource control, access or management.  
Government climate change narratives emphasize sea-level rise – that 
results from global processes such as melting glaciers and thermal expansion – 
as the main factor driving erosion. However, Mexican geologists have recorded 
the existence of coastal erosion along the case coasts since the 1940s. Based 
on historical data analysis these scientists have concluded that land subsidence 
– due to sediment compression and oil and gas extraction – is the main driver of 
coastal erosion. As I explain further in this dissertation, this resonates with what 
scientists around the world have pointed out: that sea-level rise is not necessarily 
the primary driver of coastal erosion, also highlighting the need to consider the 
diversity of regional factors.  Fishers, who hold different explanations of the 
causes of coastal erosion, produce a third account. From their perspective, 
coastal erosion is a “man-made” problem. They argue that the origin of this 
problem goes back to 1975, when the oil industry built coastal infrastructure that 
changed sea currents, which caused erosion along their coasts. Fishers’ 
accounts coincide with scientists’ in attributing the emergence of erosion to the 
building of infrastructure: deep-water ports, channels, and artificial openings. I 
argue that adopting climate change frameworks to explain long-term 
environmental changes such as coastal erosion allows governments to sidestep 
13 
 
contentious local political problems that are at the core of some socio-natural 
phenomena like coastal erosion – such as the role of the oil industry in causing 
erosion and environmental degradation, land-use changes, and deforestation.  
Fieldwork findings suggest that in Mexico climate change as a public issue 
has also been adopted by governments as a causal explanation of disasters and 
environmental problems recently experienced in Mexico, such as floods, water 
scarcity, or other problems. An example is the flooding the province of Tabasco 
experienced in 2007, regarded by the government as one of the most costly 
disasters in Mexico’s history (CICC, 2012a). In this event, 62% of the province 
was under water and 75% of the total population, from 679 communities, was 
affected (Perevochtchikova & Lezama, 2010, p. 73). Scientists working in that 
province criticized the government and media’s emphasis on climate change 
impacts – the increasing frequency and intensity of storms – that overlooks the 
anthropogenic sources of such disasters. In their study of this phenomenon, 
Perevochtchikova and Lezama (2010) explain that governance problems related 
to land-use change, dam management, hydraulic infrastructure, urban planning, 
deforestation, and corruption are among the many factors that explained this 
phenomenon. This disaster was also the cause of public outrage against 
government authorities since it was argued that they had diverted public funds 
originally budgeted for water management planning and infrastructure – a project 
that was never implemented. In an interview, a scholar referred to this disaster as 
an example of “genocide” since water administrators “deliberately” ordered the 
diversion of waters from dams and rivers towards the region where most 
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indigenous communities are settled so they could prevent damages to industries, 
urban infrastructure and the population in the capital city.2 This is another 
example of how a complex, abstract and unclear meaning of “climate change” 
can be used and appropriated to assign responsibilities and overlook structural 
problems – lack of planning, corruption, lack of early alert systems, land-use 
change, and many other factors causing such problems or increasing people’s 
vulnerabilities to their impacts. 
I argue that government narratives have “unintended” effects (Ferguson, 
1994). In this case study, the most important is the depoliticization of government 
interventions, local problems and social relations. My research illustrates that 
government initiatives recognize the catastrophic social and environmental 
impacts past state interventions had in Tabasco. However, despite such 
recognition, these initiatives propose projects and measures to face climate 
change that are divested of any consideration to address the complex local 
conditions that are causing environmental changes in the first place. I 
demonstrate how these interventions aim to render as “technical” contentious 
political problems (Ferguson, 1994; Li, 2007).  
 
b) Shaping a New Development Narrative? The Promises of Adaptation for 
Local Communities 
As I explain above, a research question this dissertation explores is how climate 
change narratives are redefining the very content and grammar of development 
                                                 
2 Interview with a social sciences scientist, Multidisciplinary Regional Research Center, National 
University of Mexico, Tabasco, Mexico, May 30 2012. 
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frameworks in Third World contexts such as Mexico. In order to address this 
question, this research identifies assumptions that frame climate change 
adaptation as a neutral and beneficial practice governments need to promote to 
help populations and natural ecosystems better face climatic impacts. It analyzes 
characteristics of government narratives that (i) present new ways of framing 
local people’s vulnerabilities, (ii) define new goals to be pursued by both 
governments and people, (iii) identify new obstacles to overcome, and that (iv) 
frame new understandings of the role of the subjects of government, and with 
this, new social representations of fishers.   
Hajer (1995) defines story‐lines as “devices through which actors are 
positioned, and through which specific ideas of ‘blame’ and ‘responsibility’, and of 
‘urgency’ and ‘responsible behaviour’ are attributed” (p. 64-65). In this research, 
government initiatives are analyzed as story-lines that emphasize the global 
dimension of the climate change problem and the urgency in attending its 
“inevitable” impacts. It also identifies the differentiated attribution of 
responsibilities in solving environmental problems as well as the type of 
“responsible behavior” expected from fishers. This research discusses the 
problems that the use of generic categories such as “citizens,” “coastal 
populations” or sectors – which are urged to change productive practices or 
adopt adaptive strategies to cope with impacts – may have for local actors.  
In this regard I argue that climate change narratives, in elaborating and 
envisioning strategies and policies for how populations can get a better future, 
are: (i) taking up past development assumptions and practices in the process of 
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defining the problem and solutions; (ii) integrating new problems to be faced and 
fixed and; (iii) elaborating on emergent categories, social representations and 
roles.  
 
c) The Transition from Global-to-Local 
In my research I question assumptions about the movement of narratives and 
scientific knowledge from the global-to-local (e.g. world polity theories), which 
describe the process as static, one-way and unquestioned (Pellow & Brehm, 
2013). This dissertation demonstrates the various levels in which such global 
frameworks are reshaped, adopted and challenged on the ground. I argue that 
national and provincial government agencies are key actors shaping these 
narratives. In the process they reinterpret climate change as a public issue 
explained in public reports – a process through which the voices of scientists and 
scientific knowledge are either reframed or overlooked. I argue that looking at the 
sphere of government allows us to understand the various ways knowledge is 
produced, promoted and used, challenging classic understandings of science 
and the role of scientists in posing problems and their solutions.  
Fieldwork findings show how “localization” (Hulme, 2008) of global 
frameworks take place, how these frameworks are continuously negotiated on 
the ground, by a range of actors with particular agendas and interests. I analyze 
scientists’ perspectives on climate change, specifically I discuss some 
contentious problems regarding policy implementation as well as framing issues. 
I also discuss how scientists accommodate their interests and perspectives to an 
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emergent climate change agenda promoted by government officials and 
epistemic communities. I also analyze fishers’ perceptions of environmental 
changes, I elaborate on fishers’ criticisms on the main factors causing such 
changes that implicitly challenge climate change narratives.  
 
1.3 Theoretical Perspectives 
This dissertation draws on narrative analysis as an overall approach to address 
my research questions. I use this method of inquiry as it has been used in 
political ecology, sociology, science and development studies. I also base my 
analysis on science and technology studies, from which I use two key concepts – 
boundary work and coproduction – to explain the science-policy intersection in 
the making of climate change policies.  
 
1.3.1 Narrative Analysis  
To explore my research questions I use narrative analysis as a methodological 
approach that facilitates the identification of the existence of competing 
interpretations of local changes, and with it, the recognition of potential material 
and non-material consequences of privileging certain frameworks and 
sidestepping others. Narratives, then, are means I use to elaborate on the 
analysis of (i) the making of policy problems and (ii) people’s accounts, 
understandings and meanings of their social world.3  
                                                 
3 Narrative analysis is based on numerous approaches that cut across several theoretical and 
disciplinary boundaries (Orbuch, 1997, p. 466). It emerged since the 1980s, but most 
predominatly since the “cultural turn” during the 1990s (Harling, 2010; Orbuch, 1997). Ewick and 
Silbey (1995) explain that there has been a proliferation of definitions of “narratives” in 
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In my research I do not intend to do a sociology of narrative, looking at 
narrativity as the object of inquiry in itself. I use it as a method of research, as a 
means and “mode of observation, a vantage from which the world can be seen or 
heard” (Ewick & Silbey, 1995, p. 203). I apply a sociological analysis when I write 
“accounts of accounts” produced by social subjects (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 15). As 
Laslett (1999) explains, figuring out what a narrative is constructed for is one task 
of sociological analysis (p. 392). It has also been argued that sociologists should 
be interested in narrative analysis since “narrative texts are packed with 
sociological information, and a great deal of our empirical evidence is in narrative 
form” (Franzosi, 1998, p. 517).  
A key sociological concept I use in my analysis of narratives is that of 
framings, a notion that is defined as “organizing devices that allow the selection 
and emphasis of topics to decide ‘what matters’ (Grundman & Stehr, 2010, p. 
904). My analysis of framings questions the various processes they carry out: 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and treatment 
recommendation for the problem (Grundman & Stehr, 2010). 
                                                                                                                                                 
sociological analysis. They identify, from these definitions, some key characteristics to be 
qualified as narrative. First, a narrative relies on some form of selective appropriation of past 
events and characters. Second, within a narrative the events must be temporally ordered, with a 
beginning, a middle, and an end. Third, the events and characters must be related to one another 
and to some overarching structure, often in the context of an opposition or struggle (Ewick and 
Silbey, 1995, p. 200). Roe (1991) characterizes development narratives using some of these 
characteristics as well. Meaningfulness and sociality are also identified as main characteristic 
dimensions of this concept; meaningfulness “indicates that narratives are not necessarily 
instances of ‘truth’ but rather what is important to the narrators” (Harling, 2010, p. 597). Orbuch 
(1997) explains that “narratives are ‘real’ events as presented, and narrative analysis pays 
special attention to the form, coherence, and structure of these stories” (p. 466). Sociality refers 
to the social and historical context in which narratives emerge as well as to the specific audience 
they aim to address (Harling, 2010, p. 597). 
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My dissertation is based on political ecology and environmental 
sociology,4 and their approaches to narratives that discuss the problems of 
adopting predominant frameworks of environmental change. Political ecology is a 
paradigm focused on explaining how power relations are reflected in conflicting 
perceptions, discourses and knowledge claims about nature. In this field, 
narratives have been defined as “simplified explanations of environmental cause 
and effect that emerge in contexts where environmental knowledge and social 
order are mutually dependent” (Forsyth & Walker, 2008, p. 17). Particular 
frameworks of environmental change, scholars argue, are used to justify 
interventions that are imposing prohibitions, regulations and practices on local 
communities (Fairhead & Leach 2000). Narratives, therefore, have material 
impacts on people’s lives, on government budgets, and on the allocation of 
international funding for local projects as well.  
Forsyth and Walker (2008) explain that in environmental studies, 
The term ‘narrative’ has been used to describe succinct summaries of 
environmental cause and effect that are seen as factual within popular 
debates or policy networks, but which are essentially based on highly 
selective participation in problem definition and knowledge production. 
                                                 
4 Environmental Sociology has been defined as “the study of interrelationships between society 
and the environment” (Humphrey, Lewis, & Buttel, 2003, p. 23). This field emerged between the 
late 1960s early 1970s, in the aftermath of the mobilization of the US environmental movements, 
and thus in response to the emergence of widespread societal attention to environmental 
problems.  The origin of environmental sociology was based on a critique of classical sociological 
thought and its anthropocentrism; a core idea in environmental sociology is the need to 
incorporate nature into the sociological analysis. We can say that the precursors focused on 
answering a core question, which Carolan (2005) indicates can be framed as follows: “what 
place, if any, should there be for the biophysical in sociology?” (p. 11). Buttel explains that “the 
basic essence of environmental sociology ‘has been to recover and uncover the ‘materiality’ of 
social structure and social life, and to do so in ways that yield insights relevant to solving 
environmental problems. Materiality, in this context, involves the dependence of human societies 
on natural resources and the biophysical condition necessary for human and nonhuman life” 
(quoted in Humphrey et al, 2003, p. 1).  
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As a result, environmental narratives frequently impose meanings that 
are acceptable to their creators or users, but which may contain 
unwelcome implications for other social actors (p. 17). 
 
This dissertation elaborates on these ideas, discussing the existence of a 
plurality of histories, voices and understandings of environmental change, which I 
argue, are challenging the definition of problems displayed within government 
narratives.  
The interrelation between language/narratives/discourses, and 
power/space/social order discussed by political ecologists has also been a core 
theme in sociological analysis. Critical discourse analysis, for example, highlights 
the centrality of language in power relations; it “investigates the category of 
discourse as a form of power and as an instrument of the social construction of 
‘reality’” (Marston, 2004, p. 37). These approaches focus on the “social and 
political context and relations of power that shape and are shaped by discourse” 
(Marston, 2004, p. 37). Narrative analysis is salient in the postempiricist analysis5 
of public policies, an approach that “focuses on the crucial role of language, 
discourse, rhetorical argument, and stories in framing both policy questions and 
the contextual contours of argumentation, particularly the ways normative 
presuppositions operate below the surface to structure basic policy definitions 
and understandings” (Fischer, 2003, p. 14).   
                                                 
5 Postempiricism is defined as an “epistemological orientation that seeks to move beyond an 
‘objectivist’ conception of reality” (Fischer, 2003, p. 12). This is a perspective that challenges 
neopositivist/empiricist methods which emphasize “rigorous quantitative analysis, the objective 
separation of facts and values, and the search for generalizable findings whose validity would be 
independent of the particular social context form which they were drawn” (Fischer, 2003, p. 4). 
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Orbuch (1997) explains that accounts, narratives or stories are all 
associated concepts that constitute “a major avenue for sociologists to depict and 
understand the ways in which individuals experience and identify with that 
meaning and their social world” (p. 455). In my dissertation, I use political 
economy as a perspective that informs the social, political and economic context 
from which individuals’ experiences emerge. I understand individuals’ 
experiences as the product of people’s interactions and dynamics within political 
and economic institutional settings that have historically shaped people’s 
perceptions and understandings of their social realities. In my research, then, I 
conceive of actors’ narratives, and the lives these narratives describe, as ideas 
that have been “shaped by relations of production and power, systems of 
language, symbols, beliefs, and cultures, as well as histories and geographies” 
(Laslett, 1999, p. 392). I adopt a concept of narratives that describes them as 
“socially organized phenomena which, accordingly, reflect the cultural and 
structural features of their production” (Ewick & Silbey, 1995, p. 200).6 
 
Subversive Narratives 
Ewick and Silbey (1995) highlight two important dimensions of the 
narrative analysis approach. The first is its epistemic dimension, since this is a 
methodological approach with “the capacity to reveal truths about the social 
world that are flattened or silenced” by traditional social science methods (p. 
                                                 
6 These characteristics and definitions of narratives differ from other associated concepts such as 
accounts that as Orbuch (1997) explains, were used in early sociological studies – and influenced 
by ethnomethodology and social psychology scholars – “to understand deviance or disruptions in 
social interaction and the consequences of accounts for the nature and maintenance of that 
interaction” (p. 458). 
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199). This characteristic has also been highlighted by other scholars, who argue 
that narrative analysis goes beyond the instrumental rationality predominant in 
policy research, based on empirically based rational decision methods (Fischer, 
2003, p. 10) that privilege data and measurement at the expense of meaning and 
context (Marston, 2004). Sociologists using microsociological approaches point 
out the relevance of narrative analysis in emphasizing temporality, contextuality 
and subjectivity – characteristics that from other perspectives may represent the 
very flaws of this approach to explain social problems (Laslett, 1999, p. 400).  
The second important characteristic is its political dimension, since 
narrative analysis identifies and interprets actors’ material and symbolic 
struggles. It is an approach that allows us to understand the many factors 
accounting for narratives becoming hegemonic – reproducing existing relations of 
power and inequity – and subversive stories that challenge such hegemony “by 
making visible and explicit the connections between particular lives and social 
organization” (Ewick and Silbey, 1995, p. 197). Moreover, through narrative 
analysis one is able to map and identify perspectives that are otherwise obscure 
or overlooked within predominant frameworks and story-lines. 
 In my case study, narrative analysis has allowed me to recognize the 
existence of a variety of perspectives and accounts, of “counternarratives” 
(Batterbury et al., 1997; Fairhead & Leach, 1995; Fairhead & Leach, 2000; Roe, 
1995) which implicitly question how problems are defined and by whom, but 
more importantly, which problems count in the first place. Furthermore, scholars 
argue that the identification and construction of counternarratives to predominant 
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views can better inform policies that are going to impact peoples’ lives (Forsyth, 
2003). Narrative analysis, then, potentially represents a tool researchers may use 
to make counterviews socially visible, to enhance their “subversive and 
transformative potential” (Ewick & Silbey, 1995). 
It is important, however, to state that narrative analysis may also show us 
the existence of continuities or a reinforcement of predominant or hegemonic 
ideas that are reproduced by agents. People’s narratives, then, are not always 
counterhegemonic, but may unintentionally serve as vehicle to reproduce 
existing meanings, understandings and perceptions. Another form we may find, 
as my case shows, is the existence of narratives that do not necessarily always 
engage with dominant narratives. Sometimes fishers’ narratives engage with 
global climate change frameworks, specifically in identifying what is climate 
change and how it manifests at a global scale. In other accounts, however, like in 
the case of explaining local environmental changes, fisher’s views rely on their 
own history and politics to elaborate counter-accounts. Narrative analysis then, 
may provide rich reflections not only of the many challenges actors encounter 
but, most importantly, of actors’ agency and the resources they may potentially 
mobilize to articulate alternative discourses, narratives, and ideas to transform 
their social reality.  
 
Critical Perspectives on Climate Change Narratives 
More generally, my analysis of narratives is informed by the literature on critical 
perspectives on climate change, which highlights the various equity and human 
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rights implications of using global frameworks that are redefining problems and 
identities, and how in this process local inhabitants’ perspectives and voices are 
being misrepresented (Cameron, 2012; Bravo, 2009; Felli & Castree, 2012; 
Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Hartmann, 2010). As I discuss further in this 
dissertation, my analysis resonates with the discussion that climate change 
scholars explore when they analyze how climate change narratives are imprinting 
particular meanings onto highly problematic concepts. These critical approaches 
– predominantly addressed by sociologists, geographers and anthropologists – 
highlight the potential social, political and economic implications dominant 
frameworks of environmental change might convey to local actors.  
 Cameron (2012) for example, discusses how global narratives are 
defining Indigenous peoples and communities in terms of their attributes as 
“local” and “traditional”, attributing new social representations to local inhabitants 
as “victims” or ”climate refugees.” Scholars argue that such categories distort 
historical social processes that communities have experienced for generations, 
such as migration (Farbotko & Lazrus 2012) or the overexploitation of natural 
resources by extractive economies such as in the case of Tabasco. Hartmann 
(2010) criticizes the use of the concept of “environmental refugee,” for example, 
because “it naturalises the economic and political causes of environmental 
degradation and masks the role of institutional responses to it” (p. 235). Bravo 
(2009) explains that global change narratives are “constructing a new Arctic 
regional identity,” in which citizens “are portrayed as being an at-risk community, 
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a victimised community lacking the agency to fight back, and the keepers of 
valuable traditional knowledge” (p. 258).  
There have been additional criticisms of how the climate change global 
discourses have framed vulnerability7 particularly in developing regions, that 
portray people and regions as passive and helpless actors, as weak, powerless, 
unstable and marginal, in the need of external help – ideas that are re-creating 
pre-existing colonial representations in those regions (Barnett & Campbell 2010). 
Barnett & Campbell (2010) argue that 
It is not our argument that the Pacific Islands do not face serious risks arising 
from climate change, but we do argue that the mantra of vulnerability is 
problematic, can be counterproductive, and so needs to be used with caution 
and with a sensibility to its negative connotations (p. 99). 
 
However, as these authors recognize, “outsiders” are not the only ones 
representing these sites and their people as vulnerable. National leaders are also 
strategically appropriating and mobilizing this discourse and its many 
representations in international forums – so these nations can have a voice that 
call for the need to reduce emissions and to negotiate adaptation funding as well 
(Barnett & Campbell, 2010, p. 166). Other scholars argue that it is important to 
distinguish the existence of different framings of vulnerability, not necessarily 
because they define it differently, but because they are “fundamentally” defining 
the climate change problem. They “are manifestations of different discourses on 
climate change – discourses that not only represent different approaches to 
                                                 
7 Fussel (2007) explains that “[t]he ordinary use of the word ‘vulnerability’ refers to the capacity to 
be wounded, i.e., the degree to which a system is likely to experience harm due to exposure to a 
hazard” (p. 155). 
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science, but also different political responses to climate change” (O’Brien, 
Eriksen, Nygaard, & Schjolden, 2007, p. 74). 
 For some scholars, the IPCC climate change framework is reconfiguring 
new discourses and policy approaches to poverty and development. Chandler 
(2010) argues that under an “adaptation agenda” the key question in terms of 
policy-intervention is not “are you reducing poverty? But, are you decreasing 
people’s vulnerability to climate change?” (p. 162). He argues that, this agenda 
“brings together the concerns of poverty reduction and responses to climate 
change by understanding poverty not in terms of income, or in relation to social 
and economic development, but in terms of ‘vulnerability to climate change’” 
(Chandler, 2010, p. 163). As I discuss further in this dissertation, climate change 
researchers second those criticisms by questioning whether adaptation 
strategies are addressing the underlying factors that are causing vulnerability in 
poor communities, or if those initiatives are just focusing on responding to the 
impacts of climate change (Schipper, 2007; Christoplos, Anderson, Arnold, 
Hedger, Klein, & Le Goulven, 2009; Parry, Hammill, & Drexhage, 2005). 
In particular, my dissertation echoes some of the few analyses on 
adaptation initiatives in Mexico which highlight inequality and power relations, 
and criticize the technological approach to climate change (McEvoy & Wilder, 
2012; Manuel-Navarrete, Pelling, & Redclift, 2011). McEvoy & Wilder (2012) 
analyze the Arizona–Sonora binational desalination project, an adaptation 
initiative, concluding that 
Our critical risk analysis shows that the associated (and unintended and 
under-examined) consequences of desalination are likely to exacerbate 
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existing inequalities and introduce new vulnerabilities by compounding the 
water-energy nexus, increasing greenhouse gas emissions, inducing 
urban growth, producing brine discharge and chemical pollutants, shifting 
geopolitical relations of water security, and increasing water prices (p. 
361). 
 
The authors criticize that the desalination project represents a technological fix to 
the water problem, putting aside more structural measures such as conservation 
measures, or addressing issues that may “question the growth paradigm that 
drives regional water policy” (McEvoy & Wilder 2012, p. 358). In their study on 
adaptation to hurricanes in the Mexican Caribbean, Manuel-Navarrete et al. 
(2011) analyze the existence of a prevalent vision supporting mass tourism 
growth and favor technical “band aid” adaptation solutions such as the building of 
robust hotels, implementing beach restoration technology and improving early 
warning systems. This approach to adaptation, they argue, “increases social 
inequalities, degrades ecosystems, and amplifies overall exposure to extreme 
events” (Manuel-Navarrete et al., 2011, p. 249). My research also draws on the 
vulnerability literature that points at the multiple factors determining climate 
change vulnerability and adaptation in Mexico (Liverman, 1990; Liverman & 
O’Brien, 1991; Eakin, 2005; Tucker, Eakin, & Castellanos, 2010).   
My approach to environmental narratives has also been informed by 
environmental sociology scholarship that discusses how environmental issues 
are problematized and considers “the social authority of different claims about 
the environment” (Woodgate, 1997, p. 1). In particular, my discussion of 
government narratives draws on the literature that elaborates on the construction 
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of global truth and rights regimens of the environment and natural resource use; 
on the making of hegemonic forms of rationality that translate into new effects of 
government; and with regard to the ways in which environmental science is 
constructed so as to target populations, production practices, and behaviours, 
vis-à-vis nature (Goldman, 2004; Taylor & Buttel, 1992). Key topics in this 
analysis are the production of local environmental knowledge by indigenous 
populations, the variation of knowledge across classes, gender, age, and the 
question of who generates and applies knowledge and for what aims. I analyze 
environmental sociologists’ debates about “how environmental knowledge is 
constructed and deployed by different stakeholders in environmental debates” 
(Woodgate, 1997, p. 2). 
This dissertation relies also on discussions in environmental sociology and 
related approaches that challenge existing approaches to intellectual and 
scientific inquiry that historically have been universalist, that have ignored the 
heterogeneity and difference inherent in social reality (Gandy, 1997; Watts & 
Peet, 2004; Darier, 1995). As Gandy (1997) explains, this critique conveys “a 
greater sensitivity to the limits of knowledge and to the need to open up 
intellectual debate to a broader array of actors and perspectives”   (p. 154). My 
research engages this debate by illustrating the existence of a plurality of 
interpretations about nature and local environmental changes.  
Finally, my analysis of narratives is broadly informed by Mexican political 
ecology scholarship that critically elaborates on the interconnection between 
dominant capitalist rationalities and the deterioration of environmental 
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degradation, on the crisis of productive-driven rationalities and knowledge 
systems that support economic growth strategies that externalize ecological 
impacts (Leff, 1994; Lezama 2004). In their analysis, scholars highlight the need 
to shift towards the construction of a new productive rationality, to an “alternative 
modernity” based on universal values such as social equality and an ecological 
sustainability (Leff, 1994, p. 12). This dissertation is also influenced by Mexican 
anthropological studies of the society-nature relationship, which analyze how 
factors such as culture, politics and economy shapes local inhabitants’ 
perceptions of nature, of natural resources use and access, and of the social 
organization necessary to manage them (Toledo & Argueta, 1993; Paré, 1995). 
My analysis of the interrelation between fishers and their resources has been 
influenced by studies in political anthropology that look at conflicts of interest 
among various stakeholders, analyzing power relations and historical processes 
by which actors are constituted, their territories, their identity, their practices and 
interests that give rise to conflicting socio-political projects on the ground (Paz, 
2002; Paz & Vázquez, 2002).  
 
1.3.2 The Making of Policy Problems 
My research elaborates on ideas from policy analysis, development studies and 
Science and Technology Studies (S&TS), which analyze the interrelation of 
politics and knowledge and the “inherently normative and interpretive character 
of policy problems” (Fischer, 2003, p. 11). Scholars from these fields look at the 
processes and contexts through which policy problems are “naturalized” 
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(Marston, 2004). A core argument both fields share is the questioning of the 
“value neutrality” of policy problems and the science on which these rely.  
 
1.3.2.1 Expert Knowledge Legitimating Climate Change Interventions 
The analysis of climate change narratives sheds light on the intersection between 
knowledge production and policy-making. S&TS scholars argue that the science 
and politics of climate change are not separate domains, but rather that they are 
strongly intertwined because, as Demeritt (2001) explains: “Not only has the 
science of climate change largely driven national and international politics of 
climate change, the politics in turn have also influenced the practice of that 
science” (p. 308).  
S&TS scholars have examined how science has become the dominant 
frame, or “epistemic authority,” for understanding climate change (Edwards, 
2001; Miller & Edwards, 2001; Jasanoff, 1996; Jamison, 1996; Norton & Suppe, 
2001; Yearly, 1996). Climate change has not only been “unveiled” by science but 
also – since the mid-1980s – has been considered one of the most important 
environmental problems to be solved worldwide. However, it is important to 
highlight that S&TS scholars have also pointed out that this strategic role of 
science and scientists in the making of the international climate change regime 
has been questioned around the world (Miller, 2001, p. 478). Miller explains that 
different actors – scholars, non-governmental organizations – have raised 
important contentious issues such as: “What counts as legitimate knowledge? 
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Who speaks for nature? How much power and authority should be accorded to 
science relative to other modes of knowing and deciding?” (Miller, 2001, p. 479). 
S&TS studies have also analyzed the role of political institutions as 
important agents in posing problems to be solved, as well as in determining the 
nature of the techniques of management and control to be used in the process of 
researching such issues (Jasanoff & Wynne, 1998, p. 5). Demeritt (2001) 
explains that in the process of promoting “science for policy,” governments are 
also shaping “the formulation of research questions, choice of methods, 
standards of proof, and the definition of other aspect of ‘good’ scientific practice” 
(p. 308). In this dissertation I analyze the role of governments in using science as 
an authoritative source to legitimize state interventions. I illustrate how scientists’ 
influence in framing problems and decision-making processes are importantly 
determined and constrained by state power. My work aims to contribute to 
understandings of the science-policy interface by discussing how government 
officials – the “fourth government branch” (Jasanoff, 1990, p. 3) – and institutions 
enhance or restrict scientists’ roles – or technical experts, the “fifth branch” 
(Jasanoff, 1990, p. 3) – in framing problems and their solutions.  
According to Yearley (1996) “environmental policymaking has turned out 
to be a particularly favorable arena for the operation of science advisers because 
many environmental problems have only been drawn to our attention in the first 
place through the specific cognitive apparatus of science” (p. 198).  However, in 
this dissertation I discuss and question this role attributed to scientific advisers. 
By looking at the government sphere, my work puts the role of scientists into 
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perspective: I argue that even though the role of scientists is key, the role of 
government officials in framing and presenting the climate change problem 
publicly has been just as important. Government officials decide how and what 
kind of scientific data they are going to use to present and frame the problem, 
putting forward their own views on how to frame the issue. In my study the voices 
of scientists have not always been incorporated in government climate change 
narratives and initiatives, regarding for example (i) scientists’ understanding of 
some characteristics of the climate change problem and solutions, as well as 
their interests in preserving scientific accuracy in what has been said about the 
problem; (ii) their concern in highlighting issues of climate change predictions 
and; (iii) their use of alternative scientific frameworks to explain environmental 
changes – such as coastal erosion – that government narratives attribute to 
climate change. In what follows, I analyze this problem by applying three 
concepts used in S&TS studies: boundary work, epistemic communities and 
coproduction. 
 
Boundary Work 
Boundary work is a concept used in science studies to describe the process by 
which scientists aim to legitimate their work and separate it from other types of 
knowledge and agents – from non-scientific/expert knowledge and from 
governments. It has been defined as 
the attribution of selected characteristics to the institution of science (i.e., 
to its practitioners, methods, stock of knowledge, values and work 
organization) for purposes of constructing a social boundary that 
33 
 
distinguishes some intellectual activity as non-science (Gieryn, 1983, p. 
782). 
Miller explains that boundary work also intends to separate “scientific and 
political domains of authority and action” (Miller, 2004, p. 59); or as Gieryn (1983) 
explains, it is forged with the aim “to protect the autonomy of scientific research 
form political interference,” among other objectives (p. 781). Boundary work 
“occurs as people contend for, legitimate, or challenge the cognitive authority of 
science – and the credibility, prestige, power, and material resources that attend 
such a privileged position” (Gieryn, 1995, p. 405). 
Although this is a concept that explains scientists’ practices, in my 
dissertation I use it to show how government officials are actively doing boundary 
work. My case illustrates that scientists are not the only agents making 
“ideological efforts” to separate themselves from other spaces and actors. 
Government officials, who are providing the institutional setting and conditions, 
reinforce this process as well. I argue that boundary work is strategically 
promoted in governmental spheres as part of the process of legitimating climate 
change interventions based on scientific facts. “Purification” (Latour 1993) is a 
necessary step towards the accomplishment of that goal.  
In Mexico, the majority of provinces and some municipal governments are 
designing Climate Change Programs – as part of the Mexican government’s 
international commitments and climate change agenda – with the main goal of 
evaluating vulnerability to climate change and proposing mitigation and 
adaptation policies and projects. The government leads this process and with it 
establishes the conditions for the emergence of boundary work. 
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Mexican governments do boundary work through the establishment of 
committees that design and propose climate change plans and initiatives. Within 
these committees – constituted by sectors such as entrepreneurs, non-
governmental organizations, and government agencies – it has been the 
scientific group who has been assigned the task to diagnose the problem and its 
possible solutions. In this case, the process of attributing to science “a cognitive 
authority” (Gieryn, 1995, p. 405) is an important step in the process of 
legitimating government interventions. The boundary made between scientists 
and other actors delimits who has the right to speak about climate change, to 
define it and to provide solutions. Outside of the boundary delimited by 
government agencies are non-expert agents (some local non-governmental 
organizations) whose understanding of the climate change problem is 
contentious and problematic for government authorities. As I explain further, 
outside of the boundary are also other kinds of experts – e.g. geologists – who 
provide different scientific frameworks to explain environmental changes.  
 
Epistemic Communities 
In Mexico, climate change is an issue that responds to an international agenda 
that requires an active mobilization of public efforts to fulfill the many 
commitments the government has acquired. As part of various strategies to 
reach its goals, the government has been instrumental in providing the conditions 
for the formation of a national epistemic community (Hass, 1989) that supports 
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the generation of knowledge and narratives that sustain the climate change 
agenda. 
The concept of epistemic communities elaborates on how experts use 
authority to persuade other people to adopt ideas and to agree to create new 
environmental regimes (Miller, 2001, p. 248). Studies of epistemic communities, 
Miller and Edward explain, “identify the authoritative knowledge claims of experts 
as a significant ‘power resource’ in influencing the construction of environmental 
regimes” (Miller & Edward, 2001, p. 4).  This approach explains that “new forms 
of social order emerge from the development of shared ideas among government 
officials, scientists, and citizens around the planet” (Miller, 2001, p. 248). 
However, this approach is challenged by scholars (Miller & Edwards, 
2001; Miller, 2001; Jasanoff, 2001) who explore the emergence of ideas but also 
“how particular ideas come to be shared in the first place” (Miller, 2001, p. 249). 
Miller (2001) explains that “rarely do people adopt convergent ideas and then 
decide to band together in communities or form new institutions; rather, they 
come to share ideas as a result of social interactions that help constitute the 
community in the first place” (p. 249). The key argument, then, is that ideas do 
not emerge in a vacuum but are part of a web of institutions and practices that 
allow the emergence of such communities. In this case study the government 
has been a key actor in the creation and coordination of networks and institutions 
in which social interactions are taking place. The Mexican experience reinforces 
S&TS perspectives that suggest environmental problems such as climate change 
emerge from an interplay of scientific discovery and description with 
other political, economic and social forces. Persuasive accounts of 
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environmental phenomena are constructed, according to this view, by 
myriad social interactions, encompassing not only the diverse activities 
and practices of scientific communities, but also the work of nonscientific 
actors and institutions in defining problems and endorsing solutions 
(Jasnoff & Wynne, 1998, p. 3- 4). 
 
1.3.2.2 The Science-to-Policy Framework in Climate Change Research 
The role of scientific expertise in making and legitimating claims about climate 
change have also been analyzed by scholars discussing the science-politics 
interrelation within the IPCC. Beck (2011) argues that the IPCC is based on a 
“linear model of expertise” in which the science-politics interrelation is conceived 
as “unidimensional, linear, and one-way: from science to policy” (p. 298), as it is 
in the classic model “truth (facts) speaks to power (values)” (Jasanoff & Wynne, 
1998, p. 8).  This model is based on the assumption that “knowledge is a 
necessary (if not sufficient) basis for decision-making” (Beck, 2011, p. 298). Beck 
(2011) explains that this model conveys propositions such as that: (i) more 
research will necessarily lead to more certainty (the linearity of knowledge 
production); (ii) more and better science will help solve political disagreements 
(science as harmonizing force); and (iii) science makes evidence-based policies 
(p. 298). This model assumes a “positivist understanding of science’s relationship 
to politics” (Carter, 2013, p. 26) holding classic assumptions of the separation of 
science from politics where “[v]alue judgments [are] thought to be limited to 
politics, whereby the provision of scientific advice [is] understood to be value-free 
and scientists politically neutral” (Carter, 2013, p. 26). 
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Scholars explain that the adoption of this model responds to the fact that 
the very emergence, positioning and consolidation of climate change in global 
politics have been determined by their promoters’ capacity to provide sound 
science data to validate the existence and impacts of climate change vis a vis 
global-warming skeptics (Beck, 2011; Edwards, 2001; Norton & Suppe, 2001; 
Shakley & Wynne, 1996). Therefore, scientific-expertise has been the basis that 
sustains climate change claims and this includes the strategic use of scientific 
data and devices.  
The creation of computer models as boundary objects has been 
instrumental in efforts to posit climate change in policy design (Edwards, 2001, p. 
54). Boundary objects are “relatively stable and reproducible things, people, 
projects, texts, maps, and ideas that facilitate the articulation between different 
actors or ‘social worlds’” (Shakley & Wynne, 1996, p. 279). Computer models, 
maps and indexes, are among the various boundary objects created as climate 
change emerged and was positioned as a global problem. Edwards (2001) 
highlights these objects’ relevance when he argues that without computer models 
“we would be unable to understand the climate system as a single, integrate 
whole, and discern the effects of policy decision” (p. 42). Therefore, as Norton 
and Suppe (2001) explain, computer models are “absolutely essential in the 
efforts of atmospheric scientists to represent the earth’s climate and its possible 
evolution” (p. 67). Hulme (2010) describes the emergence of the first global-
mean temperature index as another key object in the making of global knowledge 
claims that has also been instrumental in policy-making because it “offers a 
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number around which the normative goals of international climate diplomacy can 
be stabilised: witness the citation in the Copenhagen Accord of 2 degrees 
Celsius as the increase in global-average temperature below which climate 
change ‘should be’ limited” (p. 560). Measurement of greenhouse gas emissions 
is another boundary object with “high political significance” since it is a means 
“for assigning blame for changes in the climate and therefore for assigning 
responsibility” to take action (Miller, 2001, p. 489). 
S&TS scholars have criticized the IPCC science-to-policy framework. 
Rather than conceive such interface as a “one-directional knowledge transfer 
from science to policy” (Wesselink, Buchanan, Georgiadou, & Turnhout, 2013, p. 
2) these scholars argue that policy is immersed in a coproduction process where 
the “scientific and political order are simultaneously created and recreated so as 
to sustain each other through complex rituals of interdependence” (Jasanoff, 
Markle, Petersen, & Pinch, 1995, p. 527). Coproduction is an approach that helps 
us  
avoid the trap of imagining that activities taking place in those domains 
labeled as ‘scientific’ are somehow free of concerns about values, power, 
and order, while activities taking place in domains labeled as ‘political’ are 
somehow not involved in the production of knowledge... Science is surely 
political in the sense that its activities shape the distribution of power in 
modern societies (Miller, 2001, p. 482). 
 
Coproduction then points to the existence of a dual process referred to as the 
“scienticization” of policy on one hand, and the “politization of science” on the 
other (Huitema & Turnhout, 2009).  This dissertation aims to analyze this dual 
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process by discussing the role of state agencies and officials as key agents in the 
instrumental promotion of science and scientists, and in restraining and orienting 
their actions. As I discuss in this dissertation, there are some government 
practices that at times position the government as a key agent in shaping climate 
change discourses, representations and practices. In this context, knowledge 
claims are not translated directly into political decisions and scientists are not 
“the ultimate power holders” but “it is the governments that decide which policy to 
develop and which knowledge to use” (Grundmann, 2007, p. 416).  
 
1.3.2.3 State Power in Coproduction Processes 
Ethnography of development provides a perspective that illustrates an interesting 
characteristic of the interface science-policy: the role of power relations. Mosse 
(2005) argues that policy recipients or “beneficiaries” shape development 
interventions through practices. In this case I define scientists as “policy-
recipients” since they are receiving public funds for conducting policy-oriented 
research commissioned by government agencies. Scholars state that it is 
important to recognize the important role of policy beneficiaries, their 
“collaboration and complicity,” since they “understand and manipulate the 
rhetoric, rules and rewards of aid delivery” (Mosse & Lewis 2006, p. 4). In my 
case, scientists are actively involved in policy-making since they are defining 
problems and solutions, or as Mosse puts it, they “establish rules and norms, 
develop strategies and form judgments” about climate change initiatives (Mosse 
2004, 658). Therefore they are not passive but active actors shaping policy 
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through their practices. However, as Mosse explains, we need also to recognize 
the prevalence of power relations in policy-making: 
 [w]hile this [recipients shaping policies] is true, the problem is that it 
does away with the asymmetries of power that ensure the need to 
register desires and aspirations, to retain legitimacy, to access resources 
and reputation by translating one set of thought-actions into another – 
the capacity for which is unevenly distributed (Mosse, 2004, p. 658).  
 
Therefore I argue that it is important to recognize the existence of “asymmetries 
of power” while analyzing processes of coproduction. Scientists’ participating in 
climate change initiatives by providing data and doing analysis are not 
necessarily determining how to present and frame the problem, who participates, 
or what issues should be prioritized; some of their proposals to address the 
problem are not integrated as part of government narratives either.  
 
1.3.3 State Interventions in Development Studies 
This dissertation discusses some characteristics of state interventions –
specifically “improvement” schemes (Li, 2007) – in the light of theories and 
perspectives from development studies. It also draws on studies that analyze the 
rationale of government interventions, which look at “what they seek to change, 
and the calculations they apply” (Li, 2007, p. 1). 
Models and Practices 
My general approach to development draws on ethnographies of development 
that highlight the need to look at the relationship between models, on one hand, 
and the practices, events, and material outcomes that these models are 
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expected to generate or legitimize, on the other. Scholars from this perspective 
(Olivier de Sardan, 2005; Mosse, 2005; Mosse & Lewis, 2006) point to the need 
to look at “the social life of projects, organizations and professionals, the diversity 
of interests behind policy models and the perspective of actors themselves” 
(Mosse & Lewis, 2006, p. 5). This perspective highlights the relevance of 
analyzing the way written initiatives are implemented and negotiated on the 
ground; in this approach, scholars do not take for granted the existence of a 
direct and nonfluid relationship between theory and practice, but they look at the 
many ways those ideas can unfold in practice.  
I analyze climate change interventions as development discourses.8 
Deconstructivist approaches define development as a historic discursive 
formation that emerges from certain forms of knowledge and that produces 
particular forms of subjectivities (Escobar, 1995, p.10). From this perspective, 
based on Foucaultian notions of power and discourse, development discourses 
are conceived as practices (Ferguson, 1994, p. 18). They are discourses that 
result “in concrete practices of thinking and acting through which the Third World 
is produced” (Escobar, 1995, p. 11). From an ethnographic perspective, 
discourses of development are also conceived as “practice and theory – material 
activity which transforms nature and society and the modes of thought that inform 
this action” (Gasper and Apthorpe, 1996, p. 4). From these perspectives, then, it 
is clear that there is a need to go beyond the idea of discourses as ideological 
                                                 
8 Hajer and Versteeg (2005) define discourse as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories 
through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and 
reproduced through and identifiable set of practices” (p. 175).  
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statements and to explore how they are produced, put into practice and the kind 
of intended or “unintended” results they generate (Ferguson, 1994).  
My analysis also draws on studies of development narratives that explore 
how certain narratives persist over time, and have a predominant position even 
though some facts in the field evidence their failure (Scott, 1998; Roe, 1991). I 
adopt Roe’s approach to development narratives. He explains that they 
tell scenarios not so much about what should happen as about what will 
happen according to their tellers – if the events or positions are carried out 
as described. Even when their truth-value is in question, these narratives 
are explicitly more programmatic than myths and have the objective of 
getting their hearers to believe or do something (Roe, 1991, p. 228). 
 
This dissertation reconstructs the story-lines implicit and explicit in government 
initiatives and texts, as well as in verbal narratives, and considers the definition of 
problems and events that are justifying government interventions. It identifies the 
process of simplification (Scott, 1998) taken up within projects so government 
officials can structure the unstructured social reality they aim to change.  
My research also relies on scholarship on development interventions. In 
particular I illustrate their “anti-political” nature, a process by which complex 
political issues become depoliticized and reduced to technical problems 
(Ferguson, 1994, p. 267). Li (2007) uses the idea of “rendering technical” to refer 
to mechanisms through which experts and policy-makers “exclude the structure 
of political-economic relations from their diagnoses and prescriptions” (p. xx). I 
discuss these concepts in light of fieldwork findings indicating the existence of 
competing views about environmental changes embedded in conflicting 
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relationships between fishermen and the oil industry. I analyze climate change 
government narratives that on one hand recognize the existence of historical 
economic, political and environmental processes explaining the emergence of 
environmental changes and vulnerability to climatic changes, but that on the 
other hand are proposing solutions devoid of mechanisms to address structural 
causes and that ignore the historical local contexts in which these initiatives are 
going to take place.  
In this same line of analysis, I use Scott’s ideas on processes of “legibility” 
and “simplification” in which state interventions design “large-scale social 
engineering” initiatives (Scott, 1998, p. 5). As a result, such initiatives are “more 
static and schematic than the actual social phenomena they presume to typify” 
(Scott, 1998, p. 46). I analyze how simplification takes shape through climate 
change initiatives and the “unintended” (Ferguson, 1994) political and social 
consequences of such “narrow visions” of social relations and processes (Scott, 
1998).  
Finally, it is important to explain that in my interpretations of climate 
change narratives, and of fishers, government officials and scientists’ multiple 
interrelations, I use a Foucaultian notion of power. Foucault explains that power 
is not possessed or held, but rather circulates via networks that work through and 
produce different bodies, discourses, institutions and practices (Rutherford, 
2007). Power is located and exercised from and through countless sites, 
practices, agents, discourses and institutions. Foucault states that power cannot 
be seen as emanating only from above. Rather, it comes from below working 
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through webs of different power relations. Foucault invites us to de-center the 
role of the state; the process of government, “the conduct of conduct,” is, rather, 
adopted by a wide range of social actors (Agrawal, 2005).  
In particular, I use this poststructuralist idea of power in my analysis of 
subject-making. However, in my analysis I consider subjects not as a pre-existing 
category; I argue that subjects are not only a product of discourses but they are 
also agents that act back, that hold counternarratives and have practices that 
challenge “dominant” discourses of environmental changes. Therefore, I adopt 
Long’s definition (1990) of social actors as entities that 
are not simply seen as disembodied social categories (based on class or 
some other classificatory criteria) or passive recipients of intervention, 
but active participants who process information and strategize in their 
dealings with various local actors as well as with outside institutions and 
personnel (p. 7).  
 
This dissertation analyzes the complex means and ways of how interactions 
among actors take place, as well as the historic processes that have shaped 
actors’ perspectives and practices.  
 
1.4 Thesis Organization 
In the next chapter (2) I first explain the methodology, fieldwork instruments, and 
organization plan implemented during my research. I also conduct a detailed 
analysis of the methods and epistemological positions adopted to interpret my 
research findings. In Chapters 3 and 4 I present a close analysis of communities’ 
findings. Chapter 3 is divided in two sections. In the first section I explain the 
origin of climate change within the government agenda and highlight some of the 
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most relevant characteristics of the process of positioning climate change in 
government policies and initiatives. In the second section I introduce my case 
study, the political-economic context of the coastal communities and region in 
which this dissertation is based. I present a detailed characterization of these 
sites, with special focus on fishers and their organization.  
In Chapter 4 I discuss how coastal erosion is explained and understood in 
government, scientific and fishers’ narratives. I analyze the implications of 
adopting climate change frameworks to explain local changes such as coastal 
erosion. Chapter 5 is dedicated to identifying the characteristics of an emergent 
development/climate change narrative. I base my analysis on some of the 
problems pointed out in government documents that discuss coastal 
communities’ conditions and risks under climate change scenarios. I discuss the 
governments’ adaptation measures proposed in projects and policies in light of 
local political and environmental problems discussed with local fishers and 
authorities. 
Chapter 6 offers a broader characterization of climate change government 
narratives and scientists’ perspectives at the national level. I analyze contentious 
topics identified by scientists during my interviews – which have also been 
discussed in international climate change organizations, and taken up by climate 
change scholars. Finally, Chapter 7 is dedicated to discussing the conclusions of 
this study. Here I take up my research questions to guide the discussion on the 
implications of using global climate change frameworks to explain local 
environmental changes. 
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CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodology I used in the development of this 
dissertation. In the first section I describe the network of actors on which this 
research is based and in the second section I discuss my dissertation’s 
approach. 
 
2.2 Case Study Analysis 
This dissertation is based on case study analysis – one of the research strategies 
used in social qualitative and quantitative analysis. A case study is “a specific 
approach or strategy that can be used as a unit of analysis and also the means 
by which data have been gathered, organized, and presented” (Wolff, 2007, p. 
32). In this research I employed a multi-method approach; I conducted 
interviews, analyzed archival materials and planning documents, and also 
engaged in direct participant observation. My research included one exploratory 
fieldwork stage in May-June 2011 and two fieldwork periods, the first in 
November-December 2011, and the second in May-July 2012. Table 1 shows the 
total number of interviews carried out during these periods and the types of 
actors included in this study: 
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Table 1. Total number of interviews during three fieldwork stages (2011 and 
2012). People interviewed from local, provincial and national communities, 
government institutions and organizations. 
 
Actors Number of 
Interviews 
Fishers from five communities 90 
Leaders of fishers and the local community 8 
Government Officials  14 
Scientists  13 
Non-governmental organizations 6 
Private Consultants 1 
Journalists 1 
Total  133 
 
This research looks at three particular networks: I) coastal communities – 
specifically the groups of fishers; II) the government – national and provincial – 
and its policies and programs and; III) the community of experts and scientists 
who are working in the Gulf of Mexico and are members of academic institutions 
and non-governmental organizations. 
 
Coastal Communities in the Gulf of Mexico 
This case study analysis is based on five coastal communities in the Southern 
Mexican State of Tabasco, in the Gulf of Mexico (Figure 1). Tabasco is located in 
the delta of two of the most important basins of the country; due to its extension 
and the volume of water it produces (33% of the national freshwater production), 
this delta is one of the most important in North America, and is the seventh most 
important worldwide (Mendoza, Arevalo, & Inda-Diaz, 2013, p. 120). It is a humid 
tropical lowland region, with extensive swamps and lagoons: 28% of Tabasco’s 
territory constitutes wetlands and 53% of Mexico’s freshwater swamps are 
located in this province (Barba, Rangel, & Ramos, 2006). A large percentage of 
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its territory is situated 10 meters above sea level, and large parts of coastal 
wetlands are located at -1 meters below sea level (Gama, 2008, p. 7). 
Approximately 30% of the territory – grazing marsh – is periodically inundated 
(Gama, 2008) (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 1. Site of the Study, Province of Tabasco, in the Gulf of Mexico, Mexico. 
 
Source: Modified from Wikimedia Commons. 2014. 
 
Gulf of Mexico 
Tabasco 
Pacific Ocean 
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Figure 2. Wetland vegetation in the study region.  
 
 
 
The coastal communities are located on a barrier island, defined as the 
“elongated, shore-parallel accumulations of unconsolidated sediment… that are 
separated from the mainland by bays, lagoons, or wetland complexes” (Hayes, 
2005, p. 117). These communities are located on a long tiny strip of land that 
divides the sea from three continuous coastal lagoons. These communities are 
essentially settled on a kind of island, because along the strip there are two 
openings – one natural and the other artificial – at each extreme end of the 
territory (Figure 3 and 4).   
50 
 
Figure 3. Map of Tabasco, the Study Site and of the Carmen-Pajonal-Machona Lacunar System. 
Source: INEGI. 2014 
Figure 4. Map of the Carmen-Pajonal-Machona Lacunar System and Study Area  
 
Source: Gutierrez & Galaviz 1983. 
Study Site 
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The research site for my study was selected based on three important 
factors: a) this region has been characterized as “highly vulnerable” to climate 
change due to coastal erosion; b) these communities are located in an area that 
historically has been affected by the Mexican oil industry and; c) these 
communities are part of an area located within a coastal wetland – a coastal 
lagoon – which is one of eight pilot sites that the Mexican government selected 
for the implementation of adaptation projects with the aim to “decrease the 
coastal region’s vulnerability” to climate change (Buenfil, 2009). 
 Scientists and government officials identified and defined these 
communities as places “highly vulnerable” to climate change impacts. This 
vulnerability, it was explained, was based on high rates of coastal erosion, a 
phenomenon resulting from sea-level rise. This was the fundamental criteria to 
select the case, since my core research question was precisely to understand 
how actors – government officials, scientists – defined and framed climate 
change; the fact that they define a specific site as vulnerable to that particular 
environmental change allows me to identify and discuss the factors and 
characteristics they attribute to climate change, how they understand it and frame 
it. Another important feature is these communities’ location within an oil 
production and transportation area. The intersection of a wide diversity of social 
changes – economic crisis, environmental changes, and the effects of oil 
pollution – determine the complexity of analyzing this area in the light of climate 
change and adaptation issues. Finally, my case study is part of a pilot site project 
– promoted by governments, international organizations and other countries – 
52 
 
aiming at designing and implementing adaptation strategies. The reports and 
texts that resulted from these types of initiatives gave me the opportunity to 
analyze written narratives about the topic.  
According to scientists, climate change is already having concrete impacts 
on coastal ecosystems, and will affect local fishers in particular, due to 
permanent changes in species reproduction and distribution, among many other 
impacts. Therefore groups of local fishers are the main focus of this research, 
since they are the agents on which those environmental changes have the most 
direct impact. Through qualitative research techniques I analyzed fishers’ 
understandings of climate change and other environmental changes. I explored 
their perception and experiences of different environmental problems and their 
understanding of the processes causing them.  
My entry into these communities was facilitated by the contacts that 
researchers from the National University of Mexico have in some communities. 
After years of conducting various kinds of studies, members of the Sea Sciences 
Institute have gotten to know local fishers and established formal and informal 
connections with them. I also used the contacts provided by one of my 
supervisory committee members, who has been working in this region for several 
years. Through these contacts I made a first approach to the communities, and 
afterwards I used a snowball technique to get in contact with other fishers. I also 
interviewed local leaders and other key members of the communities, such as 
political party leaders and local teachers. Through interviews and archival 
material I reconstructed some of the social, political, economic and 
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environmental developments in the history of the place. Figures 5-9 show the 
study communities. 
 
Figure 5. Study community in Tabasco. 
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Figure 6. Study community in Tabasco. 
 
 
Figure 7. Study community in Tabasco. 
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Figure 8. Study community in Tabasco. 
 
Figure 9. Study community in Tabasco. 
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Governments and Policies  
Through semi-structured interviews and archival analysis, I reconstructed 
governments’ paths to mainstreaming programming around climate change 
adaptation. I interviewed members of government agencies from different 
organizational levels – national and provincial – with the aim of investigating how 
planners imagine or envision climate change and adaptation in their initiatives 
and projects.  
At the national and provincial level, I interviewed government officials from 
environment, agriculture and health agencies involved in designing adaptation 
plans.9 Within each Ministry I looked at the different bureaus in charge of 
adaptation projects, their specific tasks, and the perceptions government officials 
have about the problem. Other governments – at the provincial level – are also 
important for understanding the trajectory of adaptation plans in Mexico. A 
significant case is Mexico City’s government, which has taken the lead in 
designing adaptation projects and has also designed its own methodologies and 
strategies to prepare those plans. In this case, I interviewed a government 
representative in charge of the environment office. 
At the provincial level – the Mexican province of Tabasco – I interviewed 
officials who participated in organizing the Climate Change Committee, who are 
in charge of designing adaptation plans at the provincial level. Government 
officials, scientists from local universities, and members of NGOs participate in 
that committee. At the local level I interviewed fishing authorities that provided 
                                                 
9 During the last ten years, the Public Health Institute has played a key role in analyzing, 
providing information, and discussing climate change impacts and adaptation in Mexico. 
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information and views on local fishing production, organization and main 
problems. 
Archival analysis is based on planning documents and materials, primarily 
the following government reports:  
a) The Fourth and Fifth “National Communication to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change” released in 2010 and 2012, 
respectively, by the National Institute of Ecology and Climate Change of the 
Ministry of Environment (CICC, 2012b).  These reports are part of the 
commitments Mexico acquired as a Non-Annex I Party to the UFCCC, and 
contain an inventory of greenhouse gas emissions, the results of studies on the 
country’s vulnerabilities to climate change, and the progress of mitigation and 
adaptation programs. They are key reports that assemble many different 
government climate change initiatives and actions. They also report on the 
variety of studies made by universities and research centers at the national level.  
b) “Climate Change Adaptation in Mexico: Vision, Elements and Criteria for 
Decision-making,” is a report released in 2012 by the National Institute of 
Ecology and Climate Change of the Ministry of Environment (CICC, 2012a). This 
report explains vulnerability to climate change impacts in Mexico. It is presented 
as a policy instrument and “a guide for decision-making actions towards the 
strengthening of national adaptation capacities” (CICC, 2012a, p. 19). It includes 
conceptual frameworks and discusses some of the country’s first efforts in 
adaptation initiatives. 
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c) In 2009, the Inter-Institutional Climate Change Commission (ICCC) released 
the “Special Climate Change Program 2009-2012” (CICC, 2009). Containing 105 
objectives and 294 goals for climate change, this document is described as the 
most challenging project the government has taken up to now. This is a 
government instrument that specifies with more or less concrete actions the 
ideas outlined in the National Climate Change Strategy. 
d) The “National Climate Change Strategy” was released in 2007 by the ICCC 
(CICC, 2007). It is an umbrella document that identifies measures to mitigate and 
proposes the different studies needed to be able to define mitigation goals. It also 
discusses ideas about how to carry out adaptive capacity building. 
e) The Ministry of the Environment released “Climate Change in Rural 
Communities” in 2008 (SEMARNAT, 2008). It is described as a climate change 
manual for local promoters, offering practical knowledge so they can help local 
rural inhabitants in their thoughts and views about how to better adapt to climate 
change. This was an important report to analyze since it is the only document 
that explicitly addresses rural areas. 
f) In 2011 the provincial Ministry of the Environment presented the “Tabasco 
Climate Change Action Plan” (SERNAPAN, 2011), which contains an inventory 
of greenhouse gas emissions, vulnerability assessments, and mitigation and 
adaptation measures to be implemented in the province. 
g) The project “Adaptation to Climate Change Impacts on the Coastal Wetlands 
in the Gulf of Mexico” is an initiative promoted by agencies such as the Global 
Environmental Fund through the World Bank. The initiative’s goal is to promote 
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adaptation to the consequences of climate impacts in eight pilot sites “through 
the implementation of pilot measures that would provide information on the costs 
and benefits of alternative approaches to reduce their [coastal wetlands] 
vulnerability” (World Bank, 2008). This project was designed in 2008, and it is 
analyzed in this dissertation because my case study includes the fishing 
communities that are part of one of these pilot sites selected in this project, the 
Carmen-Pajonal-Machona Lacunar System. 
 
Scientists 
I interviewed scientists working in the Gulf of Mexico to explore how they 
understand climate change and adaptation. I met scientists from the National 
University of Mexico who have been working on the region – mainly members of 
the Atmosphere Sciences Institute and the Sea Sciences Institute. I also 
interviewed researchers from the local University of Tabasco working on the 
Climate Change Provincial Plan. I also talked to scientists from other local 
universities who were involved in writing provincial climate change plans, 
particularly from the provinces of Morelos and Puebla.  
I interviewed other scientists working on the topic of climate change, and 
some of them working actively in government initiatives. Specifically, I 
interviewed researchers from the National University of Mexico who during the 
last decade have been working with peasants to implement adaptation projects in 
the State of Tlaxcala. I also met scholars who have studied how local peasants 
are adapting to climate change in the State of Chiapas. I interviewed scientists 
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who were working closely within government projects as advisers, who worked in 
private research organizations. I also met researchers from a national research 
center located in Tabasco’s capital city, who are working on coastal communities. 
I analyzed these scholars’ publications, articles, books and reports.  
 
Other Organizations 
To complement my analysis I interviewed other relevant actors, such as non-
governmental organizations members. There are two NGOs, both national and 
provincial, that have been working in the study region. Oxfam-Mexico has worked 
in the province addressing flood problems and has been discussing planning 
issues with government officials. There is another important organization working 
on coastal erosion within this region – the Association for Research and 
Development, based in the State of Morelos. They are monitoring the rise of sea 
levels and its impacts on oil infrastructure.  
I also met with two local non-governmental organization members; one of 
them is a member of the climate change provincial committee. The second 
organization was important to contact since government officials characterize 
them as a “radical” organization; this organization was not invited to be part of 
the provincial climate change activities organized by the government. 
Understanding how this organization’s members think about environmental 
changes in Tabasco was an important task; interviews with these members 
provided me with a more or less comprehensive picture of the different local 
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political dynamics, mainly between the provincial government and local 
organizations. 
 For confidentiality reasons in this dissertation I do not identify the 
interviewees using their names. Instead, I use their agency job position in the 
case of government officials, their affiliated university, research center or 
organization in the case of scientists, and their characteristic stratified and 
organizational position in the case of fishers (cooperative members, freelancers 
and private fishers). 
 
2.3 Research Process and Approach 
In case studies, “analysis is inductive by nature” since a main research goal is to 
capture “unexpected issues” that otherwise would be overlooked if one goes to 
the field with a predetermined set of theories, concepts and processes to analyze 
– deductive reasoning (Aaltio & Heilmann, 2010, p. 67). From other approaches 
however, a more or less defined theoretical approach should inform research 
design and instruments – interview guides – so researchers should “pursue 
focused discussion” of specific processes identified previously (Elger, 2010, p. 
256). 
My study followed a path of ongoing inductive-deductive analysis, which 
shaped the research process along the way by re-formulating research 
questions. The research set for my study case was selected based on its specific 
unique particularities, which at the same time were defined in relation to a 
broader theoretical analysis. An inductive process took place along the 
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implementation of qualitative instruments; my dissertation analysis was 
determined by the themes and problems fishers, scientists and government 
officials discussed. Furthermore, textual analysis also determined the set of 
themes discussed in depth in my field site and in my dissertation. Therefore, core 
research topics in climate change research and analysis that could have 
emerged in my research, such as social justice themes about the role of 
industrialized countries in causing climate change, were partially absent from my 
findings and discussion.  
 I frame, understand and discuss my research findings using a critical 
realism approach, which “combines an ontological insistence on the existence of 
objective natural and social realities with recognition of the socially constructed 
and fallible character of scientific knowledge” (Elger, 2010, p. 254). Critical 
realism reappraises the discussion of theory and reality, beyond the classic 
binaries of idealism/empiricism. Harvey explains that critical realism “embraces 
naturalistic explanations in the social sciences without ignoring, at the same time, 
the fact men and women, unlike natural entities, actively reproduce their social 
world” (Harvey, 2002, p. 163). It is argued that within this approach, reality is 
conceived as layered; reality, Morgan (2007) explains, “could be analytically 
distinguished into structures, the outcome of their complex interplay, and human 
experience, perception, or interpretation of those outcomes” (p. 1). I carefully 
avoid structural and constructivist determinisms; I aim to understand how 
economic and political structures shape, constrain and enable social action, 
perceptions and understandings. At the same time, I explain how actors’ agency 
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and practices, and the perceptions underlying them, at times reproduce and at 
times challenge those structures.  
I use a political economy approach to address the interrelations of 
economic, social and political processes and factors, and the institutional 
structures and context that generate and reproduce them. I analyze those 
interactions in their spatial and temporal manifestations. Critical realism 
understands structures as entities with “real power and effects” (Elger, 2010, p. 
254). Morgan (2007) explains that 
although human action is central to social reality there are problems with 
reducing that reality solely to the beliefs and actions of the individual 
because it then becomes impossible to account for where beliefs come 
from, how actions and their goals are constrained, enabled, and 
conditioned, how goals sometimes fail, and why there may be 
unintended consequences (for the actor and for society at large) from the 
action, or lack thereof (p. 3). 
 
However, this is not to say that structures mechanically function as causal 
determinants to explain social reality and social action. Critical realism also 
problematizes structural determinism, explaining the need to understand 
structures, cultures and their agential mediation as mutually dependent process. 
Scholars explain the idea of the “duality of structure and agency,” conveying the 
idea that 
structures of social relations are not merely epiphenomena of social 
interaction, but have distinctive emergent and enduring properties that will 
constrain or enable different lines of action, although these properties may 
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then be modified by ensuing individual or collective action (Elger, 2010, p. 
254). 
 
In the implementation of research strategies, theorists of critical realism 
emphasize the need to do “explicit theorizing, identification of causal processes, 
appropriate contextualization, attention to temporal sequencing and interaction 
effects, and critical contextualization of actors' accounts” (Elger, 2010, p. 255). In 
my research I aimed to pursue each of these components to provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the research problem. 
The case study is defined as one of many other qualitative research 
strategies used by interpretative research methods, which “produce descriptions 
and accounts about the ways of life of the writer and those written about” 
(Denzin, 2001, p. 7881). Here, it is important to state how I interpret people’s 
accounts and how I position myself in relation to them. I interpret actors’ – 
government officials, scientists and fishers – arguments through the lens of 
performativity. I understand these agents as “situated actors” who “are in the 
permanent business of re-negotiating, re-constructing, and intervening 
‘performatively’ upon them” (Tsekeris, 2007). In adopting this interpretative 
stance I try to understand and make sense of fishers’ views “in terms of the 
meanings people bring to them” (Denzin, 2001, p. 7883). In my view, to be able 
to understand these meanings in my research site context one needs to 
understand the history of the communities; the state’s history of interventions in 
the form of public policies that have transformed these places’ social and 
physical landscapes; the institutional context; and the political, economic and 
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social structures and processes. Fishers’ identities as shaped by their ethnic 
background, social stratification and occupation have been sources I also take 
into account to understand their positions and opinions. This approach allows us 
to second Bourdieu’ idea about the rejection of the existence of a “universal 
subject” (Bourdieu 1989); qualitative analysis helps us visualize the diversity of 
positions, opinions and subjectivities.  
An analysis of people’s performativity highlights the existence of others 
whose perspectives, interests and practices are at stake and are relational to the 
subjects in which the research is based. In my case study, analysis of fishers’ 
positions, negotiations and changing roles shed light on the subjects with which 
fishers interact. Fishers’ performativity points at who the others are, their 
interests, and positions before them. At the same time, fishers implicitly or 
explicitly named, labeled and assigned specific roles to “others.” In this way one 
is able to grasp their relational existence.  
Fishermen as situated actors interacted with me as a researcher with a 
particular “intentionality” (Kompf, 2007). I was an agent who interacted and 
interpreted while holding specific gender, class, race, and cultural identities 
(Denzin 2001, p. 7882). During fieldwork I introduced myself as a Mexican 
student studying abroad, interested in understanding how different agents define 
and understand climate change. In the research process I recognize myself as a 
privileged middle class woman, who grew up in an urban context. I assume 
myself as an actor with specific social justice concerns about the conditions and 
lives of specific marginal groups. I decided to focus the analysis on narratives of 
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environmental change since a core concern I had was to question who were 
making them, and most importantly, what were the types of implications they 
would potentially have on the ground. I critically question predominant – and at 
times dominant – discourses on how fishers should work, live, interact, and 
organize. I am critical of frameworks that, under the veil of ideas about 
development, try to impose new understandings about local problems. At the 
same time, I wanted to know and understand what fishers thought about what 
has been said about them, and what were their views, histories and stories, 
which over time have been shaping their positions and perceptions. 
In my interaction with fishers, during my interviews with them, it was clear 
for me that they saw me as a vehicle, as an agent who might be used to convey 
fishers’ ideas, perspectives and interests to different agents, mainly government 
officials. Fishers thought of me as an actor of possible use who might bring them 
– directly or indirectly – different types of capital and resources, mainly economic, 
e.g. funding, market advice, etc. I have concrete examples that illustrate this 
idea. In one of my interviews, a private fisher asked me directly if having this 
interview will help him to solve his problems; if not, he said, he was not interested 
in having the interview. Other fishers also asked me very cautiously it I have any 
connection with government agencies, or if I was there to offer them some kind of 
government support. In interpreting my research findings I took into account the 
narrative strategies they used during our interaction. 
There is another example of my interactions with fishers. As I explain in 
chapter 3, in the study communities I found three different types of fishers: 
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cooperative members, freelancers and private fishers. Each of these categories 
conveys a different type of individual, with different economic and political power 
within and outside their communities. In my interviews it was very clear that 
cooperative members and freelance fishers were much more open, friendly and 
willing to talk to me about their problems. However, I had a different reception 
from the private fishers. They were always, without any exception, cautious about 
what they said to me. They were very suspicious about my work in their 
communities and they always asked questions about what kind of information I 
was collecting and my reasons for doing this work. They checked my ID in detail. 
Most of the time they initially rejected talking to me, explaining the lack of time or 
other reasons. However, in the end they would give me the interview. It was clear 
to me that this attitude was closely related to their reputation within their 
communities of being corrupt, of exploiting other fishers’ work, of benefiting from 
their connections to government officials to get funding, among others. 
Therefore, fishers’ social position within their communities was an important 
factor determining the course of our interactions.  
My relation with government officials brought about other types of 
reactions. In my view, in this case issues of legitimation and justification 
permeated their positions and understandings about the research topic. During 
my interaction with government officials, it was evident that their analysis and 
positions on the research topic were influenced by their need to justify their job 
and activities and to provide coherent rational perspectives on government 
initiatives and agenda. Finally, scientists saw me as a colleague with whom they 
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could be open and reflexive about their ideas and problems in dealing with 
climate change research. They recognized and discussed some of the criticisms I 
analyze in this dissertation: research agenda setting and climate change as a 
“trendy” topic (a new label that more researchers are using to frame their 
research so they may be able to get research funding), lack of resources to 
produce climate change data, among others.  
I am sympathetic towards fishermen’s demands and claims; however, I 
am also critical of local dynamics and practices that within the communities are 
reproducing forms of exclusion and oppression – the same type of exclusions 
fishers say they are experiencing from “external” actors, e.g. government 
institutions. I look with particular concern at power dynamics against minorities 
within these communities – specifically with the “freelance” fishermen, who are 
the most marginal among the different groups. Similarly, even though I am critical 
of government officials’ narratives and practices, I am also aware of and 
recognize the complexity of institutional bureaucratic dynamics that constrain 
officials’ actions. I also understand government representatives’ role within local 
communities as a product of complex interactions within a thick network of local 
actors and institutions.  
Performativity however, is only one of many other dimensions at play in 
interpreting my analysis of fishers, scientists and government officials’ views of 
my research topic. A comprehensive understanding of subjects’ positions needs 
to integrate a parallel analysis of their actual practices and actions. In order to 
understand fishers’ practices, we need to look at the political economy of 
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environmental changes in the region. The following chapter explains the regional 
and local contexts, and analyzes some of the key characteristics of the study 
communities and fishers. 
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CHAPTER 3.  CONTEXT 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first briefly explains the emergence of 
climate change within the government agenda, and identifies the characteristics 
of government narratives. I also introduce themes that I explore in depth in other 
chapters of this dissertation, specifically the process of boundary work in which 
officials and scientists are engaged. The second part introduces the case study 
on which this research is based. I discuss the political economy of the study 
region. I also explore the history of the most important state’s interventions, and 
discuss some of the most important features of these communities, focusing the 
analysis on fishermen’s characteristics and organization.  
 
3.2 Climate Change in the Government Agenda 
Climate change first entered into the government agenda in 1992 with Mexico’s 
incorporation into the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
that prompted the development of institutional structures and initiatives. 
However, climate change was not incorporated into the government planning 
agenda until 2007, in the National Development Plan 2007-2012. Government 
narratives on climate change adaptation draw on the conceptual frameworks 
produced by what has been called the international climate change regime, 
defined as “the explicit and implicit principles, rules, norms and procedures 
enshrined in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), its Kyoto Protocol and related legal documents” (Okereke, Bulkeley, 
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& Schroeder, 2009, p. 58). These government narratives are based on a grand 
climate change narrative that, as Bravo explains, “is serving as a point of 
departure for a plurality of culturally and geographically situated policy responses 
to climate change” (Bravo, 2009, p. 258). 
The government adopts both mitigation and adaptation strategies to 
mitigate emissions and to reduce impacts, or to use the opportunities that such 
climatic changes can bring to the country. The narratives explain that mitigation 
and adaptation are implemented under the principle of “differentiated 
responsibilities” included in the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) that recognizes the differentiated role of developed 
and developing countries in mitigating climate change based on their respective 
responsibilities and capabilities (CICC, 2012b).10 It is important to mention that in 
the UNFCCC, Mexico is a non-Annex I country, which means that it is not 
required to quantify its greenhouse gas emission limitation or reduction. 
However, the Mexican government has expressed a voluntary commitment to 
control emissions; this may be explained as a government strategy to position 
itself in the international arena as a climate change advocate.  
Government narratives highlight two facts that reflect the Mexican 
government’s commitments to climate change. The first is the enactment of the 
Climate Change General Law, that “puts the country as one key actor in the 
                                                 
10 Through this principle the UNFCCC recognizes the differentiated responsibilities between 
developing and developed countries based on their different contributions to global degradation 
and change – e.g. per capita greenhouse emissions. The Convention Article 3.1 states that "The 
Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of 
humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should 
take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof" (UNFCCC, 1992, p. 
4). 
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world struggle against this threat, guaranteeing the path towards a green growth 
and a competitive economy that preserve the natural wealth for future 
generations” (CICC, 2012b, p. 133).  Mexico is the first developing country to 
have a federal climate change law (Ibid). The second is the increase in the 
federal budget for climate change initiatives that between 2008 and 2011 rose 
from 14.9 to 564.5 million Mexican pesos (approximately 40.3 million US 
dollars11) (CEFP, 2011, p. 3). However, this amount was mostly allocated to 
mitigation programs and projects. As it was explained in interviews, in Mexico 
there is no formal funding source for adaptation initiatives. The government has 
been working towards the creation of international mechanisms to allocate 
funding for adaptation initiatives.12 Funding has also been channeled from 
climate change development policy loans received by the government to 
mainstreaming climate change in government agencies and programs. Since the 
mid-1990s Mexico has received climate change loans and technical support from 
the World Bank. In 2011 it received 501 million dollars loan from this institution 
(World Bank, 2011). In addition, during the period 2006-2011 the World Bank 
provided training and workshops supporting about 700 state and municipal 
governments’ officials and NGOs members; and it also organized research 
groups (World Bank, 2011, p. 16).  
There is public funding going to the Natural Disasters Fund associated 
with climate changes, which has the objectives of repairing the economic impacts 
                                                 
11 Exchange rate January 2011. 
12 In 2012 Mexico received funding for first time from the UNFCCC Adaptation to Climate Change 
Fund, which was implemented in 2007 with the aim of financing adaptation projects in developing 
countries. 
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of these types of events; it is a fund that covers the emergence of public health 
issues and the impacts of climate change on social services. This fund increased 
considerably over the last years, from about 7 million Mexican pesos in 2002 to 
22 million in 2010 (CEFP, 2011, p. 2). In 2011 a new fund was created, the 
Reconstruction Fund, to finance repairs of infrastructure impacted by climate 
change events (CEFP, 2011). 
It should also be highlighted that Mexico is the only Non-Annex I country 
in the world that has elaborated five Country Communications (CICC, 2012a, p. 
52). However, according to a government official, mainstreaming climate change 
within the government ministries and agendas has been a challenge. In an 
interview, the official explained that “climate change has an important role only in 
the discourse, but not in practice” since there is a lack of financial resources and 
people; then, the official added that  “it is a contradictory discourse” through 
which government agencies are asked to integrate climate change using the 
same assigned budget.13 
The Intergovernmental Climate Change Commission (ICCC) was 
established in 2005 to coordinate the decision-making process on climate 
change issues and the elaboration of the first and second Country 
Communications to the United Nations. In this period the emphasis was on 
mitigation policies; adaptation initiatives were incorporated in the agenda later on 
in 2005 (CICC, 2012a, p. 18). The 2006-2012 period was characterized by a very 
active involvement on the topic; a variety of instruments emerged during this 
                                                 
13 Interview with a government officer from the Ministry of the Environment.  July 13, 2012. 
Mexico City. 
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stage, such as: the Climate Change National Strategy (2007); the Special 
Climate Change Program (2009); the Adaptation Policy Framework (2010); the 
elaboration of the Third, Fourth and Fifth Country Communications to the United 
Nations; and in 2012, the publication of the Climate Change Federal Law. During 
this period almost every province in the country began to elaborate Provincial 
Climate Change Programs and about nine municipalities designed climate 
change programs (CICC, 2012a, Merino, 2011). Finally, another important effort 
made by government officials was the organization of the COP16 in 2010, which 
according to some officials, prompted the positioning of the topic within the 
government agenda. 
 
Multiple Voices Shaping Narratives 
An important feature of government narratives is the multiplicity of voices and 
actors that take part in their making – mainly national, provincial, and local 
governments, scientists at national and local universities, international 
organizations and national and international non-governmental organizations. 
Therefore, the number of initiatives and the mobilization of resources through 
different networks requires one to refer not to a singular project and narrative, but 
to multiple and sometimes contradictory messages and story-lines. Moreover, 
even though the initiatives analyzed in this research are official documents 
released by government agencies, the information that is presented comes from 
different projects and studies conducted by scientists and private advisors in 
charge of making reports for the government. These documents also integrate 
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information from different government agencies. This chapter, then, refers to 
government narratives in the plural to capture the wide range of voices involved 
in their making.  
Information gathered in my interviews revealed the role of international 
government agencies such as the Global Initiative from Great Britain, which had 
a key role in promoting the Federal Law in Climate Change – it engaged in 
lobbying activities for about four years. It was explained that this agency is a 
cooperative initiative that has the goal to promote the translation of climate 
change programs into concrete legislation and laws that transcend short-term 
government administrations in developing countries. Other actors include 
international and private environmental organizations – such as World Wildlife 
Fund, Nature Conservancy, Conservation International, the German International 
Cooperation Agency and the United Nations Development Program, among 
others – who had made the commitment to collaborate with national government 
agencies “to develop activities that reduce natural ecosystems and human 
communities’ vulnerabilities to climate change impacts” (CICC, 2012a, p. 107). 
Development agencies from countries such as Korea, Spain, Japan and France 
are also collaborating on climate change initiatives in Mexico.  
Of particular relevance is the role of international organizations such as 
the World Bank, who is establishing the funding and conceptual frameworks in 
climate change adaptation initiatives in Mexico. As I explained in the previous 
chapter, in my study region the World Bank is implementing the project 
“Adaptation to Climate Change Impacts on the Coastal Wetlands in the Gulf of 
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Mexico.” The Inter-American Development Bank and the Latin American 
Economic Commission have lent resources and provided technical assistance to 
Mexico on climate change initiatives as well (CICC, 2012b, p. 137). Other 
international initiatives such as the Local Environmental Initiatives – in 
collaboration with the British government – are funding the creation of climate 
change programs in some Mexican municipalities (CICC, 2012a, p. 95). These 
initiatives exemplify specific forms of “hybrid governing arrangements” (Bulkeley, 
2005) which are analyzed in the governance literature by questioning “how 
climate change is governed” (Okereke et al., 2009), highlighting the role of non-
state actors in the making of environmental regimes worldwide as well as 
illustrating “the ways in which new geographies of environmental governance are 
taking shape” (Bulkeley, 2005, p. 897). 
At a national level, my research findings agree with other studies that 
explain that in Mexico the role of a group of scientists from the national university 
– Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) – and government officials 
from the Ministry of Environment have been key in the process of mainstreaming 
climate change within the Mexican government agenda (Pulver, 2007). It is clear 
that it is a small group of meteorologists, biologists and ocean scientists from the 
UNAM and from some local universities who have had an active role. In an 
interview, the director of the UNAM Climate Change Research Program 
explained that he has been interested in promoting social science research; 
however, he argues that their participation in this field is still marginal. This is an 
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important observation that highlights who and what type of knowledge is being 
used by government institutions to understand and frame climate change. 
 
Coproduction and the Role of Governments  
In Mexico, governments position themselves as key actors in the making of 
climate change initiatives through the following practices: a) as the ultimate 
authority in approving climate change programs to be implemented at the local 
level; b) by choosing the actors who are to be involved in formal decision-making 
processes, which determines the configuration of the political setting in which 
policy-making processes take place; c) by deconstructing scientific data 
produced by national scientists and by the IPCC in the process of producing 
public information; and d) as key “translating” agents of scientific knowledge to 
citizens, to people that “do not necessarily understand this type of information.”14 
Government narratives also explain that agencies are important actors in 
“socializing” the topic of climate change within different government agencies and 
among key sectors – private, NGOs, and scientists. 
Based on the IPCC methodology, scientists and universities are in charge 
of elaborating Climate Change Provincial Programs whose guidelines were 
designed by a “hybrid science-policy community” (Shakley & Wynne, 1996, p. 
276). But it is a national government agency who provides technical advice and 
the formal official approval of these Plans. It is important to mention that the role 
of the government goes beyond the formal approval of these initiatives since it 
also affects and determines the kind of actors to be involved in decision-making 
                                                 
14 Interview with a government official from the Ministry of the Environment, Provincial 
Government. May 28, 2012. Tabasco. 
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processes. Government officials write down the list of participants of private and 
social sectors to be convened as members of the committees that validate such 
initiatives. In an interview, an official explained that when thinking of that list of 
names they were very cautious about including certain types of non-
governmental organizations that clearly had a more “political” vein.15 In this 
particular case the organization being referred is an active NGO with a history of 
challenging government policies; their members have helped communities in 
their struggles against the oil industry for decades. In the government officer’s 
view, because this local NGO had a particular political agenda and claims 
against the government, then its participation may impact on the production of 
science-based policy climate change initiatives that should be neutral, science-
based and depoliticized. Implicit in the government official’s comments was the 
idea that climate change – and the actors in charge of dealing with it – should be 
“depoliticized” so the classic model of separation between science and politics 
and policy-making can be shielded. 
Research findings illustrate the power of state agencies in determining a 
research agenda. But this process also involves an accommodation and 
negotiation of scientists’ own interests. While conducting fieldwork in Tabasco, 
national government agencies organized a meeting with scientists to plan the 
creation of the National Climate Change Research Institute. During the meeting, 
discussion focused on how scientists can think of their own research agendas in 
light of the climate change problem. They were asked to reframe their own 
                                                 
15 Interview with a government official from the Ministry of the Environment, Provincial 
Government. May 28, 2012. Tabasco. 
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approaches and practices to address simultaneously climate change issues. For 
example, some panelists explained that the use of a multidisciplinary approach to 
understand climate change require scientists to engage in more collaborative 
work.  
Furthermore, attempts to position climate change as a legitimate topic for 
a research agenda have also been questioned among the community of 
scientists.  In comments overheard after the above-mentioned meeting, scientists 
overtly stated that from now on they would re-label their original research under 
the name of climate change so they can get funding and have the opportunity to 
be part of this center. One of the comments was particularly interesting: a 
biologist recognized that in his study he had not found any evidence of climate 
change; notwithstanding this recognition, he kept saying he would reframe his 
research. In one of my interviews a local scientist explained that in one meeting, 
while a government official explained the relevance of climate change, a member 
of the meteorology office commented to him that this was not true, that in their 
records there was no evidence of climate change. It was clear from the two 
examples that these perceptions among the scientific community are not 
interfering with funding planning and the creation of climate change initiatives or 
in their own decisions to participate in them.   
This case illustrates S&TS scholars’ discussion about the idea that 
“research knowledge is a product of politics” (Cozzens & Woodhouse, 2001, p. 
534) since it is the product of the power exercised by funders – in this case 
government and international agencies – which are determining who participates 
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in climate change research, and “in what network of power relationships” actors 
would be immersed and carry out many other political negotiations (Ibid). From 
this perspective “science and scientists are not politically neutral, rather politics 
structures the provision of advice in multiple ways, including structuring research 
programmes” (Carter, 2013, p. 27).  
 However, it is important to highlight the contentious challenges and 
negotiations that are taking place in the process of positioning climate change. 
Interview findings show the tensions in the science-policy interface and how 
scientists challenge state power. Scientists that have actively collaborated with 
government agencies in the making of climate change initiatives did not fully 
identify with certain government practices. Scientists’ work is used in the making 
of some initiatives but this is not to say they agree with the final product. In fact, 
as some documents and the interviews clearly show, scientists do not see 
themselves as part of the making of such policies and initiatives, since they do 
not have the final word on the narratives presented in the name of government 
agencies.   
 
Boundary Work 
In following IPCC guidelines in the making of climate change provincial plans, 
Mexican governments – national and provincial – are actually creating the setting 
for the emergence of boundary work by selecting groups of scientists from 
specific bodies of knowledge, disciplines and professional institutions as 
participants in these initiatives. In the guidelines to design these programs the 
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government explains that it is the scientists and universities who should 
coordinate the technical studies, since this sector has special characteristics: (a) 
it is a more stable sector since government officials and projects may change 
every government term, the university appears to be a place that can guarantee 
continuity in climate change programs and plans in the long-term; (b) it has solid 
basis to understand the phenomenon and; (c) it is highly credible and trustworthy 
(Tejeda & Conde, 2009, p. 69). 
As I discuss in this dissertation, government narratives use science as a 
legitimate source to position climate change as a public issue. Scientists have 
been characterized as “neutral” actors that hold more credibility and legitimacy 
before Mexican society than the government. In interviews and in some 
documents scientists also endorse this representation. Leon et al. (2012) explain 
that the promotion of adaptation initiatives should be based on a scientific 
discourse because it provides codified messages that allow dialogue among 
different sectors and actors. This scientific discourse, the authors explain, would 
also help to avoid an interaction based on political discourses or discourses that 
are based on “trendy topics” (León, Magaña, & Guigue, 2012, p. 62). In looking 
to construct alliances and agreements, the authors argue, government promoters 
should look for “neutral” interlocutors such as scientists and members of non-
governmental organizations (León, Magaña, & Guigue, 2012, p. 62). I will take up 
these ideas in the following chapters where I discuss climate change government 
narratives in detail.  
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Neoliberal Environmental Policies in Mexico 
Climate change government narratives in Mexico have emerged in a context of 
what many scholars (Sunkel & Zuleta, 1990; Valenzuela, 1991) have labelled 
“neoliberal” government policies.16 In my research, climate change initiatives are 
analyzed as part of broader structural political and economic transformations in 
the country. Important policies and initiatives include, for example, the agrarian 
reform to Article 27 of the Mexican constitution and changes in federal agrarian 
and forestry and water-use laws. These have changed, impacted and reframed 
property rights and natural resource access, use and management in local 
communities, including those in the study site.17 The agrarian reform has been 
particularly important: it aimed at transforming ejido lands to more productive 
units since according to the government, productivity was the key towards the 
improvement of peasants’ quality of life. However, debates over the radical 
transformation of relations of production, on the de-ruralization of the rural areas, 
on the relationships of the peasants with their lands and local agrarian 
organizations, are among the many issues raised by peasant organizations, 
activists and scholars. More recently, key debates around the privatization of the 
oil industry constitutes another important case where issues about sovereignty 
and the role of transnational corporations in the profiting of natural resources are 
at stake.  
                                                 
16 Neoliberal policies promote outward-oriented economies, privatization, liberalization and state 
deregulation. Among some key characteristics are an understanding of open, competitive and 
unregulated markets as the optimal mechanisms to organize economies (Brenner & Theodore, 
2002). 
17 Historically the ejido land was inalienable, not subject to sale or transfer. The Reform included 
amendments to provide private property to ejidos and common land, so that their owners could 
sign any kind of contract. With the Reform, owners could sell, rent, mortgage, and cede their 
rights of property as member of the ejido (Vargas, 2005, p. 103). 
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Environmental strategies that have been defined as neoliberal include 
initiatives such the Payments for Ecosystems Services (PES) programs - 
promoted by the Global Environmental Fund through the World Bank.18 Some of 
the neoliberal features integrated into this type of intervention are market-based 
resource management approaches that reframe how natural resources should be 
managed and valued; an emphasis on efficiency as key criteria for resource 
protection, conservation and use; the key role of social participation as a 
procedural mechanism to integrate stakeholders; and finally, the emphasis on 
encompassing both resource conservation and management aimed at directly or 
indirectly reducing poverty. The payments for environmental services programs, 
for example, were conceived as “a triple-win solution for nature, private investors, 
and the poor” (McAffe and Shapiro, 2010, p. 580).  
Mexico has one of the most extensive PES program in the world (McAffe 
& Shapiro, 2008), and in Tabasco a government representative explained in an 
                                                 
18 Another type of environmental policy characterized as neoliberal has been sustainable 
development. In Mexico, the National Program on the Environment 1995-2000 integrated this 
perspective as one of its key axes. In general terms this approach referred to the reconciliation 
and intersection between environmental protection, economic growth and the satisfaction of 
people’s needs. Sustainable development has been broadly analyzed; some discussions regard 
this policy as a neoliberal strategy to address environmental issues that does not question 
dominant models of economic growth (capitalism) that generate poverty, inequality and the 
overexploitation of natural resources (e.g. Escobar, 1995). Instead, and in a context of 
environmental degradation and resource overexploitation, these types of initiatives are explained 
as strategies to reconstruct capitalism (Dickens, 2002; Escobar, 1995). However, in Mexico 
sustainable development was explained by government officials as a fundamental policy to 
address both natural resource restoration, conservation and management on one hand, and 
poverty reduction on the other. Julia Carabias, a biologist from the National University of Mexico, 
strongly promoted this project as part of the government agenda when she was the minister of 
the Ministry of the Environment (1995-2000). Under this sustainable development strategy, 
natural protected areas should be transformed as regional sustainable development enclaves, by 
promoting the active participation of indigenous and non-indigenous community members, who 
were the inhabitants, owners and managers of this territory and its resources.   
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interview that they were preparing a PES proposal.19 PES are defined as 
mechanisms that “translate external, non-market values of the environment into 
real financial incentives for local actors to provide environmental services” 
(Engel, Pagiola, & Wunder, 2008). PES are characterized as neoliberal, in that 
they are “based on the premise that the natural environment can best be 
safeguarded by valuing and managing “nature’s services” as tradable 
commodities” (McAffe & Shapiro, 2008, p. 580). However, the challenges and 
struggles to implement PES programs in Mexico illustrate the contentious 
character of neoliberal perspectives on how “nature” should be conceived, used 
and managed, for whom and for whose benefits.   
In recent years the emergence of literature about the “privatization” or 
“neoliberalization” of nature shows how capitalism is restructuring its modus 
operandi in a new context of environmental politics (Castree & Braun, 1998; 
Escobar, 1996).20 Castree and Braun (1998) point out the different modalities of 
nature’s neoliberalisation that have been pursued in relation to a range of 
biophysical resources. They argue that nature everywhere is “enterprised up” 
and that global nature is remade in the image of the commodity (Castree & Braun 
1998, p. 4). Dickens explores an interesting idea regarding the role of capitalism 
in reconstructing itself. He argues that in that process capital is also redefining 
                                                 
19 Interview with a government official from the Ministry of the Environment (provincial 
government). May 28, 2012. Tabasco. 
20 Peck and Tickell (2002) use the term neoliberal(ization) to place more emphasis on the concept 
as a process than as an “end-state”; it also refers to the different types of neoliberal policies 
which are unevenly implemented around the world as well as the variations and mechanisms that 
mediate them on the ground (p. 383). 
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what constitutes “nature” and “society” and their relationship, positing them as 
being always “renegotiable” (Dickens, 2002, p. 55).  
As I state above, my analysis of climate change narratives in Mexico 
should be understood in light of the political and economic neoliberal shifts 
Mexico has experienced since the 1980s, and in particular the promotion of 
environmental initiatives since the 1990s. In this dissertation I argue that to 
understand government initiatives and actors’ views on environmental changes, 
we need to take into account the contexts in which they emerge. However, I also 
argue against determinist views that explain social processes as a direct result of 
neoliberal policies. I argue that neoliberal initiatives such as the ones described 
above interplay with a historical and multilayered set of other factors. As Brenner 
and Theodore (2002) explain,  
we emphasize the contextual embeddedness of neoliberal restructuring 
projects insofar as they have been produced within national, regional, and 
local contexts defined by the legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, 
policy regimes, regulatory practices, and political struggles (p. 349). 
 
There is also another important reason why explaining neoliberalism as a 
direct causal factor does not help to answer my research questions. In this 
dissertation I avoid the use of the term neoliberalism, and it is not a core concept 
in my research because in my analysis of climate change adaptation narratives I 
actually did not identify many features attributed to that type of policy. Instead, I 
frame my analysis of these narratives as arguing for the emergence of a new 
kind of development discourse, since these narratives allude more to teleological 
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ideas and ideals about how to achieve a better future, rather than to concrete 
market-based mechanisms. This however is not the case for climate change 
mitigation initiatives that are more clearly based on neoliberal-related ideas – e.g. 
REDD+. 
As I discuss in this dissertation, only some characteristics of government 
climate change narratives reflect neoliberal strategies and concepts of natural 
resource use, access and management. In chapter 5, I discuss in detail how 
government narratives refer to a subject-making process which directly or 
indirectly refers to how fishers need to face their own risks, the transfer of state 
responsibilities to the citizens, the role of social participation as a recipe to 
project implementation success, among other features.   
 
Promoting Climate Change in the Government Agenda 
Government climate change adaptation narratives are based on grand narratives 
that emerge in international organizations and national epistemic communities 
that have designed and financed projects and initiatives. Of particular relevance 
is the role of the World Bank, which is promoting and coordinating some of the 
initiatives analyzed in this dissertation. Government narratives base their analysis 
on and adopt the language of mainstream ideas that circulate within North 
American academic spheres as well. The question of how and to what extent 
government narratives are being shaped by international institutions such as the 
World Bank requires an analysis that goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
However, my argument is that global frameworks are not imposed in a “top-
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down” fashion, but they are negotiated on the ground, with different stakeholders 
and actors such as government agencies, non-profit activists, peasant and fisher 
local organizations and social movements, whose practices transform and shape 
these global initiatives. 
As I discussed above, the role of government agencies and national 
epistemic communities have been key in positioning climate change within the 
government agenda. Edwards argues that the emergence of an epistemic 
community with “compelling interest in global change issues… is one of the 
major reason why global change has reached the political agenda of 
governments” (Edwards, 1996, p. 150).  But the question of why certain themes 
and topics such as climate change adaptation are being promoted by certain 
groups within and outside the government sphere may be explained by many 
other factors.21 The first has to do with personal agendas politicians want to 
promote. This is the case of the promotion of climate change by the Mexico City 
government. According to a government official,22 the head of government of the 
Federal District (Mexico City), Marcelo Ebrard, has worked and promoted climate 
change research since years before he took this office, when he was scholar and 
researcher in a research center. When he was the city Major, he saw the 
                                                 
21 Pralle analyzes agenda-setting processes and climate change, suggesting a list of “political 
strategies for raising the salience” of the climate change problem. Among various measures, she 
proposes to emphasize scientific consensus and knowledge, public concern and local impacts 
(Pralle, 2009, p. 797).  Buttel, Hawkins, & Power (1990) discuss the factors accounting for the 
prominence of global change “as a dominant issue” in government, international organizations, 
environmental movements and research agendas (p. 58). 
22 Interview with a government official, Ministry of the Environment, Provincial Government. July 
14, 2012. Mexico City. 
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opportunity to promote climate change by producing the first Climate Change 
Plan of the county, and to project his own image internationally as well.23  
A second possible explanation of the promotion of climate change 
initiatives may be the possibility of receiving international funding to promote 
national adaptation projects. However, at this stage Mexico’s government is 
borrowing funds to promote its initiatives. It is in 2012 when Mexico for first time 
received funds from the Global Environmental Fund to be channeled to 
adaptation initiatives. The lack of funding for adaptation initiatives is a very 
contentious issue in Climate Change conventions and international meetings.  
The promotion of climate change may reflect the interests and needs of 
certain government officials and groups in their search to promote their work and 
expertise, and to get economic resources for their agencies. In fact, the question 
of what criteria are used to distribute climate change financial resources within 
government agencies is important to answer. In chapter 6, I discuss the role of 
the Ministry of the Environment vis a vis other agencies such as the Ministries of 
Health, Agriculture and Energy in establishing their own climate change agenda. 
I explain that the Ministry of the Environment has no political and financial power, 
its budget is small compared with the other ministries, and this reduces the scope 
of their influence in setting the agenda, or even in promoting particular 
frameworks in dealing with climate change adaptation. 
In sum, the translation and integration of global initiatives into national 
agendas is contingent on several factors. For example, in the case of developed 
                                                 
23 In 2010 Marcelo Ebrard was nominated as the "world's best mayor" by the Project World 
Mayor. 
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countries, political and interest groups may mobilize strategies to prevent 
mitigation measures that may represent an obstacle to “do business as usual,” 
preventing the expenditure of public funding to climate change programs as well.  
In the case of developing countries, the promotion of these type of climate 
change initiatives may represent the acquisition of aid funding from international 
organizations. In the case of Mexico, however, adaptation initiatives in the Gulf of 
Mexico have been designed through government debt. 
 
3.3 Case Study: Coastal Communities in Tabasco, Mexico 
This section, consisting of two parts, introduces the case study of my 
dissertation. At a macro level, it describes some of the most important state 
interventions that were implemented in Tabasco during the twentieth century. 
This analysis is aimed at contextualizing the emergence of climate change 
interventions in this region in light of past initiatives that have had long-term 
negative impacts on people’s livelihoods and their environment. At a micro level, 
the second part of this section analyzes some of the features of my study 
communities, with a particular emphasis on fishermen’s lives and organizations. 
As I discuss throughout the development of this dissertation, in order to 
understand fishermen’s views and perceptions of local environmental changes, it 
is important to analyze the history of this sites as well as the political and 
economic context in which these environmental changes are taking place.  
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3.3.1 State Interventions: The Historic Construction of Vulnerability in  
Tabasco 
 
Throughout its history, Tabasco has been a territory that bears contradictory 
meanings for state actors, fishers, peasants and scientists. It is a region 
described as backward and isolated, a frontier, a place where modernity – 
economic production, roads, infrastructure, progressive ideals and ideas – has 
struggled to settle, and as a waste of unproductive land. This picture takes 
another form when one follows the history of the state’s interventions, which have 
conveyed messages such as the existence of an ideal territory waiting for the 
workings of human hands to thrive: extensive territory to be productively used at 
the service of national interests. A blank page to be filled with unimaginable 
potential interventions.  
Historically Tabasco has been a locus of governments’ development 
“experiments” that have resulted in what Tudela (1989) describes as a “harmful 
development”. There have been three key historical moments in the state’s 
efforts to advance this land’s productive potential: from (i) its promotion as a 
banana enclave, to (ii) the “conquest” of swamplands through a massive 
deforestation of lands to be incorporated into agricultural and livestock farming 
and, more recently, (iii) its positioning as one of the most important oil producing 
regions in the country, in the context of the oil boom. These projects have taken 
more or less similar form as an enclave, extraction-based and crop-boom 
economy. These have been state-led undertakings, based on intensive resource 
exploitation, designed to fulfil external – national and international – markets, and 
that have reconfigured the social space by introducing new organizational forms 
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of production and modes of extraction (Bunker, 1985), changes in property land 
rights, migration – and in the ecological space, changes in land-use, water and 
land pollution, among others.  
To some extent, Tabasco’s state interventions could be also described as 
the archetype of failed “high modernist” projects, of well-intended utopian social 
engineering schemes to improve the human condition (Scott, 1998). Scott 
explains that these projects are based on a “supreme self-confidence about 
continued linear progress, the development of scientific and technical knowledge, 
the expansion of production, the rational design of social order, the growing 
satisfaction of human needs, and, not least, an increasing control over nature” 
(Scott, 1998, p. 89). Government discourses in Tabasco were permeated by 
ideals about the need to become modern, to promote technical knowledge to 
domesticate and use “unproductive” swamp lands, to promote the potential 
productive capacity of that territory.  
These interventions had many goals. Through these projects the 
government aimed “to remedy the social ills – poverty, sickness, and illiteracy – 
which had resulted from Porfirian [dictatorial] rule” (Ridgeway, 2001, p. 138). The 
state’s hand expanded into these territories to promote the creation of new 
settlements that would alleviate the problem of lack of land among landless 
populations in other areas of the country. This “march towards the sea” also had 
the objective of promoting the extraction of raw materials for exportation with the 
aim to attract investments and increase commercial profits to be invested in the 
industrial modernization of Mexico (Arrieta, 1994, p. 11). The “myth of the 
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productivity” of the coastal lands, then, was the driving force behind the 
promotion of these projects (Martínez, 1979, p. 88).  
These economic projects emerged in a particular post-revolutionary 
historical context of a strong authoritarian state, the consolidation of a federal 
system and the positioning of the official political party that ruled the country for 
more than seventy years. The characteristic arbitrary exercise of governmental 
authority was accompanied by effective control by the executive branch of the 
other political authorities, like the legislative and judicial powers; and by strict 
government controls on opposition political parties and the electoral process (Fox 
& Hernández, 1992). As it was the case of other countries in Latin America, 
political and social life in Mexico “has long been shaped by the heavy hand of the 
state” (Fox & Hernández, 1992, p. 167); therefore, the interventions I analyze 
here must be understood in light of this political backdrop. 
In the nineteenth century the main economic activities in Tabasco were 
the production of tobacco, timber, cacao, coffee, pepper, indigo, sugar cane and 
vanilla (Martinez, 1979). From colonial times to the middle of the twentieth 
century, the uncontrolled extraction of mahogany and other tropical woods was 
one of the most important economic activities in Tabasco (Arrieta, 1994). The 
exportation of tropical woods was one of the most profitable activities: from 1857 
to 1872 felling increased from 273 to 16,000 tons, and the exportation of rubber 
trees increased from 459 kg in 1888 to about 416 thousand in 1910 (Martínez 
1979).24  
                                                 
24 Felling was one of the most profitable activities since it was possible to elude taxes and cut 
more trees than were authorized (Martínez, 1979). 
93 
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, banana plantations emerged as 
one of the most important export products.25 In the 1920s, Tabasco was one of 
the largest banana-producing provinces in the country, forming part of the 
banana boom in Mexico – “the new green gold” (De Giussepe, 2011). Production 
and marketing were organized through a cooperative system organized and 
controlled by the state. This strategy was designed and promoted by one of the 
most popular cacique leaders in Tabasco, Tomas Garrido,26 “the strong man” (De 
Giuseppe, 2011, p. 646). Through this system the government established a 
clientelist relationship with workers and gained political control over their union 
(Rideway, 2001, p. 165). Corruption, nepotism and repression constituted the 
backdrop in which the plantation-based economy and other economic activities 
developed (Rideway, 2001, p. 165). The banana boom ended due to increasing 
pests in the 1940s; production diminished from 180 thousand tons in 1935 – 
representing 40% of the national production – to 1, 500 tons in 1941 (Martínez, 
1979). 
 The decline of the banana boom was followed by another structural 
transformation of the natural landscape promoted by the state: the allocation of 
                                                 
25 In 1906 the Southern Steam Ship and Importing Co. made the first banana shipment to the 
United States, a shipment that was subsidized by local entrepreneurs and public funds (Martínez, 
1979). At the time, Tabasco was also exporting other fruits such as oranges, lemons, pineapples 
and eggplants. 
26 Tomas Garrido was one of the most controversial political leaders of the post-revolutionary era; 
he held power for 15 years. The main political messages of his agenda were to promote “the 
modernization” of Tabasco through the organization of its society based on a set of strong moral 
and ethical values, such as a radical anti-clerical position, the promotion of an anti-alcoholic 
campaign, as well as the organization of teachers and women (Martínez, 1979). His government 
was characterized as socialist; the modernization project included the creation of worker 
cooperatives and a strong corporative social organization: “in each village, town, municipality and 
city the workers from any trade were organized into the Central Resistance League” (Martínez, 
1979, p. 58). Young political groups were also organized into the Red Shirts, “an organization that 
served as a promoter of Garrido’s ideology” (Martínez, 1979, p. 39).  
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lands and the organization of ejidos in forest lands, as part of a late 
implementation of a late agrarian reform in 1940s (Tudela, 1989, p. 82). This 
territory was distributed among landless peasants from other provinces, mainly 
from the neighboring province of Veracruz. In the process, thousands of forest 
lands were cleared; “in the regional and national consciousness the forest was 
conceived as an obstacle whose removal was necessary to allow the emergence 
of an agriculture development process” (Tudela, 1989, p. 82). This process of 
deforestation was followed by another, more “powerful and systematic,” 
promoted by the cattle breeding sector – the transformation of forest lands into 
pasture lands (Tudela 1989, 86). The emergence of livestock farming then, with 
its “easy profit” strategies, accelerated the deterioration of Tabasco soils 
(Lezama, 1987). 
In the 1960s Tabasco was the locus of what has been characterized as 
one of the most important transformations of the region, the Chontalpa Plan, 
which changed wetland ecosystems into lands for agriculture and cattle 
production. This project was part of the large-scale land development projects 
the government had promoted with the aim of broadening the agricultural base 
beyond the central territory; it was also part of government experiments to 
develop the tropical-wet coastlands that started in 1940s, in the neighboring 
province of Veracruz, which represented “the first concerned look southward by 
Mexico” to a historically “neglected” region (Dozier, 1970, p. 62).27 
                                                 
27 Arrieta (2006) explains that the government strategy to modernize the tropics was inspired and 
based on the model applied in the Tennessee Valley in the United States; however, unlike the 
Tennessee model that aimed to recover underdeveloped economic regions, in the Mexican case 
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The Plan was a pilot project to test technologies designed to exploit the 
tropics; it also intended to take advantage of collective forms of production such 
as the ejido system (Velázquez, 1982, p. 90). The Plan entailed building dams, 
draining channels and wetlands, constructing infrastructure to provide fresh 
water, sewer systems and roads; it also included campaigns to combat pests 
(Pinkus & Contreras, 2012, p. 124). The purpose of this program was to 
incorporate 352 thousand hectares into production with crops such as sugar 
cane, bananas, rice, cacao and citrus fruits, as well as cattle (Pinkus & 
Contreras, 2012; Dewey, 1981).  This land was divided in ejidos and distributed 
to 500 families (Pinkus & Contreras, 2012). 
However, the success of this type of entrepreneurship was strongly 
determined by the characteristics of the natural ecosystems. Nature was an 
active agent shaping some of the project’s results: 
Such agricultural endeavors struggled against great odds. All have been 
subject to periodic dislocations, decline, revival, and at times complete 
abandonment – due to floods. The entire area is a maze of abandoned 
distributaries, extensive swamps, and lagoons, the patterns of which have 
shifted greatly during post-Columbian times and indeed within just the past 
century. Agriculture has been precarious even on the normally better-
drained natural levees (which have always been the attractive sites), while 
some formerly cultivated lower parts have been flooded more or less 
permanently, with no outlet for the water except by slow evaporation 
(Ridgeway, 2001, p. 63). 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
the objective was “to transform the backdrop of poverty in large frontier regions for the expansion 
of the national productive system” (p. 1). 
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“Taming” waters was one of the many actions planners envisioned for the 
viability of the Plan (Ridgeway, 2001, p. 72). As Arrieta (1994) explains, “the 
legendary promise of the wealth of the tropics” (p.7) was contingent on the 
control of water through an extensive network of infrastructure – including the 
building of one of the largest dams in Latin America (Ridgeway, 2001; Dewey, 
1981).  
 Arrieta (2006) explains that with the loans obtained from the Inter-
American Development Bank, government expectations of the Plan were high: i) 
during the following 14 years about 3, 300 families would get an income 20 times 
higher than before; ii) technicians would implement an experimental project to 
drain 50,000 hectares; iii) the government proposed the building of infrastructure, 
the organization of peasants, the transfer of direct loans and the implementation 
of training programs for peasants; iv) every family was provided with 15 hectares 
of land, in which the cultivation of crops such as corn, cacao and banana was 
promoted; v) the Inter-American Development Bank and other two consultant 
companies considered necessary to also include social services such as 
urbanization, services, schools, health centers, etc. (p. 1-2).  
Analysis of the many impacts of these types of extractive and crop-based 
large-scale projects in Tabasco echoes discussions of these types of economies 
around the world (Hall, 2011; Bunker, 1985). In the province, scholars have 
analyzed local changes such as the disintegration of local social structures and 
organizations, and their substitution by productive organizations such as ejidos. 
Among these impacts are the reproduction of clientelist engagement and 
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relationships with the government, and corporatist peasant organizations – 
largely based on corrupt and clientelistic practices – affiliated to the official 
political party, which assured the political control of peasants by regulating 
access to land. 
Among other transformations were the proletarization of formerly self-
sufficient campesinos and long-term environmental impacts (Martínez, 1979; 
Pinkus & Contreras, 2012). They explain that one of the most radical changes 
peasants experienced was the substitution of their traditional structures – family 
and collective work –for ejidos and salary-based work. Martínez (1979) explains 
that the main paradox of this Plan was that the strategy of creating ejidos to 
organize production put an end to collective work. Historically, the harsh natural 
conditions of this type of ecosystem required collective work strategies to be able 
to produce. Up to that time, collective units managed plantation and cattle 
production; people who owned a fraction of these lands were shareholders that 
shared the final product.  
The Plan aimed at transforming this region into “Mexico’s breadbasket”; 
however, land productivity did not increase as expected (Martínez, 1979; Pinkus 
& Contreras, 2012). In the 1960s rice production reached a total of thirty 
thousand tons, but by 2008 decreased to nine thousand tons (López, 2008). As 
some analysts explain, these types of initiatives show – as is the case of other 
experiences around the world – that the Chontalpa Plan was more the product of 
a political decision made by native leaders with strong political networks and 
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support in national spheres, rather than one based on technical or social 
grounds. 
To explain the “failure” of the Plan, the political elite re-cycled past colonial 
social representations: Tabasco’s population and immigrants from the country 
were “starved people, chronically sick persons, without any organization and 
condemned to live a precarious life because of the weather, the flood and the 
promiscuity” (Arrieta, 2006). For local peasants however, the Plan failed for three 
main reasons: the lack of government support, the environmental impacts of oil 
that affected their lands’ productivity, and mismanagement by government 
officials and local ejido leaders (López, 2008). The Plan started to decline in the 
1980s – the “lost decade” for Latin America – when Mexico’s oil crisis and the 
implementation of structural neoliberal reforms affected public investments. After 
experiencing the “technical and social” failure of the Plan (Chávez, 2010) the 
government closed production projects – the center for milk production, the rice 
mill, the machinery maintenance center, the pig livestock, and the banana and 
cacao plantations. Government-funded social and production services, such as 
passenger transportation, veterinary medicine and fertilizers, came to an end 
(López, 2008; Chávez, 2010). On top of these problems, the ejidatarios were left 
with debts.  
 Among the many benefits of the Plan was an improvement in living 
conditions – people had more access to health and education – and the 
improvement of other social services such as road infrastructure (Martínez, 1979; 
Pinkus & Contreras, 2012). Pinkus and Contreras (2012) mention as some of the 
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positive outcomes the creation of new villages and the redistribution of the 
population. However, this has been one of the most contentious issues of the 
Plan. The government’s expropriation affected 6,830 peasants; these lands were 
used to relocate 4,634 families into 22 urbanized villages (Chávez, 2010). Uribe 
(2010) describes this process as a radical uprooting that local peasants 
experienced in two ways: through their relocation or expulsion from their lands, 
and also through the transformation of their natural environment that underwent 
important changes due to deforestation, oil pollution, etc. (Uribe, 2010, p. 4). 
Along with the problem of the abundance of water, another key obstacle and 
“probably the most important, was that the peasants did not like the rapid 
restructuration of the lands, they did not agree to be relocated into the new 22 
ejidos” (Martínez, 1979, p. 49). Canudas explains that the Plan was an example 
of “acculturation” as it had occurred during colonial times: “in a few months, the 
population of a region changed their status, their location, home and their 
environmental surroundings. They needed to change their productive strategies 
as well” (quoted in Martínez, 1979, p.51). As Chávez, Galmiche, Rist, & Bern 
(2009) explain, the managerial modernist vision of the Plan promoters had a 
unidimensional and reduced concept of territory, 
ordering the population in relation to an ideal of economic rationality and 
efficiency… in which the communities, the vegetation, the water and the 
land were considered as simply homogeneous and replaceable building 
blocks, without any consideration of peoples’ heritage and way of living 
(p. 4040).   
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Local peasants protested against this Plan because they were not taken 
into account in the process; however, the state used military force to suppress 
any social discontent (Murillo, 2004). One more time, as in other interventions, 
Tabasco was used to accommodate an ideal national interest rather than 
address the needs of local inhabitants; under this scheme, “the local population 
was not the subject of development but its object” (quoted in Murillo, 2004, p. 
645). 
The most recent structural transformation experienced in Tabasco has 
been the emergence of the oil industry, initiated during the 1950s but expanded 
during the 1970s after the discovery of important oil and gas fields. During 
Mexico’s oil boom – 1976 to 1982 – the country increased its oil reserves from 
5.5 billion barrels in 1970, to 16 billion in 1977, and 60 billion in 1980 (Gavin, 
1996, p. 10). In 1980 Tabasco – the “Emerald of the Southeast” – produced more 
than half of Mexico’s total oil exports (Lezama, 1987, p. 235). In 2009, Tabasco 
was the second most important oil and gas producer in Mexico, just after the 
production that took place in territorial waters; it contributed 28% of the total oil 
production and 30% of gas production in Mexico (INEGI, 2009); in 2013 it was 
the most important oil and gas producer (SENER, 2013). Scholars report that the 
expansion of the industry increased giddily: in 1976 the government invested a 
total of 421 million pesos, and two years later, the amount was about 10 
thousand million (Velázquez, 1982, p. 169).  
The Mexican government had high expectations: the oil boom represented 
the possibility of restructuring the “import substitution” economic model; it was an 
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opportunity to increase its foreign currency reserves, to improve public finances, 
to promote industrialization and economic growth. In short, it represented the 
possibility “to overcome the problems associated with Mexico’s 
underdevelopment condition” (Negrete, 1984, p. 96). The oil facilitated Mexico’s 
consolidation as an emergent economy in the international sphere (Delgado, 
Jiménez, Espejel, Ferman, Martínez, Mejía, & Seingier, 2011). This period 
represented, then, the adoption of a mono-exportation model centered primarily 
on hydrocarbon resources.  
The oil sector’s contribution to the provincial economy was about 50% in 
1970, and 70% in 1978. Table 2 shows the economic share of this activity in the 
province more recently.  
 
Table 2. Tabasco Gross Domestic Product, 2009. 
 
Economic Sector Participation in 
Tabasco Gross 
Domestic Product 
 
Primary Sector: 
 
1.36 
- Agriculture, livestock, forest 
production, fishing and hunting 
1.36 
 
Secondary Sector: 
 
70.27 
- Mining (oil and gas production) 
- Construction, electricity, water, gas. 
- Manufacturing 
60.64 
6.46 
 
3.17 
 
Tertiary Sector: 
 
28.37 
- Commercial 
- Transportation and Information 
- Financial and Real Estate Services 
- Education and Health Services 
- Government Activities 
- Other Services 
8.56 
3.7 
6.16 
4.99 
2.72 
2.19 
      Source: INEGI, 2009. 
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This industry had a radical impact on the style and quality of life of local 
peasants, on their environment, on their economy and fundamentally, on their 
social relations. In discussing the characteristics of extraction economies, 
scholars highlight “demographic and infrastructural dislocations” as one of its 
important impacts (Bunker, 1985, p. 23). The location of the sites where raw 
material exploitation takes place are commonly far from the existing urban, social 
and economic centers, which increases the costs of infrastructure – social 
services, transportation – as well as the costs of foodstuff to supply the emergent 
demand. In Tabasco scholars have analyzed the same type of problems. 
The oil boom accelerated the increasing national and inter-provincial 
migration flows that have been taking place in Tabasco since the middle of the 
twentieth century, with the agrarian reform. However, an important characteristic 
of these migrations promoted by the emergence of the oil industry is that they 
were mainly intra-municipal flows (Lezama, 1987).28 During the period 1940-1980 
the population in Tabasco grew four times, rising from 285 thousand to more 
than 1 million people; the province’s growth rates were higher than the national 
average (Negrete, 1984, p. 90). There is contradictory information about the role 
of the oil industry in creating jobs. Negrete (1984) for example, argues that until 
the 1970s migrants flocked to work in the agricultural sector; however, after that 
                                                 
28 A municipality is the smallest political and administrative subdivision of the Mexican federal 
system, with power of self-government and jurisdiction. Tabasco has 17 municipalities within its 
territory. Lezama (1989) explains that in the 1970s in oil municipalities, there was a higher 
participation of women in migration flows than men. The character of migration to oil 
municipalities is familiar: men moved to the oil sites with their children and wives. This could lead 
to the hypothesis, Lezama (1989) adds, that the oil industry could have created indirect jobs for 
women, in traditional activities such as domestic work, as peddlers, or in administrative-related 
jobs. Non-oil municipalities show an opposite trend; in this type of migration, men are the main 
migration group. 
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decade the flows increased to municipalities where Pemex had productive and 
extractive activities (Ibid). However this is not to say that the oil industry 
employed this migrant labor. Lezama (1987) questions the role of the oil industry 
as the main sector generating jobs; in fact, what happened in the case of 
Tabasco is that the oil industry promoted the diversification of other sectors, such 
as construction and manufacturing, which generated more employment. The oil 
industry worked as a catalyst in the promotion of other economic sectors. The 
role of the oil industry in the labor market is also questioned by the fact that in 
four of the seven oil municipalities in the province, the agricultural sector 
employed more labor during the oil boom (1970s) than in decades before 
(Lezama, 1989). This discussion demonstrates the role of the oil in Tabasco, an 
enclave industry that disrupted local and regional social and economic 
processes, oriented to external markets, and with poor results in terms of 
activating the local economy by generating employment. 
Increasing migration gave rise to different social disruptions. Municipal 
authorities lacked the capacity to plan and provide services that the growing 
population demanded. Increasing population growth gave rise to the creation of 
irregular settlements where no service was provided, an increase in the price of 
housing, and pressure over the provision of basic social services (Velázquez, 
1982).  
Allub (1985, p. 351) explains that migrants from around the country were 
incorporated into a “traditional” social stratification29 comprised by ejidatarios, 
                                                 
29 It is interesting to notice how scholars use the term “traditional,” which appears to refer to any 
structure or arrangement found in place before the emergence of a new event. For example, in 
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small rural producers and local traders. These migrants were mainly workers, 
employees and technicians whose salaries were higher than those earned by 
locals. This new social stratification had an impact in terms of labor markets, 
income distribution and consumption patterns: distortion of the local economy 
was expressed in the decrease of local investments and the increasing demand 
for goods and services produced outside the province (Negrete, 1984, p. 103).  
As a consequence of oil extraction, public revenues in Tabasco increased 
from 1.5 million pesos in 1973 to 650 million in 1977 (Negrete, 1984). 
Paradoxically, these economic resources were not translated into better local 
conditions for the Tabasco population: between 1971 and 1976 the province 
invested 72% of its resources in oil-related infrastructure and only 28% was 
distributed to support other economic sectors (Lezama, 1987, p. 236).  The oil 
boom, then, reinforced Tabasco’s role as an “enclave” economy – oriented to 
external needs – since it was not used to support and diversify other economic 
activities that could potentially support regional development (Hall, 2011; Bunker, 
1985). 
Tabasco is also an example of an “exclusionary accumulation” economy, 
characterized on one hand, by the existence of an oil sector with high 
productivity, income and labor stability, and on the other hand by an agricultural 
sector with low productivity and salaries (Allub, 1985, p. 352). The lower income 
                                                                                                                                                 
the discussion on the Plan Chontalpa, scholars identified as one of the most important impacts 
the creation of ejidos, which replaced “traditional” collective family and community-based 
organizations. Ejidos in that context were understood as alien to the local organizational forms. In 
Allub’s (1985) analysis referred above, ejidos are conceived as part of “traditional” local 
production arrangements. This highlights the need to understand historical local dynamics before 
we attribute the category of traditional to any structure, process or person. 
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rates – less than the minimum wage – were concentrated in the agricultural 
sector; the industry and activities related to Pemex were up to three times higher 
than the minimum income (Negrete, 1984, p. 102). 
The activities involved in oil exploration and drilling, and the construction 
of pumping stations and pipelines, fragmented the already deteriorated wetland 
ecosystems in the Gulf of Mexico (Wilson & Ryan, 1997). These activities also 
displaced peasants from their lands, by both the expropriation of their lands and 
by the ecological damage and contamination that has resulted in the 
abandonment of their agriculture and livestock activities (Negrete, 1984). The oil 
industry impacted peasants livelihoods, which has meant “peasants’ violent 
abandonment of their way of life” (Velázquez, 1982, p. 170). As Tudela (1989) 
explains,  
[The] government’s oil program was designed with a technocratic view; in 
its beginnings, this project was an alien, a project that did not take into 
account local development needs. The oil company did not feel committed 
with Tabasco’s local circumstances… their consideration would have 
meant an obstacle in the industry’s compulsive expansion plans (p. 339). 
 
In the study area, fishers explained the many impacts the oil industry has 
brought to their communities, not only in terms of their life,30 livelihood and 
health, but also in terms of the reconfiguration of these communities’ social and 
political relations. The relationships between Pemex and peasants and fishermen 
has been based on the deployment of two strategies: on one hand the 
                                                 
30 In 1976, during the oil boom, oil-related accidents were the third cause of death in Tabasco, 
30% above the national average (Tudela, 1989, p. 344). 
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instrumentation of corrupt patron-client relationships to coopt local leaders and 
social organizations; and on the other hand, the establishment of authoritarian 
and repressive strategies that have caused the death and imprisonment of many 
people.31    
According to Scott (1998), the most tragic episodes of state-led social 
engineering in the context of high modernism emerged from the combination of 
four elements: the administrative ordering of nature and society, a high-modernist 
ideology, an authoritarian state, and a prostrated civil society that lacks the 
capacity to resist. As I have briefly explained, Tabasco’s experience illustrates 
the combination of at least three of these elements; civil society, however, is not 
“prostrate” in the Tabasco context. Uribe explains that two visions prevail in the 
literature about the emergence of these types of high modernist projects in 
Tabasco. The first is the “systemic” approach that explains these interventions as 
the inevitable result of Mexico’s insertion in the international market. The second 
is that they are the result of the willful initiatives of powerful politicians. However, 
Uribe argues that the emergence and development of these state interventions 
had as backdrop intense indigenous and peasant mobilizations and protests. 
                                                 
31 According to Velázquez (1982), Pemex strategies to deal with local conflicts change according 
to the political and economic power of the actors with whom they negotiate. In the case of the big 
agricultural entrepreneurs – who also have powerful political networks – Pemex compensates for 
the damage of oil on their lands, following a cooperative strategy that recognizes the direct and 
indirect oil pollution impacts on their lands. However, in the case of local peasants Pemex has an 
authoritarian relationship, dismissing damages and impacts. In this case Pemex imposes a 
“bureaucratic wall” against which peasants need to prove – using technical assessments – the 
damages caused by the industry, based on rules and procedures established by the oil company. 
Pemex-peasant power relationships, then, are based on the use of ‘’expert knowledge’’ to deny 
damages, a scheme that implicitly regards peasants as ‘’ ignorant’’ and unable to fulfill the 
technical and bureaucratic procedures necessary to demonstrate their claims. In a broader 
analysis on the relationship between the state and social movements, Fox and Hernández (1992) 
argue that Mexican governmental responses to popular movements “typically combined partial 
concessions with repression, conditioning access to material gains on political subordination” (p. 
167).  
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These state interventions, then, have been shaped by the active presence of 
fishermen and peasants who have struggled for their inclusion as participants 
and victims of these projects – negotiating resources32 and making claims about 
their impacts.33  
This activism and mobilization of local actors might also be explained in 
light of their social and economic exclusion. Tabasco is considered one of the 
poorest provinces in Mexico (CONEVAL, 2012). In 2010, 57% of its population 
was classified as living in conditions of poverty (CONEVAL, 1212, p. 12). 
Tabasco rated below national average indicators in access to social security 
(benefits, welfare, pensions), quality and lack of access to housing (housing with 
inadequate building material or high numbers of people living in a room); lack of 
social services (housing without access to water, drainage, electricity, or that use 
wood or coal to cook without a chimney in the house); and access to food 
(population with severe limitations in access to food so they can have a healthy 
                                                 
32 In 2008 a group of peasants met with the provincial governor asking that resources be 
channeled to revitalize the Plan Chontalpa, a project that, as I explained, has not received state 
support since the 1980s (López, 2008). 
33 Pemex’s “carrot and stick” strategies have resulted in social protests and mobilizations. One of 
the most important social movements in the region was the Riverine Pact, a movement that 
emerged in 1976 mobilizing tens of thousands of fishers and peasants from many villages. Their 
main goal was to claim compensation for the many damages the oil industry had caused in their 
lands and water resources – salinization of their lands, fresh water pollution, etc. Velázquez 
(1982) explains that this mobilization emerged after many failed attempts on the part of the 
peasants to negotiate with Pemex – who until that time offered as the only response repression 
and threats. The peasants reached an agreement in 1980: the government would compensate 
with 4 000 million pesos; however, as Velázquez (1982) explains, only a few powerful local actors 
received their compensation – in 1997 only six thousands of sixty-three thousand claims had 
been processed (Town & Hanson, 2001, p. 35) – the majority of the peasants are still waiting. In 
my interviews peasants referred to the fact that they did not receive any compensation, and they 
coincided with Velázquez (1982) when they attribute this to corruption and the diversion of funds 
to political campaigns of the official party. As Town and Hanson (2001) explain, “Much of the 
money earmarked for reparations has instead been employed to strengthen party-state-industry 
relationships… The reparations funds have financed large construction projects in Villahermosa, 
been stolen by Pemex and state officials, and become part of the web of electoral financing 
designed to keep the state’s ruling party in power” (p. 35). 
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and active life) (CONEVAL, 2012, p. 51).34 In an extensive and one of the most 
important studies on Tabasco, where the different state interventions mentioned 
above are analyzed, Tudela highlights the existence of a development “paradox.” 
This paradox refers to the fact that in Tabasco, the historic periods in which 
malnutrition increases in the peasant population coincide with those stages 
where there has been an economic boom.35 People’s malnutrition is among the 
social costs of progress (Tudela, 1989, p. 410). 
 
3.3.2 The Coastal Communities  
The case study includes five rural, extremely poor and marginalized coastal 
communities. The biggest and more urbanized community has about 1,600 
inhabitants, and the other four range between 374 and 600 inhabitants (INEGI, 
2010). Fishing is an old activity in this region. Fishers practice small-scale 
artisanal fishing with small boats (see figures 10-12).  
                                                 
34 A researcher from a local university stated that “Tabasco has the same conditions that any 
African country,” an idea that conveys different problematic messages about how poverty is 
socially represented and how Tabasco itself is being envisioned under the loop of “progress” 
(interview with a scientist from a local university. May 31, 2012. Tabasco). It is worth mentioning 
that in the literature I reviewed on Tabasco, I found subtle language and messages in which 
representations of local inhabitants as backward or problematic, and concepts such as tradition 
and progress, were used to describe the region. In an interview, for example, a researcher 
portrayed fishermen as people who cannot always understand or interpret their contexts and 
social problems (interview with a scientist from a research center. December 12, 2011. Tabasco). 
These findings highlight the need to re-think our work as researchers that at times reproduce the 
very categories and concepts we aim to criticize. Scientists, then, need to be understood as 
active agents that in making their analysis carrying with them values that are reproduced in their 
work.  
35 Other studies support Tudela’s argument. Dewey (1981) studied the shift from subsistence to 
commercial agriculture and its impacts on the nutrition of preschool children in the Plan 
Chontalpa region. She argues that “when families are compared with respect to the crop diversity 
of their family plots and their degree of dependence on purchased foods, children of families who 
are more self-sufficient are better off nutritionally” (Dewey, 1981, p. 185-6).  
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In these places local fishers have virtually no alternative economic activity. 
They depend on fishing to survive. In interviews fishers reported that they were 
full-time fishers. However, there are some fishermen who have other additional 
temporary activities such as agriculture and livestock farming, but these 
productive activities were small-scale and for their own consumption. Therefore, 
it is possible that fishermen did not report these activities to me since they did not 
generate any economic income. Other kinds of income sources reported were 
remittances from family members who work in the province’s capital city as 
maids, or in construction in Cancun. However in this latter case the fishers 
explained that their sons’ income was just barely enough for them to survive in 
these places, to pay their rent and food, and they did not earn enough money to 
send to their parents. 
Figure 10. A fisherman and his wife in a study community 
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Figure 11. Fishing Boats 
 
Figure 12. Fishing nets commonly used to fish in the lagoons 
 
111 
 
The study communities are not places that were incorporated in the large-scale 
government interventions such as the Plan Chontalpa (the Chontalpa region is to 
the south of the study communities). Within the study region, only one of the 
study communities had a large farm (hacienda) with palm plantations; however, it 
only employed about ten people and was not productive anymore.36 Migrants to 
these communities did not report having arrived to this region as workers from 
large-scale plantations from neighboring areas. They moved to be able to get a 
piece of land and exploit fishing resources in the area. The majority of them were 
peasants that came from nearby inland villages. Even though the study 
communities surround oil sites opened in 1976, I did not find anyone who 
reported having worked for this industry, nor had their family or neighbors in the 
community.  
The majority of fishers exploit resources from three interconnected 
lagoons, but some of them – those with motorboats and nets – also fish in the 
sea (figures 13-15 show the three lagoons). However, as it is the case of other 
inland fisheries in the region, fishers also exploit resources from others 
environments such as estuaries, rivers, streams and marshlands (Mendoza et al. 
2013). The Carmen-Pajonal-Machona lacunar system exploited by the 
communities in this study is Mexico’s most important oyster producer 
(Crassostrea virginica). Mexico is one of the most important oyster producers in 
the world. It occupies the sixth place; specifically, the Gulf of Mexico contributes 
with 93.4% of the national production, (Pérez, Galmiche, Zapata, Martínez, & 
Meseguer, 2012, p. 134). In the Gulf of Mexico the neighboring province of 
                                                 
36 Interview with a freelance fisher. December 14, 2011. Tabasco. 
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Veracruz is the main producer, Tabasco is the second most important – in 2011 
Tabasco caught a total of about 13 thousand tons of oysters (CONAPESCA, 
2011, p. 163). These communities supply the largest consumer population from 
the country, Mexico City – almost all their product was reported to go to this 
market. Fishermen organized in cooperatives exploit mainly oysters. However, 
other fishermen also fish for shrimp, crab, clam, winkle, nook, tilapia, wreckfish, 
sea bream, sea bass, shark, and dogfish. 
 
Figure 13. Lagoon “El Carmen” part of the El Carmen-Pajonal-Machona Lacunar 
System 
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Figure 14. Lagoon “Pajonal” part of the El Carmen-Pajonal-Machona Lacunar 
System 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Lagoon “La Machona” part of the El Carmen-Pajonal-Machona 
Lacunar  
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Women’s participation in fishing activities is very important; together with 
their children they have the main task of shelling oysters. They also help their 
husbands fish in the lagoons. Pérez et al. (2012) describe the process as follow: 
For oyster extraction, fishermen use instruments called scrapers, made up 
of two mangrove wood sticks joined in the middle as if they were a pincer. 
Oysters are collected in tare weights and carried to the product stock and 
shelling plants. Shelling consists of extracting the oyster meat from its 
shell, an activity carried out by women whose family members are 
partners in the cooperative, and it is done in their houses (p.134). 
 
Official data report the existence of more than two thousand fishermen in 
this region. However, as fishing officials recognized in the interviews, these 
official numbers are not accurate since only legally registered people appear in 
the data. As I explain further, the lagoon is accessed by thousands of fishermen 
from these and neighboring communities who do not hold any legal permit. There 
are three types of fishers – members of cooperatives, permisionarios or private 
fishermen, and “freelance” fishers – categories that also correspond to the 
stratified economic and political power these actors hold inside and outside their 
local communities.  
 Fishermen have restricted public access to the lagoons. Officially, the only 
people who are legally allowed to fish and market lagoon resources are the 
fishermen who have a government permit; the only type of fishers that get 
permits are the ones organized into cooperatives, or the private fishermen 
(permisionarios). But only the cooperatives get permits to exploit oysters; private 
fishers have permits for other lagoon species.  
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  In the municipality there are thirty-two cooperatives, and nine in the study 
communities. The first cooperative was created in the 1950s. The total number of 
fishers officially registered in the fishing government office is 2,500. The largest 
cooperative has a total of 172 members. 
Fishermen receive the benefits of being organized into cooperatives, such 
as government subsidies to buy boat engines, nets and gasoline. In the past they 
also received a subsidy during the closed off season, in the form of a temporary 
job with a fixed subsidized salary. Some fishers also explained that it is through 
the cooperatives that Pemex allocates the resources to compensate fishers when 
they cannot fish due to oil spills or other problems related to oil industry activity. 
Fishers’ leaders reported reductions in state support: many subsidies and 
programs that they received in the past have been closed.  
The cooperatives take turns fishing. Their members can fish wherever 
they want within the three lagoons, there is not a specific area assigned to each 
cooperative. Each member goes fishing twice a week. Each member receives a 
ticket that allows him to fish for a specific amount. In the interviews, fishers 
reported that at that time they were allowed to fish between 2,000-3,000 mollusks 
each time. At the time of the interviews fishermen reported they were paid 110 
Mexican pesos for every thousand oysters they sold to the cooperative. 
However, they also complained that sometimes they receive much less, there 
have been times when they only received 80 pesos. From this amount they need 
to deduct the expenses they incurred before they sold the product. For example, 
if a fisherman needs to contract a woman to do the shelling, he needs to pay 
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thirty-five pesos for 1,000 oysters she shelled; they also need to deduct gasoline 
expenses. In sum, the fishermen explained, if they obtained a permit for 6,000 
mollusks, they would receive about 600 pesos; from there they would pay 210 for 
shelling plus about 80 in gasoline expenses; they would end up receiving a total 
of 300 pesos a week. With this amount, as they explained, “it is impossible to 
subsist if you consider the costs of transportation to send the kids to school, to 
buy basic staples, gasoline, canoe reparations, to feed about four, six or more 
family members.”37 To send their kids to school, for example, they pay about 100 
pesos a week in transportation.  
As the fishing authorities explained, fishermen must comply with certain 
fishing regulations. They need to fish species that have a minimum length of 
seven centimeters, and they also need to return green shells to the lagoons, in 
order to restock oyster banks. A third regulation they need to observe are the two 
closed seasons (one and a half months each). Figures 16-19 show cooperative 
buildings and some of their members packing oysters in plastic bags for the 
market. 
 
                                                 
37 Interview a cooperative member fisher. June 8, 2012. Tabasco. 
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Figure 16. Cooperative building in one of the study communities. 
 
 
Figure 17. Cooperative members packing oysters in plastic bags for the market. 
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Figure 18. Cooperative members packing oysters for the market. 
 
 
Figure 19. Cooperative members selling their products to private dealers from 
Mexico City 
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A second type of fishermen are the permisionarios. These are private 
fishers who have the financial resources to buy their own equipment, boats and 
nets, and who also employ other fishers to work for them. In the municipality 
there are a total of fifty permisionarios. They have different types of permits to 
fish different kind of species, except oysters – only the cooperatives hold permits 
to exploit them. The permisionarios also receive public funds and subsidies. 
Some fishers explained that the permisionarios “exploit” their fishers, because 
they do not work directly in fishing, but send their workers to do so, and get most 
of the benefits of the catch. However, one permisionario explained that their 
employees get sixty percent of the catch, and that he gets only thirty percent 
Furthermore, the public subsidies they receive are also meant to benefit their 
employees; however, many fishermen complained that they do not share the 
benefits. The permisionarios then hamper the trickle-down effect the government 
expects to generate by supporting these kinds of initiatives. Permisionarios are 
regarded as fishermen with strong political power and networks that benefit them 
through the assignment of projects funded by the fishing authorities. They have 
connections with provincial political leaders. They have the skill to navigate the 
many bureaucratic procedures to get funds. But most importantly, as many 
fishermen explained, they have the economic resources to skip the job for 
several days and spend money traveling to the city to apply for funding, to talk to 
influential people, to learn about procedures and new initiatives, etc. The majority 
of interviewees think that these type of fishermen exert their political and 
economic power to get better conditions to exploit the lagoon and sea resources. 
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However, other fishermen thought that permisionarios are like any other 
employer, a member of the community who also faces the difficulties of his own 
economic activity. Figure 20 shows some of the infrastructure built by 
permissionarios. 
 
 
Figure 20. Permisionario’s private warehouse and freezer. 
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As I explained above, an important problem that the local fishing official 
explained was that they do not know the precise number of fishers that fish in the 
lagoons or the sea, because only the head family member is officially registered 
either as member of a cooperative or as private fisher. However, in reality all 
family members exploit the resources, and also the majority of the members of 
these and the surrounding communities make their livelihood fishing.  The 
fishermen who lack a government permit granting access to the lagoon and sea 
are called “freelance” or independent fishermen. This group of people is the 
poorest and most vulnerable (figures 21-22). Their main demand is to get 
permission from the government to create more cooperatives. However, fishing 
authorities are not issuing fishing licenses anymore; therefore, independent 
fishers need to work “illegally” with the many risks this job implies. They are the 
group most affected by the corruption of both the authorities and the organized 
fishers. Usually freelance fishermen fish without any legal protection, so if an 
authority catches them fishing they are at risk of going to jail and they are also 
deprived of their equipment, tools, nets and boats. This is a real threat. They 
explained that some could get up to seven years in jail and they could be fined 
for 30,000 Mexican pesos; and their fishing tools are never returned.  
122 
 
Figure 21. Freelance fisherman with his son. 
 
Figure 22. . Typical house of a freelance fisherman. 
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Considering that the only way to meet their needs is fishing, a key problem 
is the closed season that lasts three months each year. If fishing is their only 
means to survive, freelancers, cooperative members or private fishers, take the 
risk to fish and sell their product through smuggling, in the black market. Some 
freelancers are still in jail, because as they said, during the fishing season they 
can negotiate with the authorities but during the closed season they are not able 
to negotiate; the authorities in this case follow the legal norms. Freelancers 
explained that when they are caught during the fishing season, they immediately 
gather together in the lagoon and “negotiate” with the authority: “We tell them 
[the authorities], either you take all of us or you don’t take any of us.”38 The fact 
that they need to pay a bribe in exchange for being freed was implied in the 
interviews. As Pérez et al. (2012) explain,  
A closed season is not exactly a threat, for it has the objective of 
regulating oyster reproduction, but the lack of clear policies around it, in 
order to respond to the needs of the poorest population, generates this 
perception. This is so because the population is highly dependent on 
oyster capture and shelling to generate earnings, yet without viable and 
clear options to substitute it, their food security is affected (p. 141). 
 
Sometimes members of the cooperatives pass on to freelance fishers a 
ticket that allows them to fish legally. They get the tickets by buying them directly 
from the cooperative’s representatives. Other times they get these tickets from 
the people who buy their fish. They are called fayuqueros – people who buy 
something illegally. The fayuqueros buy the tickets from the cooperative’s 
                                                 
38 Interview a cooperative member fisher. June 9, 2012.Tabasco. 
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representatives; they pay about 200 Mexican pesos for each ticket. They allocate 
those tickets to the independent fishers, so that the latter can get oysters and sell 
them to the fayuqueros directly, without drawing up a formal invoice including 
taxes. Some fishers recognized their close dependency on these dealers, who 
buy their product and give them tickets for free. There is also a social stigma 
against freelance fishermen, who are blamed for many of the problems the 
communities face; from some fishermen’s perspective, they were responsible for 
polluting the lagoon or for doing nothing to protect their resources: “they are 
illegal therefore, they don’t care.”39   
The lack of economic alternatives for survival has forced people from 
these communities to migrate. In interviews I mainly gathered information about 
internal migration: young women usually go to the capital city to work as nannies; 
young men go to tourist areas places such as Cancun, to work in the 
construction industry. Other studies report migration to Campeche to work fishing 
sea cucumber (Pérez et al., 2012, p. 142). International migration is not as 
common as in other parts of the province such as, for example, the neighboring 
municipality of Paraiso, where women have been migrating to North Carolina, 
Virginia and Maryland to work for crab processing companies since 1989 (Pérez 
et al., 2012, p. 127).  
 Fishermen explained that members of the cooperatives and freelance 
fishermen live almost in the same material conditions. Some of them have small 
houses made of cement; most of them, however, have houses made of metal 
sheets or palm wood and mud floors. The permisionarios are seen as the people 
                                                 
39 Interview with a private fisher (permisionario). December 9, 2011. Tabasco. 
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with more economic power and this is reflected in their bigger households, more 
property – land, vehicles, fishing equipment (figure 23). These different types of 
fishers are closely interconnected with each other; freelancers have cousins who 
are cooperative member fishers. Private fishers have daughters who are married 
with cooperative member fishers, etc. These kinship interconnections explain 
some of the cooperative practices I found especially between freelancers and 
cooperative member fishers (figure 24). 
 
Figure 23. Typical house of a permisionario or private fisher. 
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Figure 24.  A cooperative member.  
 
 
The people I interviewed brought poverty conditions into the discussion. 
While doing fieldwork, it was common to see children on the streets during 
school hours; when I asked a group of four children why they were not at school, 
their grandmother told me that they did not want to go because there they got 
hungry. The family could not afford the first meal of the day for the children. It 
was noon and they had not had any meals. Their mother migrated to the capital 
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city, and she was single mother. Most of their shacks have only one large room; 
the kitchen is outside the home. The majority of the young population has 
completed only primary school; there is no high school in their communities, and 
they cannot afford to pay for transportation to go to the villages where the school 
is located. It is common see young women between sixteen and eighteen years 
of age at home. Pérez et al. (2012) provide a testimony from a local 47-year old 
teacher in one of my study communities:  
The young women here become stuck; they get together with young men 
(as a couple) from a very young age, 14 or 15 years old, because the 
father cannot support that many mouths. Since they are girls they teach 
them to make tortillas, rice, and get prepared for what will be their future 
work: the household and shelling” (p. 134). 
 
Young men in these communities face an uncertain future as well. Even if 
they belong to a family where the father is a cooperative member, they do not 
have full rights to access and exploit the lagoon resources. Their fathers pass 
them the ticket so they can fish legally. However, since there is only one ticket 
per member they usually add to the ranks of the freelance fishers, fishing 
illegally, engaging in extra-legal practices to get and sell their products. A 
common ideal of all the young people interviewed is that “they want to change 
the system.” They want to end the practices that according to them have done 
more damage to their communities and the cooperatives than good: corruption of 
their leaders, under the table negotiations with fishing and oil representatives, 
despoliation of the goods that belong to the cooperative members, the diversion 
of funds, among many others. In interviews the young people – in their early 20s 
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– thought their parents had failed. The new generation of young people, they 
said, needs to make a change. The common complaint was corruption, like a 
disease that permeates and destroys their organizations and communities (figure 
25). 
Figure 25. Former cooperative building, now empty and un-used. The 
cooperative directive is in a lawsuit with government agencies taking legal action 
for misuse of funds and other legal charges against cooperative leaders. 
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  In interviews, a different picture came from the older generation of 
fishermen. A former cooperative leader said explicitly that he accepted becoming 
the cooperative leader because he wanted to benefit from the many funds that 
flew through the organizations: “I wanted to take, to use this opportunity to get 
something for myself, but I could not find anything to get, so it was a 
disappointment” he said.40 In this narrative, his ideas appeared to be common 
sense, a normal course of action expected from someone in a leadership 
position. 
Other narratives portray the existence of an “ideal past” that was more or 
less perfect: the cooperatives were well-managed, there was no corruption and 
the state funded them with many subsidies and projects. It was a time when only 
two large cooperatives existed. However, since the 1990s everything changed 
after the government provided more permits and about nine new cooperatives 
were formed. In the past, these fishermen said, community members complied 
better with their social commitments. Before, every family used to restock the 
lagoons with shells, unlike these times where only few do that. In the past they 
used to restock because they were conscious about the need to protect their 
resources, they said. Unfortunately, they explained, the government started to 
spoil their communities because public funds were used to pay to people to 
restock: before it was for free, now people do not do it unless they get paid 
(figure 26). Before, fishermen only fished mature species, and now they 
devastate everything: they fish small sizes, interrupt the reproductive cycle of 
many species, and use nets that are not appropriate or that are illegal for fishing.  
                                                 
40 Interview with a former fisherman leader of a local cooperative. December 12, 2011.Tabasco. 
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Figure 26. Piles of oysters’ shells along one of the study community’s coast. The 
shells were usually used to restock the lagoons; in this community fishermen 
throw them in their backyard. 
 
 
 
Parallel to this narrative fishermen explained another one: the first two 
cooperatives, the only ones and largest of Tabasco, had financial problems, the 
leaders committed fraud and tax evasion, and they also diverted public funding. 
Legal allegations are still underway in Mexico City. In the past things actually 
worked differently but not necessarily because people were more conscious 
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about the need to protect the lagoon or marine resources and their communities, 
but because “they were other times”: people never restocked the lagoon because 
there was no need to do that, there were few fishermen exploiting the lagoon and 
the resources were abundant in this region. In interviews, “abundance” of 
resources was the word most used to describe the old times: a great variety of 
fish, crustaceans, mollusks and reptiles were fished. 
Fishermen explained that population growth and lack of state support are 
the two important events that are key to understanding the crisis that 
cooperatives and their communities experience. Some fishermen blamed 
migrants from the neighboring province of Veracruz – who migrated to these 
communities in the 1950s – as the cause of many of the communities’ problems. 
Migrants caused, for example, the deforestation of coastline where they decided 
to build their settlements. Therefore, they caused the disappearance of 
mangrove resources such as beach grape (Coccoloba uvifera) and other native 
species that functioned as a natural wind-braking barrier against hurricanes and 
storms. They explained that since immigrants arrived everything changed in the 
community: overexploitation of natural resources; native community members’ 
dispossession of land, fishing and other natural resources; community 
fragmentation; and the introduction of drugs are also part of the many damages, 
among other problems. But probably the most significant structural change 
introduced by fishermen from Veracruz was the introduction of their fishing 
techniques, tools and stronger boat engines that transformed the traditional 
small-scale way of fishing in these communities into one that is more intensive, 
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commercially-oriented and also more destructive, as the fishers explained. Only 
a few years of Veracruzanos arriving was enough to position this group as the 
most important – political and economically – displacing locals leaders “who did 
not have a business vision, who did not exploit the resources on a large scale.”41 
They have held political power within the cooperatives; they become their 
leaders, using their political networks with the provincial and national government 
officials. They also started the “claims-making business” against Pemex.42 As a 
local teacher explained, the Veracruzanos taught the locals “how to make their 
claims against Pemex effective, the types of tricks the locals need to use to get 
their compensation.”43 Therefore the Veracruzanos are also related to the 
emergence of corruption within the cooperatives, and in the communities in 
general.  
 There are a lot of disagreements among fishers. They think of “the other” 
as someone selfish, corrupt, who only thinks of himself instead of thinking of the 
community’s welfare. In interviews they recognize that as a community they are 
divided. Politically, there are important divisions between two main political party 
constituencies, the PRI and the PRD. In one of the communities there were two 
local representatives from each of these two political parties – both claimed that 
they had won the election, both served in their offices as the local representative. 
However, they also recognize that when it comes to negotiations with or 
                                                 
41 Interview with a high school teacher from one of the study communities. June 11, 2012. 
Tabasco. 
42 In an interview, a local teacher explained that fishermen and peasants in Tabasco grow 
damage “compensations” from Pemex, not crops, not food. The popular expression of the 
“reclamation business” refers as well to the fact that according to some non-fishermen community 
members, fishermen have made of Pemex’s compensations a way of living, a means to make 
their livelihood (June 11, 2012. Tabasco).   
43 Interview with a high school teacher. June 11, 2012. Tabasco.  
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struggles against the oil company (Pemex) they are very well organized and 
united. They mentioned that as fishers they are not divided, but they are citizens 
with different political interests and parties. In fact, the fishers from my study 
communities are known in Tabasco as the strongest and well-organized fishers 
from the province.44 A leader said that during their meetings and to avoid 
problems, they “do not talk about politics.”45 As I explain below, their relations 
with Pemex have been very conflictive, a factor that has at times made them 
organize to struggle together to make their claims.46  
In the interviews fishers identified oil pollution, overfishing, decreasing catch 
rates and total yields, and lack of markets as their main problems. A constant 
complaint was the lack of government support for the fishing sector; fishermen 
also discussed other issues such as a new fishing law that promotes fish farming, 
the failure of oyster and shrimp farming government projects implemented in 
these communities, and the law that forbids fishing close to the offshore oil 
infrastructure. Other important problems they mentioned were their need to get 
support and advice to manufacture their product. Some referred to problems with 
the middlemen that sell their product in Mexico City.  
 I observed some problems that the fishers never referred to as their 
immediate problems, nor were they raised when fishers were discussing 
overfishing or lack of production, such as the lack of enforcement in the 
                                                 
44 Private conversation with my supervisor, who has been studying this region for a long time. 
45 Interview with a local fishers’ leader. December 21, 2011. Tabasco. 
46 In the interviews private fishermen and some cooperative and local leaders were closely 
related to the official political party PRI. On the other hand, the ‘”freelance” fishermen politically 
identified themselves with the opposition, with the PRD; they remember when a local governor 
from this party, an important national leader, channeled public funding - gasoline and tool 
subsidies - to their communities.   
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implementation of the regulations regarding access to lagoon and sea resources. 
Everyone can fish, legally or illegally – there is an informal agreement about this, 
covering each other if needed. There is also a lack of enforcement of regulations 
around fishing certain species: fishermen can fish any species they want even 
without a formal permit. If the authority catches them they will report this 
production as a result of “chance” or accident. At the time of my fieldwork there 
was more shrimp production in the lagoon than ever before, and many fishers did 
not have the license to fish this species, but they did it anyway since there was a 
lot of production. There was tuna available in the sea, and fishers did not have 
license for this species either, but they fished it anyway. Another problem 
mentioned often was the lack of government oversight about the type of fishing 
nets fishermen use.  One of the fishers’ leaders referred to a new fishing law that 
had been discussed in the Congress. On one hand he was complaining about 
the law, because for them it would mean more regulations, surveillance and more 
health rules and requirements. On the other hand, he mentioned that through this 
new law fishers would be regulated to use appropriate nets to fish in the lagoon 
and in the sea. He mentioned the environmental impacts of using different nets 
that should not be allowed in the lagoons.  
The three key environmental problems that fishers discussed were water 
and oil pollution, overexploitation of fishing resources, and lagoon pollution from 
garbage and urban and industrial wastewater. In the study area, fishermen 
defined their vulnerability in relation to the impacts and transformations brought 
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to this region by the oil industry since 1970s (figure 27). The state-owned oil 
company is at the center of fishermen’s problems.  
 
Figure 27. Oil well originally opened in the 1970s but never exploited. It is located 
in the backyard of a house in one of the study communities. 
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The study area has been subjected to oil spills since 1937 (Bozada & 
Namihira, 2005). Fishers explained, as other studies also note, that Pemex 
dumps “wastewater filled with heavy metals into nearby rivers and unlined 
holding ponds” or into the marshlands (Town & Hanson, 2001, p. 34). Fishermen 
also referred to acid rain associated with Pemex activities and facilities as a main 
cause of the loss of crops and declining land productivity. They commented on 
their unproductive palm trees and other types of plants that in the past used to be 
productive in their yards; they talked about the pests and diseases that kill them 
as a result of oil pollution. They also reported other impacts of this acid rain, 
which eats away “zinc roofs, ruining crops and polluting water supplies” (Town & 
Hanson, 2001, p. 34). 
As I explain in chapter 4, in the study region one of the most important 
transformations introduced by the oil company was the opening of an artificial 
connection between the sea and the lagoon – the Boca de Panteones – in 1975. 
This had long-lasting negative impacts transforming not only lagoon ecosystems 
by increasing salt water flow to the lagoons, but also affecting the livelihoods of 
many people that suffered from the flooding of their lands and the salinization of 
until then fertile soil that was used to cultivate a wide range of crops. The 
introduction of water also impacted the oyster production in this area. Scientists 
explain that the salinization of the lagoons caused a process of ecological 
succession that due to its magnitude is of unique character in Mexico (Bello et 
al., 2009, p. 488). Among the many changes induced by this process have been: 
the substitution of freshwater species by salt water fish from the ocean 
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population; the replacement of wetlands by lagoons; and the replacement of 
wetlands for pasture and farming land. Other changes include coastal 
sedimentation, changes in hydrological systems, lagoon silting, the total 
disappearance of oyster banks and the salinization of pasture land used for 
livestock farming. During interviews, the fishers from these communities raised 
this issue, over and over again. Even though Pemex compensated some 
peasants for the loss of their lands and production, peasants are still demanding 
justice for this damage. 
Fishermen define their vulnerability not only in relation to the impacts of 
such industries on their livelihood, but also in terms of the impacts on their well-
being and health. They complained about the different pipeline explosions that 
this region had experienced, that have injured and killed people. They also 
referred to health issues they believe are related to the oil industry. Scientists 
have conducted studies identifying the spread of pollution related to the oil 
industry in fishing areas and species. They registered the presence of pollutants 
above the levels permitted by the national law and by the parameters of other 
international health institutions. They have also identified health problems among 
the population: elevated exposure to carcinogens, miscarriages, negative effects 
on children’s physical growth, and diverse social and economic impacts (Bozada 
& Namihira, 2005). Fishermen are aware of such studies so they brought them 
into the discussion.  
Along with the discussion of these impacts fishermen also referred to 
lagoon pollution from industries that pour their wastewater into the rivers. They 
138 
 
mentioned that almost every year, when the rainy season starts, there are a lot of 
dead fish floating in the lagoon. They explained that chemicals raise the water 
temperature, killing some species of fish. There have been studies that show the 
presence of metals and hydrocarbon in the lagoons in the study area – and in 
some fish species – as a result of liquid wastes from sugar refining and 
petrochemical industries, the use of fertilizers and pesticides by the agriculture 
industry, the intensive oil extraction and refining, and as a result also of the large 
number of oil industry accidents (Botello, Gofi, & Castro, 1983; Vázquez & Pérez, 
2002; Rosas, Báez, & Belmont, 1983; Rodríguez, Jiménez, & Valenzuela, 1995).  
Finally, it is important to mention that when complaining about Pemex, one 
of the fishermen was very cautious about any misunderstanding when he 
clarified that: “we are not against Pemex, oil is a public good, it is good for 
Mexicans, it is not that we are against the well-being of the country, but we have 
problems with the company that need to be resolved.”47 Fishers make clear 
through this and similar statements that the “national interest” used in 
government narratives to justify the promotion of its initiatives should be carried 
out without impacting the local inhabitants’ interests. As a peasant testimony put 
it: “oil is not for the nation… it is only for a chosen few” (Town & Hanson 2001, p. 
34). At the core of the problem are then, issues of inequalities and the costs of 
externalities, a burden carried by local populations where the industry operates.  
There is a study that discusses a kind of “disillusionment” about this 
industry’s benefits for local people, arguing that local populations “have not seen 
the benefits of the wealth being pumped out of their state” (Town & Hanson 
                                                 
47 Interview with a cooperative member fisher. December 15, 2011. Tabasco. 
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2001, p. 35). However, in my interviews fishers did not show any kind of 
disillusionment based on any type of expectations on this industry. They did not 
mention for example, the industry’s role in generating employment for their 
communities. Fishers did not associate their well-being with the oil industry – e.g. 
as wage-earning workers. Their identity as fishers permeated their expectations: 
to have better equipment, to enforce resource exploitation rules, to organize 
better, to promote their markets, among others. 
In the following two chapters I take up some of the ideas I discussed 
above.  I analyze in depth fishers’ views on coastal erosion and some of the local 
struggles and communities’ challenges discussed in interviews.  
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CHAPTER 4. PROBLEMATIZING COASTAL EROSION NARRATIVES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyzes how Mexican governments, scientists, and local fishers 
have explained coastal erosion. Coastal erosion is regarded as one of the most 
important phenomena facing coastal communities worldwide. The rates and 
impacts of coastal erosion in the Mexican communities examined in this case 
study are astounding. Mexican scientists and governments have characterized 
these communities as “highly vulnerable” to climate change due to coastal 
erosion. Coastal erosion has had important impacts on these communities. 
Dozens of homes and public buildings (e.g. a school) have been destroyed 
(figures 28-31). People have been displaced from their houses and have had to 
find other places to live, without any kind of government or community support. 
They have also been isolated due to the destruction of roads and bridges. People 
reported that this isolation has had economic impacts as well, since they are now 
paying more for staple goods and services such as transportation. In interviews, 
some local inhabitants expressed the thought that their communities will 
disappear sooner or later. 
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Figure 28. Coastal erosion impacts on housing. 
 
Figure 29. Coastal erosion impacts on housing. 
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Figure 30. Coastal erosion impacts on housing. 
 
 
Figure 31. Coastal erosion impacts on roads. 
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In this chapter I examine coastal erosion as it has been explained in the 
narratives (Roe, 1991; Forsyth, 2003 and 2008; Fairhead & Leach, 1995) that 
Mexican governments produce in the context of their climate change programs. I 
also discuss explanations of coastal erosion by scientists studying this 
phenomenon, and by local fishers living in coastal communities. I argue in this 
chapter that government narratives depoliticize and dehistoricize environmental 
change by overlooking historic and contentious political issues that are at the 
core of the emergence of local environmental changes.  
Coastal erosion is a phenomenon that occurs when a beach loses its 
sediment (Anthony, 2005); it is the landward displacement of a given point 
between the ocean and the continent (Lizárraga and Fischer, 1998, p. 1234), 
resulting in “the encroachment upon the land by the sea” (Doody et al., 2004, p. 
4).  Scientists explain that this phenomenon has two important characteristics: it 
is universal, and it is changing at rapid rates (Titus, 2005). It has been estimated 
that more than 70% of the world’s sandy coastline has retreated (Bird, 1987, p. 
151). Coastal erosion has also been identified as one of the physical effects of 
sea-level rise resulting from climate change. It has been characterized as a 
hazard for the increasing populations that inhabit coastal areas around the world, 
for their economies, and for the natural ecosystems that are at risk of 
disappearing. This phenomenon has motivated the concern of governments and 
research institutions and prompted the release of studies, assessments, and 
policy instruments in both developed and underdeveloped regions (Doody et al., 
2004; Marchant, 2010; Leatherman & Nicholls, 1995; Thieler & Hammar-Klose, 
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2001). Despite all this attention, scientists note that coastal erosion is a complex 
and poorly understood phenomenon.  
In the study region, provincial and national governments and international 
organizations produce initiatives in which coastal erosion is framed as an 
important problem that coastal communities encounter in the context of global 
environmental changes. In this narrative, coastal erosion is explained as an 
extant and potential sea-level rise impact that results from climate change. 
Although in programs and plans governments recognize the existence of many 
intertwined social and economic processes that contribute to coastal 
vulnerability, key narrative emphasis is put on climate change as the main factor 
that justifies government intervention. In the Mexican context, this narrative is 
being translated into particular projects that aim to deal with coastal erosion 
prevention and impacts.  
In considering other explanations of coastal erosion, it becomes clear that 
using climate change discourses can be misleading and problematic. This 
government narrative excludes other important factors that scientists and local 
fishers observing environmental changes in their villages have identified as 
contributing to this phenomenon. The accounts of scientists and local fishers 
coincide when they identify coastal erosion’s characteristics, the factors causing 
it and the type of solutions proposed, and these ideas challenge the government 
narrative in several respects.  
Scientists state that the very complex nature of coastal processes makes 
it very difficult to establish a causal one-dimensional relation between sea level 
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rise and erosion.  They emphasize that coastal erosion is the result of both 
natural and human-induced factors that operate at different scales. Specifically in 
the study communities, Mexican geologists have concluded that coastal erosion 
in Tabasco’s coasts has been primarily caused by land subsidence – the gradual 
caving in or sinking of land – induced by the extraction of ground water and oil. 
Coastal ecosystem’s scientists have also explained that erosion is a natural 
event, part of coastal cycles, a phenomenon that becomes a problem when 
nature does not have enough room to accommodate change due to the 
existence of infrastructure and urban developments.  
Local fishers also have their own versions of coastal erosion, which agree 
with scientists’ explanations in many ways. Fishers’ views challenge government 
ideas regarding coastal erosion as a phenomenon that is caused by climate 
change. Their perspectives are informed by a particular political economy 
context, specifically, the role of the state-owned oil industry (Pemex) that has 
historically impacted people’s livelihoods and environments. Fishers argued that 
the building of Pemex oil infrastructure was the main factor causing erosion in 
their coasts. They also mentioned the building of urban and industrial 
infrastructure – oil pipelines and roads – along their coasts as factors causing 
erosion. One fisher also mentioned land subsidence as a possible cause of 
erosion. Finally, from some fishers’ perspectives, coastal erosion is a natural 
phenomenon as well. 
I argue that adopting climate change frameworks to explain long-term 
environmental changes like coastal erosion allows the Mexican government to 
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sidestep contentious local political issues that are at the core of the emergence 
of such biophysical phenomena. Science and Technology Studies (S&TS) 
scholars have stated that scientific knowledge “is not a transcendent mirror of 
reality. It both embeds and is embedded in social practices, identities, norms, 
conventions, discourses, instruments and institutions” (Jasanoff, 2004, p. 3). 
Coastal erosion is a case in point; it has historically been framed by different 
scientific approaches – climate change, geology and sea science studies – that 
raise interesting questions addressed by S&TS studies, such as:  
What makes problem formulations change over time or, alternatively, 
cohere across different historical periods and political systems? How do 
issues come to be perceived as natural or technical rather than social, as 
public rather than private, or as global or universal rather than local? 
(Jasanoff & Wynne 1998, p. 5).  
 
Rather than verifying whether interpretations of coastal erosion are right or 
wrong, in this dissertation I am interested in the contentious politics, in the need 
to recognize the existence of a diversity of views and explanations of 
environmental change. The recognition of other actors and perspectives is a 
contentious issue because it opens up discussions about how problems are 
defined and by whom, and more importantly, about what counts as a problem in 
the first place.   
In the next sections, I analyze Mexican governments’ narratives about 
coastal erosion, followed by fishers’ and scientists’ views and explanations of 
local environmental change. I offer some final remarks at the end of the chapter.  
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4.2 Government Narratives: Framing the Climate Change Problem 
Government initiatives in Mexico draw on the predicted impacts that coastal 
ecosystems are expected to experience based on sea-level rise rates projected 
under different IPCC scenarios.  Based on the foreseeable impacts on natural 
and human systems, Mexican governments consider climate change “the most 
relevant global environmental problem from this century” (CICC, 2009, p. i). This 
account is based on a broader grand crisis narrative, which explains that “global-
scale climate change is causing physical environmental changes putting human 
communities at risk” (Bravo, 2009, p. 258). 
Government narratives mention three strategic factors that justify the 
implementation of climate change initiatives in the Gulf of Mexico. The first is the 
region’s location within the cyclone path, making the area highly vulnerable to 
climate change. The second is that the region has a strategic role in the Mexican 
economy, with two of the most important economic sectors in the nation 
occurring in the area: tourism and oil production. Finally, the environmental 
characteristics of the region are another justification for implementing climate 
change initiatives: 75% of the country’s coastal wetlands are located in the Gulf 
of Mexico; their ecological particularities make them the most productive 
ecosystems in the country, accounting for 45% of the country’s shrimp 
production, 90% of oysters, and about 40% of total fish production (Cervantes & 
Buenfil, 2009, p. 38). 
In the case study, coastal erosion has been framed as one of the several 
climate change impacts facing coastal ecosystems. According to governments’ 
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narratives, Tabasco’s intrinsic vulnerability is due to its location and specific 
characteristics – geography, hydrology, geology and geomorphology. Tabasco is 
highly vulnerable to two hydrometeorology climate change related impacts: 
floods and sea-level rise (SERNAPAN, 2011). The National Strategy on Climate 
Change identifies five critical regions in the Gulf of Mexico with higher risk of 
floods due to sea level rise, one of which is the area and communities included in 
this dissertation case study: the Machona Lacunar system (CICC, 2007).  
Based on the sea level rise projections estimated by scientists in Mexico, 
Mexican government agencies explain that if sea level rises one meter it would 
seriously affect eight Mexican provinces, including Tabasco. In Tabasco, these 
changes would impact about 8% of the territory (CICC, 2012a, p. 50). 
Government narratives explained that in the last IPCC report (2007), a sea level 
rise of between 18 and 59cm was predicted between 1999 and the end of the 
21st century. However, government reports argue that “this is a conservative 
prediction,” since there have been more recent studies that indicate greater sea 
level increases expected during the 21st century (CICC, 2012a, p. 50).  
Government reports (CICC, 2012a; CICC, 2010) include important implicit 
assumptions. For example, in the Fourth National Communication to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, in a section that discusses 
sea level predictions, the text refers to a footnote in which it is clarified that these 
predictions present “uncertainties” (CICC, 2010, p. 136). As I discuss further in 
chapter six, recognizing the existence of uncertainties in the process of predicting 
scenarios is very important, and deserves a more serious and explicit 
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consideration in the presentation of information on climate change. Uncertainty 
has a special relevance if we consider that these scenarios are tools that 
governments use to classify the degree of vulnerability of people and places, and 
with this, the sites where adaptation programs and other initiatives are going to 
be implemented. 
In pointing out the existence of different sea level rise scenarios that 
situate the IPCC predictions as “moderate,” government agencies second the 
positions of glaciologists and oceanographers who think that the IPCC’s was a 
conservative prediction (Hulme & Mahony, 2010, p. 711). However this is not a 
position that the government recognizes or takes overtly, but rather one that I 
infer through the ideas presented in government reports. After presenting the 
possibility that the 1m scenario is conservative, the report “Climate Change 
Adaptation in Mexico: Vision, Elements and Criteria for Decision-making” (CICC, 
2012a), continues with a set of predicted impacts resulting from scenarios crafted 
by national scientists who predict impacts “if” sea level rises more than one 
meter. These narratives do not explain what rationale these scientists used to 
define this parameter, nor, as I explain above, do they address the uncertainties 
in the data they present.  
By presenting data and discussing sea level impacts in Mexico in this way, 
I argue, government agencies are sidestepping important and contentious 
scientific debates: on one hand there are scientists who think that the IPCC sea 
level predictions were the product of “scientific reticence” (Hulme & Mahony, 
2010), while on the other hand there is a group who thinks that: 
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[I]n fact no consensus could be reached on the magnitude of the possible 
fast ice-sheet melt processes that some fear could lead to 1–2 m of sea-
level rise this century. Hence these processes were not included in the 
quantitative estimates (quoted by Hulme & Mahony, 2010 p. 711).  
 
By omitting these debates within their narratives, Mexican government 
agencies frame “the climate change problem” in a very particular way, which 
many would characterize as simplistic (reductionist) and catastrophist (alarmist). 
This example also illustrates the important role that government officials play as 
“translators” of data and ideas that are derived from international agencies such 
as the IPCC and Mexican scientists producing local predictions. In the process of 
presenting public reports and data, these officials also produce and frame climate 
change and knowledge themselves. 
The footnote on uncertainty that I mentioned above also states that there 
were many factors accounting for sea level changes besides climate change, 
such as coastal currents, hurricanes and storms, tsunamis, and thermal 
dilatation. This clarification has special relevance since, as I will explain further in 
this chapter, at the core of scientists’ discussions is precisely the complexity of 
attributing coastal erosion to any particular factor – in this case sea level rise.  
 
Other Factors Accounting for the Problem of Climate Change 
Government narratives highlight the need to address climate change impacts of 
phenomena like erosion, but rarely explain the particular impacts that these 
phenomena have on local communities.  In the Tabasco Climate Change Plan, 
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for example, the document explains the urgency in addressing climate change 
impacts such as coastal erosion, making implicit its impacts on coastal 
communities through pictures showing the destruction of houses along the 
Tabasco coasts. In another document focused on gender and climate change, 
that was elaborated by an NGO and financed by the government, the 
government narrative highlights two potential impacts of coastal erosion on 
people living in affected areas, specifically mentioning that coastal erosion 
reduces possibilities in both food production and people’s occupational choices 
(INDESOL, 2010). Unfortunately, this is a general statement that is not explained 
in depth; the question of how food production and people’s choices are 
interrelated with erosion is not clear. In my view, these kind of statements 
illustrate the lack of expertise of some researchers working on the topic of 
climate change impacts as well as the multiplicity of voices – in this case NGOs – 
shaping these narratives. 
There are some parts of the government narrative that acknowledge 
complexity. The report written by scientists on the project Adaptation to Climate 
Change Impacts on the Coastal Wetlands in the Gulf of Mexico (hereafter the 
Wetlands Report) promoted by the World Bank, recognizes that climate change 
impacts are one of many sources of environmental and social changes facing 
local coastal communities (Buenfil, 2009). The report highlights other important 
problems for the region, including water pollution stemming from untreated urban 
and industrial wastewater, agricultural runoff containing fertilizers and pesticides, 
and spills from oil extraction, transport or refining (Buenfil, 2009, p. 27). Coastal 
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ecosystems experience degradation, conversion of coastal wetlands to other 
uses, and the industrialization and overexploitation of fisheries. Experts also 
explain that the deforestation of forests and mangroves is occurring at alarming 
rates (Buenfil, 2009, p. 26). The main causes of this loss of vegetative cover are 
the expansion of agricultural and livestock activities, and the development of 
urban and industrial infrastructure – including developments to accommodate 
tourism (Buenfil, 2009, p. 27-28). Government initiatives in the region emphasize 
that climate change is likely to exacerbate the potentially cascading effects of 
these threats to coastal ecosystems. These documents also recognize that 
“Mexico’s poorest areas and sectors show high-vulnerability conditions to climate 
change” (CICC, 2012b, p. 28). 
However, the question of how this complexity will be addressed within 
climate change programs is not clear. The governments’ strategies to face 
climate change impacts are based on the reduction of natural ecosystems’ 
vulnerabilities by implementing conservation, restoration and sustainable 
management plans (CICC, 2012a, p. 56). For example, the Wetlands Report has 
the goal of reducing coastal wetlands’ vulnerability to climate impacts by 
implementing adaptation measures. Pilot sites were selected to introduce this 
initiative, in areas that experts considered “the most vulnerable places, with the 
largest population at risk, and high exposure to potential impacts from climatic 
events” (Buenfil, 2009, p. 30). My research area includes some of the fishing 
communities included in one of these pilot sites—the Carmen-Pajonal-Machona 
Lacunar System. In my study area, this initiative proposes adaptation measures 
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such as: reforestation with native species; the strengthening of the sandbars that 
separate the coastal lagoons from the sea; and the development of a wetland 
conservation and management strategy (World Bank, 2008, p. 8).  
Regarding the proposed measure of the strengthening of the sandbars in 
the study area, the initiative does not explain in detail the type of material or 
infrastructure proposed to strengthen and protect the coastline. As I discuss 
further in this chapter, the building of what is called “hard” infrastructures – 
seawalls, dikes – is a topic of discussion among experts studying these types of 
infrastructure in different regions in the world. Experts state that although this 
type of shore protection structure aims to reduce damage caused by flooding, 
wave attack, or erosion, they in fact have adverse effects, including shifting 
erosion and other environmental problems to nearby locations (Nicholls et al., 
2007; Doody et al., 2004; van Rijn, 2011; Kraus, 2005; Correa, Alcántara-Carrió, 
& González, 2005; Titus, 2005; Ortiz, Sommer, & Oropeza, 2010).  
Government initiatives explain that in the Gulf of Mexico the oil industry’s 
infrastructure is one of the most vulnerable to climate change, and it is a 
government priority to develop adaptation policies to protect them (CICC, 2012a, 
p. 64) (figure 32). Among such efforts is the building of infrastructure such as 
concrete, metal and synthetic walls (figure 33). As I discuss in the next chapter, 
governments’ narratives recognize both the significant environmental impacts the 
oil industry has had on the region, and at the same time the strategic need to 
protect its infrastructure from rising sea levels, coastal erosion and increasingly 
frequent storms. In this case, the Mexican government is facing a major 
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challenge in its attempts to reconcile two projects: reducing local people’s 
vulnerability and supporting oil extraction, one of the main local sources of such 
vulnerability. 
 
Figure 32. Coastal erosion impacts on oil infrastructure (pipelines). 
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Figure 33. Sea walls to protect Pemex infrastructure. 
 
 
Finally, an important issue we need to look at when analyzing this 
particular case study in Mexico is the question of who is given responsibility for 
contributing to or solving environmental problems. In government narratives, it is 
clear that this responsibility falls differently on citizens, organizations, 
universities, and on local, provincial and national government agencies. It is 
citizens’ responsibility, for example, to adopt sustainable productive practices or 
to develop adaptation practices to face climate change impacts. It is government 
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agencies’ and universities’ responsibility to design and implement adaptation 
projects; but it is also recognized that in order to successfully carry out these 
initiatives local people need to participate and be engaged in these actions. 
 
4.3 Fishermen Narratives: Coastal Erosion is not “Natural” but a “Human-
Made” Problem 
The existence of multiple rationalities and values attached to environmental 
change is clearly evident when analyzing fishers’ perspectives on coastal 
erosion. Fishers’ understandings of this physical change are particularly different 
from those of the government, specifically in their attribution of the causes of 
coastal erosion and in identifying the actors responsible for providing solutions to 
this problem. In my interviews, I did not find any distinction between the different 
categories of fishers – cooperative members, freelancers or private fishers – 
regarding coastal erosion; they shared perceptions of their problems, the role of 
different actors in causing the problem and in providing solutions to it.  
Based on the different challenges that coastal communities face in coping 
with climate change impacts, one fieldwork question I posed was how local 
fishers explain coastal erosion. I found that when asked about the environmental 
threats and problems that fishers thought were the most important for them and 
their communities, my interviewees never referred directly and explicitly to 
coastal erosion as a key problem. Instead, they mentioned issues closely related 
to their livelihood as fishers, such as sea and lagoon pollution — mainly oil and 
industrial pollution. Coastal erosion only arose as an important issue once I 
asked them explicitly about the problem. In these interviews, local fishers 
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identified environmental problems as a challenge for them when they were 
closely related to their ability to earn a livelihood. From their perspective, then, 
these other problems, such as oil pollution, fish production, or overfishing, have 
higher priority. This finding is important considering these communities’ particular 
geographic conditions, which are determining their vulnerability to environmental 
changes. In some areas the strip of land that divides the sea and lagoons is no 
wider than one hundred meters, and during storms, the sea encroaches upon the 
land making a single body of water.  
It is important to note that some fishers stated that erosion was not really 
taking place in the way that governments or other fishers described. This is 
particularly the case among fishers that inhabit one of the five communities in 
which this phenomenon is not as evident as it is in neighboring villages, where 
there have been erosion rates of 9 to 11 meters/year (Hernández, Ortiz, Méndez, 
& Gama, 2008). These fishers explained that coastline changes are part of a 
natural dynamic; they notice that after storms their beaches are eroded by the 
effect of storm waves, but that the sediments that were eroded are transported to 
other areas of the coast. Along this same line of thought, some fishers explained 
coastal erosion as a phenomenon that has always been part of their 
communities. Fishers have also been aware of coastal erosion for decades: 
people recall having to walk long distances from their villages before they could 
reach the sea. Fishers in their fifties, for example, remember that their 
grandparents told them that the shoreline was once closer to their villages than it 
158 
 
is now. There is, then, an idea that the coastline is constantly changing, and idea 
that shapes local risk perceptions around erosion and flooding as well.   
The most important aspect of fishers’ views that clearly challenges the 
government narrative is the idea that some problems attributed to nature or 
climate change are not “natural” in origin at all. From their perspective, coastal 
erosion is a “man-made” problem. They argue that the origin of this problem 
dates to 1975, when the oil industry opened an artificial connection between the 
sea and the lagoon – the Boca de Panteones (figure 34). At that time, the oil 
company (Pemex) was opening new sites for oil extraction in the region, and the 
artificial channel allowed the introduction of machinery and the transportation of 
oil. There are other opinions about the cause of this problem; some fishers argue 
that they suffer coastal erosion due to the fact that Pemex built a deepwater port 
in a city close to these fishing communities. Some fishers also explained that the 
extraction of sand from some of their coasts – used by Pemex to refill swampland 
and expand its infrastructure – is also changing coast profiles. As one of the 
fishers commented, “Pemex is responsible for changing or altering ocean 
currents, not nature as people think.”  In these fishers’ view, the building of 
infrastructure to support the oil industry is the cause of coastal erosion. 
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Figure 34. Artificial Opening built in 1975 between the sea and the lacunar 
System. 
 
 
 
In the government project on coastal wetlands – Adaptation to Climate 
Change Impacts on the Coastal Wetlands in the Gulf of Mexico (World Bank, 
2008) – authorities do recognize the negative effects that this artificial opening 
has had on the region. In one of its adaptation projects to be implemented in 
these communities – the strengthening of sandbars – the World Bank states that 
measures are under consideration to partially reverse the artificial opening of the 
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“Boca de Panteones,” and to strengthen the existing sand bar in order to stabilize 
sand deposits exposed to coastal currents (World Bank, 2008). In this initiative, 
authorities recognize the negative effects that this opening has had, transforming 
not only lagoon ecosystems by increasing salt water flow to the lagoons, but also 
affecting the livelihoods of many people that suffered from flooding in their lands 
and from decreasing oyster production. During interviews, the fishers from these 
communities raised this issue over and over. Even though Pemex compensated 
some peasants for the loss of their lands and production, community members 
are still demanding justice for this damage. 
These concerns are part of local fishers’ long-term struggle against the 
state-owned oil industry that has been operating in the region for decades. 
Fishers perceive oil pollution as the real threat to their economic activity, not 
coastal erosion. In these fishers’ perceptions, they cannot do anything about 
coastal erosion, since they do not have the material, financial or technological 
resources to prevent or solve it. In the case of oil pollution, however, they can at 
least negotiate and receive monetary compensation for their nets which have 
been made useless by oil contamination, or for the fact that they are obliged to 
stop fishing until oil spills have dispersed. 
There is one other local account of the causes of coastal erosion. 
Fishermen who consider themselves native to these communities explained that 
migrant fishermen from the neighboring province of Veracruz, who migrated to 
these communities around the 1950s, caused coastal erosion when they settled 
on land close to the coastline. These migrants caused mangrove deforestation in 
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this coastal area, which the previous residents regarded as important for their 
villages since it functioned as a natural barrier against hurricanes and storms. 
The native fishermen explained that since immigrants arrived, everything has 
changed in the community: overexploitation of natural resources; native 
community members’ dispossession of land, fishing and other natural resources; 
community fragmentation; and other social problems. In analyzing the impacts of 
this process, fishers blamed themselves for doing nothing at the time to prevent 
these migrants from taking over that land. But they primarily blamed the 
government for not preventing these settlements along the coast. Finally, in 
asking about other kinds of environmental problems, such as lagoon pollution, 
local fishers do not regard themselves as actors causing this problem. 
Interestingly, they refer to other communities far from their own towns, as 
sources of pollution. 
In the opinion of local fishers, there are certain actors that have the lion’s 
share of the responsibility for solving local environmental problems. When asked 
who has responsibility for responding to coastal erosion, the fishers answered 
that it is primarily the government’s responsibility. There is a consensus that the 
government should be key actor in solving local problems; every fisher I 
interviewed attributed the main responsibility of dealing with these problems to 
the government. In their perception, it is the government’s responsibility, for 
example, to monitor, control, and penalize lagoon pollution – by oil, garbage, or 
wastewater. These fishers perceive the government as being the entity 
responsible for solving or preventing the problem of coastal erosion, because 
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they think it is very expensive to get the technology to do something about it. 
Some of the fishers mentioned that in the past they organized themselves to fill 
sacks with sand and place them at the coastal edge to prevent erosion; however 
they did this only when the government provided them with the sacks. They 
reported that they have asked the municipal and provincial governments to 
support them by providing sacks, but also other subsidies – such as staple foods 
or economic support – to motivate people to help fill the sacks.  In these 
examples, the fishers do not regard themselves as responsible for dealing with 
the problem, mainly because they do not have the material or financial resources 
to do so.  
 In some of these communities, the government has built some protections 
against erosion, such as seawalls constructed of stone, or concrete and rubble 
mound seawalls (figures 35). Fishers explained that, overall, these protections 
have not worked, with the exception of one case where the government put piled 
stones along the shoreline. Even though they doubt of the effectiveness of this 
technology, they still want the government to support their communities with 
these protections. They also reiterated the need to conduct scientific studies 
about currents’ movement before the government invests in that kind of 
infrastructure. 
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Figure 35. Coastal infrastructure – geotubes - to protect the coast from erosion, 
These geotubes are replacing rubber tubes that were previously built in this area 
but that have been destroyed by the effects of the sea and also (as it was 
explained in some interviews) by people. 
 
 
 
Government climate change initiatives put a strong emphasis on the need 
“to educate” and “increase the awareness” of the population about climate 
change issues. In 2009, a non-government organization gave a workshop on 
climate change – financed by the provincial government – in one of the focal 
communities of this study. I asked the fishers who participated in this meeting 
their opinion about it. One of them commented that it was “good to get this 
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information, but the most important thing is to act, not only to come and talk but 
to do something.” They did not think it was necessary for people to become 
conscious of the problem, but rather that the most important thing is to actually 
solve the problem. Again, these fishers do not think of themselves as key actors 
in solving such a complex, large-scale, and distant problem as climate change. 
There are two other important ideas that arose in the interviews. The first 
is that when asked how or when local fishers heard for first time about climate 
change, the majority indicated that they had heard about this issue before the 
workshop. They said they learned about climate change by watching TV – the 
Discovery Channel was mentioned in particular. Climate change is an issue they 
had heard about, and in their perception the workshop did not improve their 
understanding of that problem. This is an important contrast to the government 
representative’s position that these types of workshops are necessary to educate 
local fishers or increase their awareness about climate change impacts. 
 Another issue that the fishers’ leaders mentioned was the fact that they 
had participated in meetings about climate change or coastal erosion with 
governments and international institutions like the Inter-American Development 
Bank, but that in terms of concrete actions, “nothing has happened.” In 
interviews, the fishers expressed disappointment and discouragement about 
these initiatives, especially because they had heard in newspapers and in the 
meetings that a certain amount of financial resources would be allocated to 
prevent coastal erosion in their region. In their view, local government 
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representatives must have engaged in corruption, since no money has been 
allocated to solve the problem. 
 
4.4 Scientists:  Coastal Erosion, a Socio-Natural Phenomenon 
In this section I first address the definitions scientists provide about coastal 
erosion. In the following part I explain the multiple factors at play in generating 
coastal erosion, putting special emphasis on how scientists explain the 
interconnection between sea level rise and erosion. The third part of this section 
deals with the different approaches and criticisms scientists discuss to deal with 
“the problem.” The final part explains these topics as they apply to my case 
study.  
 
4.4.1 Definitions 
Coastal erosion is defined by scientists as a process by which a beach loses its 
sediment, resulting in a depletion of its sediment budget (Anthony, 2005); it is the 
process of “wearing away material from a coastal profile due to imbalance in the 
supply and export of material from a certain section” (Marchand, 2010, p. 6). 
Erosion occurs where ”the beach can no longer balance energy produced by 
waves and by water piling up against it, leading to net sediment loss and 
lowering and retreat of the beach” (Anthony, 2005, p. 141). Erosion is then the 
result of “an imbalance between energy inputs on the one hand and, on the 
other, the resistance of the beach bed and sediment liable to be mobilized by the 
fluid forces” (Anthony, 2005, p. 141). 
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In the literature, scientists explain that coastal systems are one of the 
most dynamic ecosystems on the planet (Ruiz, Mendoza, Silva, Posada, & 
Mariño, 2010; Marchand, 2010); they are evolving complex systems that “show 
non-linear morphological responses to change” (Nicholls et al., 2007, p. 320). 
They also state that processes of erosion and accretion have always co-existed, 
evolving through large-scale redistribution of sediment, and that they are not 
always in equilibrium (Ortiz et al., 2010). From a geomorphologic perspective, 
then, extant erosion/accretion processes may reflect a cyclic repetition of past 
geologic processes, but varying in their intensity (Ruiz et al., 2010; Doody et al., 
2004).  
Marchand et al. (2010, p. 6) explain that understanding coastal erosion 
requires both insight into all the factors that interact along the coast, and an 
awareness of different time scales. Beach sands are supplied from four main 
sources: sand is washed down to the coast by rivers; it is derived from the 
erosion of cliffs and foreshores; it is blown to the coast by winds; and finally, it is 
washed in to the shore from the sea floor by wave action (Bird, 1987, p. 152). In 
geological time scales, coastal evolution is determined by the demand and 
supply of sediments; littoral sedimentary systems are dynamic environments that 
change according to waves, water currents and wind regimes (Alejo, Costas, & 
Vila-Concejo, 2005, p. 64). Scientists explain that coasts’ sediment demand is 
determined by the rate of relative sea-level rise (local increase in the level of the 
ocean relative to the land) and by the morphology of the coastal plain; sediment 
supply is determined by the availability of sediment and by the transport capacity 
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of wind and water (Marchand, 2010, p. 6). When coasts experience greater 
sediment supply than demand they will grow seaward; when demands equals 
supply, they stay in place; and when the supply is insufficient, coasts retreat 
(Marchand, 2010, p. 6). Erosion can result in the total disappearance of beaches, 
while the sediment lost in one section accumulates elsewhere alongshore, in 
other beaches, in estuarine and lagoon sinks, or in offshore sinks (Anthony, 
2005, p. 141-142). 
Coasts therefore exhibit natural variability, with a continual adjustment 
towards dynamic equilibrium, adopting different “states” in response to varying 
wave energy and sediment supply (Nicholls et al., 2007, p. 318). Beaches may 
experience short-term erosion as part of a morphodynamic cycle of beach 
adjustment to seasonal or nonseasonal changes in wave energy, and this period 
of adjustment may take days, months, or years (Anthony, 2005, p. 141). When a 
coastal system is able to maintain a balance between the sediment that has been 
lost and new material that has accumulated, then the system reaches a state of 
equilibrium (Ruiz et al., 2010). For some scientists, however, especially when 
considering longer time scales, coasts are never in equilibrium since they are 
continually evolving over time (Marchand, 2010). Coastal systems may present 
other states, such a static equilibrium, when the shape of coasts and changes 
through time are not significant; they also may exhibit what is called dynamic 
equilibrium when the beach experiences cyclical changes (Ruiz et al., 2010). 
It is interesting to note that the literature reviewed here relies on a single 
source – Bird’s (1987) study – to discuss the magnitude of coastal erosion 
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worldwide. This confirms concerns about the lack of information and knowledge 
on this phenomenon worldwide; and it also questions the broader assumptions of 
scholars and governments when they make their arguments about climate 
change impacts on coastal ecosystems. Bird’s study (1987) is based on surveys 
organized between 1972 and 1984, and includes information from 127 coastal 
countries. In his study it is estimated that more than 70% of the world’s sandy 
coastline has retreated (p. 151).  However this author and other sources using 
this data do not specify the time scale of this estimation. Bird also explains that 
on the global scale, losses of sand have been exceeding gains over periods 
ranging from a few years to several centuries (Bird, 1987, p. 154).   
In sum, erosion is explained as a dynamic and complex process that is 
regulated by the action of global, regional, and local physical, chemical, 
meteorological, biological, and marine agents (Ruiz et al., 2005). I argue that the 
understanding of this phenomenon as part of a natural variability, that results 
from cyclical erosive/accretive coastal processes that are never in equilibrium, 
fundamentally challenge government narratives that highlight its causal 
dimension as well as its exceptionality. I elaborate on this idea in my final 
section.  
  
4.4.2 Causes 
Scientific experts emphasize that coastal erosion is the result of both natural and 
human-induced factors that operate on different scales (Doody et al., 2004). 
Erosion appears when cumulative natural or human processes interfere with the 
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supply capacity of sediment sources and with sediment transport processes on 
beaches (Anthony, 2005; Doody et al., 2004). These processes disturb beach 
sediment budgets and the morphodynamic functioning of beaches (Anthony, 
2005).  
Among the natural factors causing erosion are storms, altered wind 
patterns, higher waves, ocean and near-shore currents, vertical land movement, 
sea-level changes, wave climate, and surge levels (Nicholls et al., 2007; van 
Rijn, 2011; Doody et al., 2004). Coastal changes induced by the El Niño-
Southern Oscillation phenomenon also promote beach erosion (Nicholls et al., 
2007). Non-human biological agents may also promote erosion. Neumann (1966, 
p. 92) explains that rock-destroying organisms play an important role in the 
erosion of coastlines; this process is called bioerosion. Scientists explain that 
physical and morphologic factors such as the type and durability of rock, coastal 
morphology, coastal subsidence, sediment composition, and beach slope may 
determine erosion as well (Doody et al., 2004).  
 Anthropogenic pressures that directly affect the delivery of sediments to 
the coasts include the damming, channelization, and diversions of coastal 
waterways. Scientists also explain that there are other types of infrastructure that 
have reduced the availability of sand and altered natural sediment transport 
pathways. These include the construction of ports, the installation of pipelines, or 
the building of harbours and sidewalks along the coast (Alejo & Vila-Concejo, 
2005; Fernández, González, Martínez, & Sánchez-Lizaso, 2005; Carranza, 
Marin, & Rosales, 2010). Land subsidence induced by the extraction of ground 
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water, gas and oil, land claims, dredging, sand mining, mangrove deforestation 
and diverse engineering works, are also among the identified human-induced 
factors that cause coastal erosion. Finally, sea-level rise as a result of global 
warming is also considered a major threat. In the following section I will focus my 
analysis on sea-level rise, as it has been described as a factor inducing erosion 
worldwide.  
 
Sea Level Rise and Coastal Erosion 
Scholars that analyze sea-level rise effects on coastal erosion recognize that 
there is a lack of knowledge and certainty on the complexity of both coastal 
systems and climate change. Experts on coastal erosion emphasize that “there is 
no single, simple explanation for the onset of beach erosion” (Bird, 1987, p. 154).  
Bruun proposed the first model to explain and estimate the erosion of sandy 
beaches in response to rising sea level; this model suggests that if sea level 
rises, the beach profile will achieve equilibrium with the new sea level by shifting 
landward and upward (Zhang et al., 2004). Bruun explains that a rise in sea level 
will be followed by erosion of the upper shoreface; and the movement of material 
eroded from the upper beach would be equal in volume to the material deposited 
on the near offshore bottom (Bruun, 2008, p. 631). A rise of the near off-shore 
bottom as a result of the eroded upper beach, equal to the rise in sea level, 
would thus maintain a constant water depth in that area (Bruun, 2008, p. 631). 
Titus explains that erosion “occurs because the swell that pushes sand from the 
bottom back onto the visible part of the beach can only reach so far below the 
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surface. If the surface is 1 cm higher, the elevation down to which that swell can 
reach is also 1 cm higher. Hence, less sand is carried back onto the beach” 
(Titus, 2005, p. 839). The Bruun rule suggests that shoreline recession is in the 
range of 50 to 200 times the rise in relative sea level (Zhang et al., 2004; Stive 
2004). However, for many scholars this model remains controversial (Bruun, 
1988; Zhang et al., 2004; Stive, 2004) which highlights the complexities of 
explaining coastal systems dynamics as well as of understanding how sea level 
rise is impacting coasts. 
The IPCC’s fourth assessment reported that throughout the 20th century, 
global sea levels rose at a rate of about 1.7 mm/yr (Bindoff et al., 2007, p. 409). 
Updated estimates of sea-level rise indicate acceleration to 3.2 mm/yr since the 
1990s (Meyssignac and Cazenave, 2012, p. 96). Church et al. (2011) explain 
that between 1972 and 2008, the largest contributors to sea-level rise were 
ocean thermal expansion and the melting of glaciers and ice caps. Projected 
sea-level rise at the end of the 21st century ranges from 18 to 59 cm (Nicholls et 
al., 2007, p. 13). 
 
Sea level rise is not the main driver in promoting coastal erosion 
Even after considering the sea level rates mentioned above, the IPCC’s Fourth 
Report emphasizes that “sea-level rise is not necessarily the primary driver” in 
promoting erosion (Nicholls et al., 2007, p. 318). In the Report, scientists explain 
that due to the coasts’ natural variability, it is “difficult to identify the impacts of 
climate change” on coastal erosion (Nicholls et al., 2007, p. 318). However they 
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highlight that sea-level rise “will exacerbate” beach erosion (Nicholls et al., 2007, 
p. 324). The Report states that even though “few studies have unambiguously” 
quantified the relationships between coastal land loss and sea-level rise, it 
emphasizes the challenge of determining whether coastal changes have resulted 
from climate change, from short-term disturbances (such as changes in the 
behavior or frequency of storms), or from human drivers like shore protection 
infrastructure (Nicholls et al., 2007, p. 318-320).  
Studies of coastal erosion promoted by the European Union state that 
climate change is one of four major concerns for the next fifty years; they explain 
that sea-level rise is one of the most important drivers of accelerated erosion, 
and that climate change “will probably lead to an increase in coastal erosion” 
(Marchand, 2010; Doody et al., 2004). However, experts also recognize that 
“several recent studies indicate that coastal protection strategies and changes in 
the behaviour or frequency of storms may be more important than the projected 
acceleration of sea-level rise in determining future coastal erosion rates” 
(Marchand, 2010, p. 9). 
 Other scientists make remarks about the uncertainty of attributing coastal 
erosion to sea-level rise. For example, Stive (2004) states that even though sea-
level rise has been regarded as the most probable cause of increased erosion, 
there are many coastal systems that have been accretive in the Holocene even 
though sea level was rising. Thus, he states, it is important to consider other 
processes and whether they have been impacted by accelerated sea-level rise. 
Thieler and Hammer-Klose (2001) suggest that in order to assess coastal 
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vulnerability to future sea-level change, it is important to combine the historical 
record of sea-level change with other variables, such as elevation, 
geomorphology, and wave characteristics. In their report on coastal vulnerability 
to sea level rise along the U.S. Gulf of Mexico Coasts– in which they considered 
geomorphology, coastal slope, relative sea-level change, shoreline change, and 
mean tide range and wave height – they conclude that 42% of the coast was 
considered to be at a very high risk (Thieler and Hammer-Klose, 2001). They 
report that geomorphology and tidal range most strongly influence the 
vulnerability ranking.   
In terms of sea-level rise impacts, experts clarify the need to distinguish 
worldwide (eustatic) sea level rise from relative sea level rise, which includes 
land subsidence (Titus, 2005; Nicholls et al., 2007). They explain that it is relative 
(local) sea-level change that is driving local impacts. Local sea level may be 
determined by atmospheric pressure, changes in ocean circulation, local coastal 
winds, local currents, and rainfall (Komar & Enfield, 1987; Bindoff et al., 2007). 
Oceanic level change and geological uplift/subsidence are also factors that can 
determine regional variations (Nicholls et al., 2007). Experts state that in some 
regions, sea level rise rates are several times the global mean, while in other 
regions sea level is actually falling (Bindoff et al., 2007; Meyssignac & Cazenave, 
2012). Scientists explain that to assess the full range of possible changes and 
impacts, it is essential to understand regional variability, its evolution in time and 
space, and its drivers (Meyssignac & Cazenave, 2012). They state that “analysis 
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should explore additional sea-level rise scenarios of +50% the amount of global 
mean rise plus uplift/subsidence” (Nicholls et al., 2007, p. 324).  
 In addition to this spatial dimension, there is another temporal dimension 
that is important to consider in analyzing sea level changes. Komar & Enfield, 
1987), for example, argue that it is important to consider short-term sea level 
changes as a coastal erosion driver. They explain that seasonal cycles typically 
account for water-level rises on the order of 10 to 30 cm, sometimes up to 100 
cm, exceeding the long-term rise that has been analyzed as an important factor 
causing coastal erosion (Komar & Enfield, 1987).  
In sum, scientists’ accounts emphasize the understanding of erosion as a 
multifactor and complex process that is not mainly determined by sea level rise. 
These perspectives, I argue, offer a more comprehensive understanding of the 
interrelation between sea level rise and erosion than the ones offered in 
government narratives. These scientific explanations also put a clear emphasis 
on the uncertain nature of climate change impacts on coastal ecosystems, which 
in itself challenge deterministic and alarmist explanations of such impacts. 
  
4.4.3 The Battle against the Sea 
Another discussion in which scientists disagree with government narratives is 
about the type of solutions to deal with “the problem.” Scientists explain that the 
most common approach to erosion management worldwide has been the use of 
technical measures and hard shoreline protections (Doody, 2004; Storbjörk & 
Hedrén, 2011; Peynador & Méndez-Sánchez, 2010). Artificial structures that are 
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part of this “battle against the sea” (Doody, 2004) have been used for centuries in 
many coastal sites around the world.  These artifacts of “hard” protection – 
seawalls constructed of stone, concrete, wood, steel, or geotextiles; rubble 
mound seawalls; quarry stone revetments; jetties; groynes; dikes; or artificial 
submerged reefs – have been the subject of much discussion among engineers 
and morphologists studying their impacts on coastal systems.  
Scientists generally agree that although this type of shore protection aims 
to reduce damage caused by flooding, wave attack or erosion, they in fact have 
adverse effects by shifting erosion problems and other environmental problems 
to other nearby locations (Doody et al., 2004; van Rijn, 2011; Kraus, 2005; 
Correa et al., 2005; Titus, 2005; Ortiz et al., 2010). Since waves and currents 
transport sediment to the coast, shore protection projects promote shore 
accretion in one section of coastline and sand starvation in other sections. For 
example, van Rijn’s study (2011) shows that the implementation of groynes in 
Holland led to an increase in the variability of the local shoreline, “with maximum 
recession values much larger than the initial shoreline recession” (p. 885).  
From an institutional management perspective, there are other 
disadvantages in approaching coastal erosion using this kind of technology: they 
require high capital investments and maintenance work, they have limited 
efficiency, their expected life is short, and they are only effective for a limited 
length of coast (Doody et al., 2004; van Rijn, 2011). Furthermore, Titus et al. 
(1991) explain that these structures are designed for current sea levels; 
therefore, if sea level rises, the infrastructure will be threatened (p. 179). In sum, 
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experts explain that these measures are remedial rather than preventive, since 
they tend to be implemented when destruction of property is impending, and 
overall there is a lack of planning and side effects are not considered (Lizárraga 
& Fischer, 1998). 
In referring to the promotion of “hard” structures to prevent erosion, Doody 
(20040 explains that in the early 1990s, “notions that we should (or could) give 
up land to the sea were an anathema to many” (p. 135). However, recent studies 
of erosion in different parts of the world discuss alternative approaches.  
Integrated management systems and the use of “soft” structures – such as 
bioengineered protections or beach nourishment – are some alternative 
approaches that governments and scientists have proposed to arrest erosion. 
“Coastal squeeze” is a term used by scholars to describe the narrowing of 
coastal zones due to the combined effects of erosion and infrastructural or other 
development that limit their natural adjustment to changes in sea level, storms, or 
tides (Doody et al., 2004; Doody, 2004). As García et al. (2005) state, the natural 
variability of coastal systems is “essentially incompatible with the static 
infrastructure developed by humans within the narrow strip of land that is 
exposed to coastal processes” (García, Ferreira, Matias, & Dias, 2005, p. 28).  
In sum, scientists emphasize the need to first address structural problems 
that are causing erosion in the first place, such as lack of coastal planning when 
it comes to implement coastal urban, industrial or infrastructure projects (Alejo & 
Vila-Concejo, 2005; Doody et al., 2004; Marchand, 2010; Nicholls et al., 2007). 
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This also challenges some of the more technical adaptation measures proposed 
in government narratives to address the problem of erosion in Tabasco. 
 
4.4.4. Coastal Erosion in the Study Case 
In order to generally illustrate coastal erosion rates I present data considering 
various variables: 1) spatial: I present data on both, in Tabasco and the neighbor 
province of Campeche and also I mention specific rates in some of the study 
communities; 2) temporal: I present data from different periods: 1943-1972; 
1972-1977; 1972- 1984; 1984-1995; 1995-2008, and; 3) severity: I show average 
rates, but also extreme values.  
Studies conducted on the coasts of the Mexican province of Tabasco in 
the Gulf of Mexico have shown severe land loss rates and the prevalence of 
shoreline recession since 1943 – the year since data records are available (Ortiz, 
1992; Ortiz et al., 2010; Hernández et al., 2008). Erosion rates are alarming in 
the communities included in this case study and in the region surrounding it. Ortiz 
(1992) explains that since 1969 several studies have analyzed the specific 
geographic characteristics of the Tabasco plains, highlighting their sediment and 
erosion problems.  Ortiz (1992) analyzes coastal erosion along the delta zone 
between the provinces of Tabasco and Campeche. He explains that between 
1943 and 1972 some areas retreated 15m, and during the period 1972-1977 
some sectors retreated by 20m (Ortiz, 1992, p. 11-12). 
 Hernández et al. (2008) explain that during the periods of 1943-1958 and 
1972-1984, coastal areas of the province of Tabasco and its neighboring 
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province of Campeche had an annual shoreline retreat rate of -8m/year. In their 
study, Hernández et al. (2008) conclude that this retreat trend continued during 
the period 1984-1995, with values between -9 and -10m/year, and with extreme 
values of up to -21 m/year in some areas. During this same period, one of the 
five communities included in my study experienced a shoreline retreat of about –
11.5 meters/year. Comparing erosion rates from the years 1995 and 2003, 
scientists found that two of the communities in this case study experienced 
extreme retreat values of up to -60 and -87 meters. 
Ortiz et al.’s (2010) study of erosion rates from 1995-2008 in Tabasco 
shows that 59 percent of the province’s total coastline – 209 km – experienced 
some degree of erosion during this period. In this study, erosion along the coasts 
of four of my study communities, about 28.4km, showed that the annual rate of 
coastal recession was -1.37 meters/year (Ortiz et al., 2010, p. 317). The study 
also showed extreme coastal retreat at higher values in some areas close to my 
case study area, with a retreat rate of -6 m/year.  
 In analyzing the causes of coastal erosion, it is important to highlight the 
different hypotheses that scientists have elaborated over the time, and to notice 
how it is only recently that sea level rise has been incorporated in these 
discussions. Experts agree that there are many, complex causes explaining the 
emergence of erosion, however, they clearly state that in Tabasco’s coasts, the 
main driver of coastal erosion is land subsidence due to sediment compression 
and oil and gas extraction (Ortiz, 1992; Hernández et al., 2008; Ortiz &  Méndez, 
1999). Ortiz (1992) also emphasizes delta plain subsidence as a primary factor 
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driving the rapid deterioration of the Tabasco-Campeche deltaic coastal zone. 
Ortiz (2010) explains that there is an analogy between subsidence and sea level 
rise impacts, because subsidence promotes beach erosion and shoreline retreat.  
After analyzing historical data records and changes in beach ridge profiles over 
time, scientists conclude that processes of erosion and accretion have always 
co-existed in the Tabasco delta plain (Ortiz et al., 2010). 
 In his 1992 publication, Ortiz (1992) hypothesized about the causes 
promoting patterns of erosion and accretion in Tabasco’s coasts during different 
periods between 1943 and 1992. He considered several factors to explain the 
diminishing of erosion rates in some areas during certain periods, suggesting that 
decreased storm and hurricane events during the 1970s and 1980s might explain 
this phenomenon. This analysis was based on the fact that certain processes, 
such as storm waves and surges and storm-induced currents, have an erosional 
impact on beaches. Furthermore, he hypothesized that the building of a road 
during the 1970s was probably another factor that could have diminished the rate 
and speed of erosion in some areas since it functioned as a wall or barrier. 
Altered wave conditions were also another factor considered in his analysis.  
In 2008, Hernández et al. concluded that the predominance of erosive 
over accretive processes in the Tabasco coasts was similar to processes found 
in other coasts in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea (Hernández et al., 
2008). From their perspective, their findings constituted new evidence regarding 
global mean sea level rise reported by experts worldwide. However, in order to 
really evaluate sea level rise impacts in the region, they pointed out the need to 
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produce spatial analysis and modeling studies focused on the particularities of 
Tabasco morphology. In their analysis, they included a section on sea-level rise 
predictions in order to draw attention to future implications for Mexican coasts. 
Other experts state that the specific topographic characteristics of the Tabasco 
delta, represented by plains and low plateaus, make its coasts especially 
vulnerable to sea level changes. Therefore, even minor sea level rises will affect 
vast continental regions of the Gulf of Mexico (Torres et al., 2010), with special 
intensity in the Tabasco plains.  
In their 2010 publication, Ortiz et al. clearly concluded that sea level rise 
due to global warming is one “accessory or complementary factor” in explaining 
coastal erosion in Tabasco (p. 322). In interviews, scientists highlighted some of 
the problems they face in understanding climate change impacts at different 
temporal and spatial scales across the country. They mentioned the lack of data 
necessary to be able to create models and more accurate predictions. In 
addition, the lack of technology and human resources are other important factors 
preventing a more comprehensive analysis of climate change at a regional level. 
Studies on coastal erosion in Mexico also highlight the lack of planning 
and the negative effects that urban developments and engineering works have 
had on Mexican coasts. Lizárraga and Fischer (1998) clearly state that Mexico 
does not have a policy to manage shoreline erosion. Peynador & Méndez-
Sánchez (2010) explain that in Mexico, coastal erosion has been addressed 
through an erosion rate control approach, by implementing remedial measures 
through the construction of protective hard structures, land reclamation, and 
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beach nourishment. In the case of Ensenada, on the Mexican Pacific coast, this 
approach takes the form of isolated actions funded by owners on their own 
properties, without coordination with authorities (Peynador & Méndez-Sánchez, 
2010, p. 352). Lizárraga and Fischer (1998) state that Mexican laws ”are silent” 
on coastal erosion issues (p. 1231). They remark that from a government 
perspective, erosion is viewed “as a natural threat” to human occupancy of the 
shoreline, sidestepping important political, social, and economic processes that 
have induced erosion along these coasts (Lizárraga and Fischer, 1998).  
In the context of Mexico’s Caribbean coasts, experts explain that tourist 
infrastructure has had more negative impacts on coastal ecosystems and 
morphology than any long-term geologic process or natural event. Studies of 
coastal erosion in Cancun have demonstrated the impacts of infrastructure in 
promoting permanent erosion, as urban projects have obstructed natural 
sediment flows between lagoon and littoral systems (Ruiz et al., 2010). More 
specifically, in Tabasco, scientists emphasize that the creation of artificial 
openings along the coast and the building of breakwaters, jetties, and deepwater 
ports have all induced erosion (Ortiz et al., 2010; Hernández et al., 2008). 
However, in recognizing the lack of understanding of factors that could have 
influenced the emergence of accretive processes in some areas, scientists 
hypothesize that coastal wall protections might have prevented higher erosion 
rates (Ortiz, 2010).  
 
 
182 
 
4.5 Discussion 
Esteves and Finkl (1998) make an interesting remark in analyzing coastal 
erosion along the Florida coasts. They explain that coastal erosion has been 
widely discussed by different actors – governments, scientists, and local 
inhabitants – however, they argue, “controversies arise regarding the perception 
and exact definition of beach erosion, mainly due to the diverse interests of the 
different parts in the subject” (Esteves & Finkl, 1998, p. 11). As analyzed in this 
paper, in the Mexican case the existence of different narratives of coastal erosion 
make evident the existence of multiple controversies about the nature of this 
phenomenon, as well as its causes and solutions. 
 One of the most important issues is that of the emergence and causes of 
coastal erosion. Mexican geologists have recorded the existence of coastal 
erosion along the Tabasco coasts since the 1940s. Based on historical data 
analysis, these scientists have concluded that land subsidence is the main driver 
promoting erosion. Since scientists have documented the existence of erosion 
since over 70 years, a key question emerges over the role of sea level rise in 
further inducing coastal erosion in Tabasco.  
As I have discussed in this chapter, scientists have clearly stated that sea 
level rise is not necessarily the primary driver of coastal erosion in Tabasco, and 
they point to the need to consider the diversity of regional factors in inducing it. 
Coastal erosion is defined as a complex process that is locally specific. Experts 
explain that it is relative (local) sea level change that drives local impacts, and 
that this relative change is determined by different regional factors such as land 
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subsidence/uplift, atmospheric pressure, ocean circulation, local winds, currents, 
and rainfall.  In sum, as Thieler and Hammar-Klose (2001) explain, “one of the 
most important applied problems in coastal geology today is determining the 
physical response of the coastline to sea level rise” (p. 1). Furthermore, scientists 
have also stated that coastal protection infrastructure and increased storminess 
may be more important than projected sea level rise in inducing coastal changes 
(Marchand, 2010).  
My case study shows that despite the existence of different scientific and 
local environmental knowledge’s explanations of coastal erosion – from 
geologists and other coastal ecosystems’ scholars and fishers – Mexican 
governments are privileging global climate change frameworks to explain local 
environmental changes. The Mexican case demonstrates how government 
narratives explain erosion as a phenomenon that coastal areas are or are going 
to experience as a result of climate change – according to future predictions and 
scenarios. The privileging of certain frameworks points to core issues highlighted 
by S&TS studies, such as: What type of science and knowledge counts in 
problem definition? What factors are determining the type of science and 
scientists governments use in framing problems? Why are some frameworks 
used to mobilize human and financial resources while others are limited to the 
realm of scholarly debates?  
In defining regional coastal erosion as a result of global sea level change 
due to the melting of glaciers and thermal expansion, the Mexican government is 
bounding and characterizing the problem within particular temporal and spatial 
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dimensions – bringing the politics of scale into the discussion through the framing 
of global problems. I argue that climate change frameworks allow the Mexican 
government to exclude contentious historical, political, economic, and 
environmental processes that influence environmental changes in coastal 
communities from their diagnosis. In adopting a narrative that emphasizes the 
“global” dimension of the problem and the “urgency” in attending its “inevitable” 
impacts, Mexican governments are excluding from their initiatives concrete and 
contextual governance failures – such as policy implementation, corruption, lack 
of planning, or land speculation – that are at the core of some environmental 
changes. In this case study, the discourse that explains the need to address 
climate change impacts in coastal communities does not discuss or address key 
contextual issues such as the role of infrastructure built by the oil industry or the 
development of urban projects, or other land-use changes that drive 
environmental change.  
As Li (1997) explains, in the process of “rendering technical” contentious 
political issues, government discourses “are devoid of reference to questions 
they cannot address, or that might cast doubt upon the completeness of their 
diagnoses or the feasibility of their solutions” (p. 11). In criticizing the climate 
change narrative in the context of coastal areas, Mexican scholars such as Ruiz 
et al. (2010) clearly state that there is a need to “demystify” the idea that every 
coastal change is the result of climate change. These scientists emphasize the 
need for the government to focus on more “immediate” and important problems 
and needs before it commits to design initiatives that attend to impacts over the 
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long term. In criticizing governments’ failures in addressing the root causes of 
climate change vulnerability, Gaillard argues that “national authorities further find 
in climate change a perfect scapegoat for the occurrence of disasters and the 
inhabitation of development” (Gaillard, 2010, p. 224). 
The purpose of this chapter is not to deny the existence of climate change, 
nor to disagree on the importance of addressing its impacts on coastal 
communities.  Instead, it highlights the need to critically analyze how certain 
narratives of environmental change frame problems, and the implications for 
local inhabitants experiencing those changes. Critical literature on climate 
change has discussed the implications of climate change narratives in terms of 
equity and human rights, and how in the process of redefining problems and 
identities under the climate change lens, local inhabitants’ perspectives and 
voices are being “misrepresented or silenced” (Bravo, 2009, p. 268). As I discuss 
in the next chapter, the Mexican case shows how this process of reframing 
affects not only social identities but also contentious social relations. Government 
narratives, for example, call for a reconfiguration of fishermens’ relationships with 
the oil industry, from confrontation to partnership and cooperation, so that 
adaptation goals can be achieved. As I discuss further, these are some of the 
“unintended” effects (Ferguson, 1994) of climate change narratives that should 
be critically analyzed. 
Forsyth argues that “orthodox” environmental change narratives “fail to 
incorporate local people’s experiences on environmental changes” as they have 
experienced them across the time (Forsyth, 2003, p. 24). This idea is clearly 
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illustrated in my case study, since it shows how local socio-political processes 
and fishers’ environmental knowledge have shaped fishers’ perceptions and 
understandings about environmental changes such as coastal erosion. In this 
chapter I have argued that fishers and scientist’s explanations challenge 
government narratives in three important respects: (i) in relation to problem 
definition, questioning whether erosion represents “a problem” for local 
inhabitants in the first place; (ii) about the identification of the main drivers in the 
emergence of local changes, and; (iii) regarding the attribution of responsibilities 
to solve local problems. 
Government narratives highlight coastal erosion as one of many climate 
change impacts. However, scientists and fishers question the very definition of 
erosion as “a problem” in itself. Scientists and fishers agree that coastal erosion 
is both, a natural phenomenon in the sense that it is part of a natural coastal 
variability but also they both argue that it is a “man-made” problem.  
For fishers, erosion is part of the life of their communities; they recall their 
ancestors’ testimonies about different shoreline variations that their coasts have 
experienced over time. These ideas also shape fishers’ perceptions of 
environmental risks. For some fishers, erosion is not dangerous; they have 
always lived with it. As one fishers said: “maybe we are going to move from our 
places when we have the water up to our knees.”  These statements and 
perceptions may have important policy implications in terms of the solutions to 
coastal erosion included in Mexican climate change initiatives, such as the 
relocation of people living in at risk areas. In interviews, fishers explained their 
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concerns about relocation, including both economic and identity issues, which 
government officials many times fail to consider when designing their initiatives. 
As one activist clearly states, “some of us might think climate change is just 
about moving people to a safer place. But it’s about equity, identity and human 
rights” (quoted in Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012, p. 383).  
Scientists and fishers also point out that coastal erosion becomes a 
problem only when there is not enough room to accommodate ecosystems’ 
changes. This alludes directly to development issues, such as the building of 
urban infrastructure or the lack of planning that fails to consider natural 
ecosystem processes or actively obstructs them.  
The second idea that fundamentally challenges government narratives is 
that for fishers, coastal erosion is not a ”natural threat,” as it has been framed by 
the Mexican government, in Tabasco and other coastal areas (Lizárraga & 
Fischer, 1998, p. 1240). Fishermen clearly stated that this is also a “man-made” 
problem that emerged as a result of infrastructure built by the oil company. 
Coastal erosion is perceived not as a consequence of changes in the 
environment, but as an effect promoted by engineering works that altered ocean 
currents, resulting in the promotion of erosion in their coasts. As I discussed, 
scientists studying coastal erosion have also greatly emphasized the role of 
infrastructure and urban developments as factors in inducing coastal erosion. 
This case study clearly illustrates Gaillard’s analysis of climate change 
narratives, in which he explains that “the contemporary focus on climate change 
thus reinforces a paradigm where Nature is the danger source (even if 
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exacerbated by human activity, as with climate change and other hazards) and 
where people have to adjust / adapt to that threat” (Gaillard, 2010, p. 224).  
In analyzing environmental narratives in Oaxaca, Mexico, Mathews 
explains that “the texture of state society relations profoundly affects the status of 
knowledge, the legitimacy of the state, and the credibility of official knowledge 
claims” (Matthews, 2009, p. 89). In this case study, I argue that fishermens’ 
perspectives on coastal erosion are shaped by their long-standing conflict with 
Pemex, which has had catastrophic social, economic, and environmental impacts 
on the region. It is in the context of their conflict-ridden relationship with the 
government that local fishermen have developed their understanding that the 
causes of many of their problems are due to decisions by the Mexican 
government – through the oil industry - as opposed to problems caused by 
nature or climate change. Fishermens’ positions also make evident that people’s 
vulnerability to climate change impacts are the product not only of climatic 
events, but “from conditions and systemic power relations on the ground” 
(Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012, p. 382).  
The third idea challenging government narratives is in the attribution of 
responsibility for dealing with coastal erosion impacts. In a report on coastal 
erosion commissioned by the European Union, scientists remark that “hardly 
ever are parties responsible for coastal erosion made accountable for the 
consequences” (Marchand, 2010, p. 9). This is one of local fishers’ claims as 
well, when they explain that the government is responsible for solving or 
preventing coastal erosion. In contrast, government narratives highlight the 
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“common” responsibility that individuals, governments, and other actors should 
assume in facing climate change impacts. For government representatives, 
fishermen “must adapt” to climate change by modifying their practices, and the 
list of specific recommendations is long: they should shift to farm fishing, build 
their homes as their ancestors did, or relocate away from risky locations to safer 
places. In sum, they should adopt many of the so-called “sustainable” practices 
that these government narratives describe. 
In sum, my analysis of different explanations of environmental changes, 
and the controversies surrounding these issues, illustrates that efforts to position 
climate change at the core of global politics is a very contested process on the 
ground.  Analysis of fishers and scientists’ explanations of coastal changes 
clearly illustrate the de-politicized nature of government narratives, which are 
ignoring contentious political, economic and environmental issues. The 
discussion of such a variety of narratives also demonstrates how fishers’ 
perceptions of environmental changes are not detached from the political 
economic context forged in this region over time. Finally, this chapter also 
discussed issues pointed out by S&TS studies, regarding problem definition 
(when erosion is a natural process, or when it is a social problem), and the type 
of knowledge government narratives use (or sidestep) to explain the problem.  
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CHAPTER 5.THE PROMISES OF CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 
IN COASTAL COMMUNITIES 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I analyze government climate change adaptation narratives in 
Tabasco. I discuss them in light of fieldwork findings, particularly in relation to 
local struggles that represent a challenge for government officials seeking to 
implement climate change adaptation measures in the region. Mosse explains 
that government initiatives “may not generate events, but [they help to] stabilize 
the interpretation of events” (Mosse, 2004, p. 655); they “work to maintain 
themselves as coherent policy ideas, as systems of representations” (Mosse, 
2004, p. 654). In this chapter, I analyze how the Mexican government’s climate 
change narratives stabilize and maintain coherent interpretations of events under 
a structured set of ideas and frameworks that highlight some aspects of events 
rather than others, or that exclude certain events and actors and include others.  
I argue that government narratives attempt to reconfigure social, political, 
and economic relations in the region – e.g. by attempting to make fishermen and 
the state-owned oil industry into allies against climate change impacts. These 
government narratives propose forms of "adaptive" action that I argue replicate 
and reinforce problems historically associated with critiques of “development.” 
Finally, according to these narratives, adaptation measures must be 
implemented alongside other strategies that aim at shaping an “adaptive subject” 
(McNamara, 2006; Felli & Castree, 2012). Fishers should modify their behavior, 
practices and social relations so they can face climate change impacts. 
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These government narratives are based on the IPCC model. This is a 
scenario-driven approach that evaluates the impacts of climate change and 
assesses potential adaptation and mitigation measures aimed at reducing 
climate change vulnerabilities, an approach that “echoes particular models of 
explanation and causality” (Beck, 2011, p. 299).  In this framework, Beck argues, 
adaptation “refers only to actions taken in response to climatic changes attributed 
to green-house gas emissions” (Beck, 2011, p. 302). In the case of Tabasco, this 
analysis focuses on two climatic impacts: floods and sea-level rise. Although the 
government narratives discuss climatic and non-climatic causes in the 
construction of coastal communities’ vulnerabilities, the purpose of these 
government interventions is to propose adaptation measures that aim to deal 
with climate impacts. The “field of view” determined by this narrative therefore 
leaves aside the set of policies and initiatives that would address structural 
factors that determine coastal communities’ vulnerabilities in the first place. And 
in doing so, they “render technical” contentious political issues. 
Ferguson argues that development apparatuses work as an anti-politics 
machine, which in the case of Lesotho represented a process of depoliticization 
in which history and politics were swept aside, and state initiatives were 
represented as neutral and technical (Ferguson, 1994). Using this framework to 
analyze the case of Tabasco is of particular importance, since it is a context in 
which resource access and management is a very contentious issue, involving 
conflicts between powerful actors – including the state-owned oil company – and 
fishermen. The government’s climate change initiatives are presented as 
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“neutral,” since they are based on science, which is itself conceived as a neutral 
force whose only aim is to provide “truth to power.” However, since such 
interventions aim to assess, diagnose, and propose adaptation measures, they 
necessarily involve extremely sensitive political issues, such as resource control 
and access, among others. As I discuss in this chapter, this representation of 
adaptation measures as “neutral“ could never be seen as such by local 
fishermen if these measures propose specific ways to manage, limit or access 
local resource, or even if they just involve new ways of reinterpreting contentious 
historical issues.  
As I discuss in this chapter, Roe’s illustration of development narratives 
closely resembles the climate change narratives of the Mexican State. He 
explains that development planning: 
“employs a narrative structure comparable to the archetypal folktale. A 
problem (often a “crisis”) is encountered: it will be ‘solved’ through the 
epic endeavour of a hero (the project/policy), who faces and overcomes 
a series of trials (constraints), and then lives happily ever after” (quoted 
in Gasper & Apthorpe, 1996, p. 9). 
 
However, my analysis of the Tabasco case also shows that the recognition of 
complex and structural problems within the folktale does not necessarily address 
or change an initiatives’ final aims. Within these narratives, the discussion of 
social, economic, and historical conditions is instrumental in justifying the 
“complexity” of the climate change problem; however, as I demonstrate in this 
chapter, even though these factors are contained within government narratives, 
they are not actually addressed. 
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These climate change narratives are presented as a manifestation of the 
collective efforts that are needed to face climate impacts, to reduce the 
population’s vulnerabilities, to promote sustainable development, and, in sum, as 
“a force for beneficial change” (Ferguson, 1994, p. 10). Quarles, Kumar, and 
Mosse (2003) argue that international development is entering a new phase of 
“high managerialism” – the reverse of high modernism – stating that: 
Today’s narrowly defined development ends and broadly defined means 
precisely contrast the modernization models of the 1950s and 1960s in 
which broadly defined and radically future-oriented development ends – 
the transition to modernity – were to be accomplished through narrowly 
defined means, namely technology-led growth (roads, seeds or 
architecture) (p.7). 
 
As I discuss in this chapter, the Mexican government’s climate change narratives 
show signs of both of the two processes described above, which the authors 
describe as separate. On one hand they are strongly future-oriented, since the 
very nature of the issues they deal with have long temporal scales, but also 
because they are oriented towards the realization of a sustainable world. On the 
other hand, climate change initiatives also include broadly defined means, which 
are labeled under big and poorly-defined policy fields such as adaptation 
measures which include fishing planning, implementation of better water 
management practices, and the improvement of agriculture. Other means are, in 
contrast, more narrowly defined. Some scholars criticize them as technocratic 
and managerial, examples include improved climate-resistance seeds or climate-
proof infrastructure. 
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 In the next section I analyze how climate change adaptation narratives 
attempt to reconcile opposed interests between local fishers and the oil industry, 
a sector that according to fishers and scientists has been the main factor causing 
people’s vulnerabilities in the study region. The third section focuses on the many 
promises of adaptation, and analyses specific measures proposed for Tabasco’s 
coastal communities in light of local fishermen’s views. The last section 
discusses two examples that illustrate government narratives’ efforts in the 
making of an adaptive subject, which are aimed at shaping fishers’ conduct. 
 
5.2 Discursive Reconciliations between Fishermen and the Oil Industry  
In this section I discuss how federal and provincial government narratives 
recognize the existence of non-climate change factors determining the 
vulnerability of coastal communities. These narratives do not attribute 
responsibility to the oil industry as one of the many sources of local vulnerability. 
Instead, government narratives work to discursively reconcile the oil industry and 
the fishermen by presenting both as victims of climate change impacts.  
The history of Tabasco – marked by development interventions that led to 
profound social and environmental structural transformations – has represented 
for local inhabitants a history of the construction of their own vulnerability. 
Despite these historical facts, government narratives of climate change appear to 
reconcile what history has shown to be an irreconcilable set of interests and 
projects. Government climate change interventions, according to these 
narratives, look for solutions for a broad array of actors and sectors, including the 
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oil and tourist industries on the one hand, and the abstract aggregate of “coastal 
populations” on the other, as well as claiming to take into account the different 
ecosystems they inhabit.  
As many scholars have argued, the accelerated growth of the oil and 
tourist industries in Mexico over the last few decades “has triggered social and 
environmental conflicts concerning land use, resource exploitation, and pollution” 
between state and private agencies and local communities (Delgado, et al., 
2011, p. 1137).48 The government’s climate change narratives both recognize 
these industries’ impacts on local inhabitants, and at the same time highlight the 
need to implement strategies to protect these industries from climate change 
impacts. Under this approach, the oil sector and fishermen are supposed to 
share the same concern: they are both victims of climate change impacts – for 
example, beach erosion that is destroying oil infrastructure as well as 
communities’ houses and roads – with a shared need to find a solution.  
I argue that this work to reconcile the interests of fishermen and the oil 
industry is possible because these narratives focus on explaining vulnerability to 
climate impacts rather than addressing structural factors that put communities at 
risk in the first place. My analysis shows how government narratives transform 
the oil industry from being a historical cause of environmental change and source 
of local vulnerability, to a potential victim, therefore aligned with the fishermen 
who have historically been opposed to this industry.  
                                                 
48 In Tabasco the tourist sector is marginal; this note refers to the most important touristic enclave 
in the country: Cancun and the Mayan Riviera region.  
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This is also the case with wetland ecosystems that according to 
government narratives need to be protected – through conservation programs or 
the creation of natural protected areas – so they can be better equipped to face 
climate change impacts. Instead of critically discussing the role of the oil industry 
in destroying coastal and marine ecosystems, what government narratives 
emphasize is the need to propose a set of actions – adaptation measures – to 
protect ecosystems from possible future climatic changes based on uncertain 
scenarios. The search for structural solutions to problems that the oil or tourist 
industries cause for fishermen’s livelihoods or environments, or for wetlands, are 
not considered part of the problem to be solved, although they are part of the 
storyline. 
Government narratives do recognize the existence of “non-climate 
change” factors that have determined the magnitude of weather-related disasters 
to a great extent. Specifically, the Tabasco Climate Change Plan states that 
floods are “not the result of changes caused by ‘climate change’ but are due to 
various changes introduced by human beings, specifically by altering the natural 
hydraulic flows” (SERNAPAN, 2011, p. 94). The Plan states that there are two 
key non-climate related factors that are increasing flood impacts: deforestation, 
which reduces water filtration and increases sedimentation, and non-planned 
infrastructure building that obstructs natural hydrologic dynamics (SERNAPAN, 
2011, p. 95). In addition, increasing urbanization and other land-use changes 
have also impacted the hydrodynamics of the region. 
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The oil industry has been a key actor in implementing efforts to contain, 
divert and manage water in Tabasco; it has built 80 km of channels and drains 
inside lagoons and rivers to facilitate the introduction of oil machinery (Bello et 
al., 2009, p. 488). The construction of roads and pipelines, as explained in the 
previous chapter, has destroyed coastal vegetation, induced beach erosion, and 
modified the natural draining streams of peasants’ lands, which has resulted in 
the inundation of their territory or drought in other places. However, the Tabasco 
Climate Change Plan omits any mention of the role of Pemex in altering the 
natural hydrologic dynamic, or other impacts. It mentions the problems of 
infrastructure and land use change as a rationale to intervene, but without 
naming the actors that historically have driven such transformations.  
In a study of climate change vulnerability in Tabasco, which provides data 
and analyses used in making the province’s climate change plan, scientists 
explain that the magnitude of risks and the occurrence of disasters are directly 
related to the vulnerability of the population. Vulnerability is highly associated 
with poverty and the economic conditions of Tabasco’s population; in this study, 
scientists refer to indicators such as population growth and lack of urban 
planning. They also highlight the lack of government support in rural areas, 
associating this factor with increasing migration flows to cities. This factor, they 
continue, contributes to increasing urban density and therefore, to the fact that 
more people are exposed to hydrometeorological risks (Gama 2008).  
This analysis of the structural causes of vulnerability is again omitted from 
the Tabasco Climate Change Plan. Instead, the Plan primarily focuses its 
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analysis on predicted risks and the methodologies used to construct different 
scenarios. According to government protocols, studies and assessments are 
needed to understand the magnitude of climate change impacts, but more 
importantly, to design corresponding adaptation policies to face them. However, 
government officials discretionally select the information and rationale to be used 
in justifying government interventions, and in the process key actors and events 
are erased from the narratives.  
An example of what I call discursive reconciliation of actors and interests 
is made in initiatives such as the Adaptation to Climate Change Impacts on the 
Coastal Wetlands in the Gulf of Mexico (hereafter the Wetlands Report). This 
initiative is promoted by agencies such as the Global Environmental Fund, the 
World Bank, and the government of Japan, who are lending or donating funds to 
Mexico to support climate change projects. In this study, the authors (scientists) 
clearly recognize the existence of a diversity of non-climate sources of 
vulnerability, stating that “[i]t is safe to say that pressure from human activities in 
these ecosystems is the main threat, to which we must add future changes in 
climatic conditions” (Buenfil, 2009, p. 26). This project highlights the fact that 
water pollution, stemming from untreated urban and industrial wastewater, 
agricultural runoff containing fertilizers and pesticides, and spills from oil 
extraction, transport, and refining, are some of the most important problems in 
the Gulf of Mexico region (Buenfil, 2009, p. 27). The study explains that the 
deforestation of forests including mangroves is occurring at alarming rates 
(Buenfil, 2009, p. 26). The main causes of this loss of vegetative cover are the 
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expansion of agricultural and livestock activities and the development of urban 
and industrial infrastructure – including that developed to accommodate tourism 
(Buenfil, 2009, p. 27-28).  
Scientists who participated in the Wetland project recognize Pemex’s 
environmental impacts in the region, and the study discusses the long-lasting 
transformations in the region induced by such “forced industrialization” and also 
includes other environmental transformations such as those Tabasco 
experienced due to the Plan Chontalpa (Bello et al., 2009, p. 489). Although the 
oil industry is considered the source of many of the region’s problems, this study 
includes a discussion about the impacts of sea level rise on Pemex’s coastal 
infrastructure. Pemex has built several different kinds of infrastructure to contain 
increasing erosion – particularly concrete and synthetic walls – but these have 
failed to prevent damages to the oil infrastructure. A newspaper reported that 
when Pemex started working in Centla – a neighboring coastal area – the water 
was far from where the company built its infrastructure, but after only two years 
the sea has advanced about 200 meters over the beach, causing severe damage 
to its facilities (Mari, 2012, p. 14). According to this source Pemex will begin to 
implement a fourth strategy to stop erosion: the building of artificial reefs (Mari, 
2012, p. 14). Due to its situation, the Wetlands project emphasizes that the oil 
industry’s infrastructure is one of most vulnerable to climate change and coastal 
erosion. As a result, they argue that “adaptation projects are essential to sustain 
the economic system [oil industry]” in the region (Bello et. al, 1999, p. 499). In 
this framing, the oil industry shifts from being one of the most important causes of 
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vulnerability in the region to a victim of climate change impacts. The discussion 
of the industry’s role in contributing to climate change is also omitted.  
The Wetlands project report includes some important clarifications that, to 
a certain extent, question the core argument and rationale with which climate 
change interventions are made. These clarifications are important to highlight, 
because they reveal a variety of different approaches that scholars participating 
in the making of a study have toward the issue of climate change. First, the study 
states that it is not clear whether the hydrometeorological events that have 
severely impacted the Gulf of Mexico coasts over the past few years are caused 
by climate change, or whether they are part of a natural process. The narratives 
in this project recognize that although the number and intensity of natural 
catastrophes have increased in the coasts of the Gulf of Mexico, “[w]e do not 
know with precision whether they are consequence of a natural evolution of the 
Earth and what percentage has been caused by climate change” (Graizbord & 
Gómez, 2009, p. 43).  As I analyze in chapter six, this kind of uncertainty about 
climate change impacts is not preventing the mobilization of government 
resources and interventions. 
The second important caveat noted in the Wetlands project is that 
“wetlands present low or moderate vulnerability to climate change, but [they] 
however experience different anthropological stresses such as deforestation, 
overfishing, tourism and pollution” (Buenfil, 2009, p. 53). Again, this statement 
intrinsically questions the centrality of climate change impacts in wetlands 
degradation, by highlighting the impacts human activities have had on these 
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ecosystems. This is similar to my finding discussed in chapter six: scientists 
interviewed in my study have commented critically on government narratives 
centered on climate-related impacts, particularly in contexts like Mexico, where 
many other development issues must be addressed to reduce the vulnerability of 
people to climatic changes. 
 
5.3 The Promises of Adaptation 
In this section I discuss the concept of adaptation in light of some critical 
approaches to climate change and development narratives. I also analyze some 
characteristics of the proposed adaptation measures for coastal communities, as 
they relate to local livelihoods and perspectives.  
In government narratives, adaptation is explained as “an opportunity to 
change paradigms and to improve the quality of life” of people (CICC, 2012a, p. 
147). Adaptation is framed as a key step towards the realization of sustainable 
development in Mexico (CICC, 2012a, p. 146). This echoes framings circulating 
among international aid development agencies that point out the need to 
mainstream adaptation into development projects, because it represents an 
opportunity to get development “right” – that is, to avoid the pitfalls of past failed 
development practices (Lemos, Boyd, Tompkins, Osbahr, & Liverman, 2007). 
Adaptation is also explained as an opportunity “to rethink or 'reimagine' what 
international development means and how it needs to change” (IDS, 2012). This 
teleological conception of climate change adaptation resembles past 
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interpretations of development models, something that can be seen strongly in 
the government narrative as well. Orlove (2009) explains that, 
Much as the word development places all nations on a single scale, 
offering the suggestion that the very poorest nations of the world are 
developing and are moving towards the prosperity of the richer ones, so 
too the word adaptation places all outcomes on a single scale, offering the 
suggestion that the world can shift up from the less satisfactory outcomes 
to the better ones (p. 136). 
 
A clear illustration of these framings can be found in the recently released 
National Climate Change Strategy (SEMARNAT, 2013), in which the Mexican 
government explains its strategy and targets to be achieved by implementing 
climate change strategies in development planning. This document explains that 
in 10 years, the goal is to attend to the most vulnerable groups; the Strategy also 
envisions an “involved and actively participant society” in climate change issues 
(SEMARNAT, 2013, p. 23). In 20 years, “society is committed to reducing climate 
change impacts, and human settlements would have strengthened their adaptive 
capacity” (SEMARNAT, 2013, p. 23). In 40 years, society “culturally and socially 
has become integrated into the climate change struggle,” and the rural population 
is “not very” vulnerable (SEMARNAT, 2013, p. 23).  
Government climate change narratives state that the integration of 
adaptation objectives with development planning is a challenge since they need 
to address poverty and inequality, which implicitly “question[s] the development 
model” (CICC, 2012a, p. 82). The Tabasco Plan seconds these ideas by stating 
that climate change policies are an important step towards the reconsideration of 
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“human-environment relationships” (SERNAPAN, 2013, p. 9). For example, the 
Wetlands project states that adaptation is a process that “will lead to better 
resource management (water and land), conservation of ecological processes 
and biodiversity, more sustainable human activities, reduction in vulnerability to 
extreme weather events” (Buenfil, 2009, p. 30).  
This discursive approach to adaptation however, is not translated from this 
theoretical framing to practice on the ground. Furthermore, as I discuss in the 
next chapter, adaptation measures in Mexico reflect a managerial approach that 
reinforces the idea that if we as a society “are prepared” then problems will be 
manageable (Orlove, 2009, p. 136). This statement can be analyzed through the 
many scholarly debates that criticize what has been described as the dominant 
technocratic approach to adaptation, which draws on physical, technological, 
economic, and managerial frameworks, values, and narratives to explain the 
problem of adaptation to climate change and its possible solutions (Heyd & 
Brooks, 2009; Nelson, West, & Finan, 2010; Smith, Burton, Klein, & Wandel, 
2000; Leach et al., 2010).49  
Using this literature, we can identify two normative characteristics of this 
framing of adaptation. On one hand, adaptation has been portrayed as 
“something”50 local communities must do if they want to overcome the impacts of 
climate change. On the other hand, as I discussed above, adaptation is included 
                                                 
49 Scholars have also highlighted the regulatory character of the term adaptation, explaining that it 
is a concept that “has gone from being considered something done by plants and animals in 
evolution as a response to environmental changes, to being promoted as a concept for guiding 
policy to ensure sustainable development, reduce vulnerability and minimize risk to humans from 
climate change” (Shipper, 2007, p. 3). 
50 Scholars point out the need to clarify what exactly is being understood by adaptation and for 
whom: Is it a course of action? Is it a process? Is it a public policy? Is it a local action? I raised 
these same questions in interviews with scientists in Mexico. 
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in development jargon as something “good”51 that should happen in order for a 
community to improve, as an opportunity, or something advantageous for local 
communities. Finally, another set of critiques underscores the top-down origin of 
this concept,52 suggesting that the term adaptation “does not always capture the 
full impacts of climate change and … does not always represent accurately either 
the perceptions of the people affected by these impacts or the range of 
alternatives open to them” (Orlove, 2009, p. 131). The implications of this 
statement are clearly illustrated in the discussion that follows in the next section. 
 
Adaptation Measures 
In this section, I discuss adaptation measures in light of fishermen’s views on 
particular problems that directly intersect with such initiatives. As this section 
shows, the “promises of adaptation” are challenged by situated local dynamics, 
which are determined by historical struggles over natural resource use and 
access. Adaptation initiatives in Tabasco articulate ideas about how coastal 
inhabitants should live and produce, but also about how they should transform 
their social relations in order to better face climate change impacts. But 
implementing such ideas on the ground is not an easy process. My fieldwork 
findings show the complexity of the transition between global and local scales, 
                                                 
51 As Nelson et al. criticize, in climate change discourses “adaptation is presented as a panacea, 
a kind of off-camera bodyguard that will opportunely step in to buffer populations from the 
advance of rising sea levels, species extinctions, temperature extremes, shrinking ice flows, and 
so forth” (Nelson et al., 2009, p. 271). 
52 In discussing the omission of the long-term scholarly tradition of cultural anthropology on 
adaptation research, Nelson et al. emphasize that “the climate-change debates have historically 
focused on technologies and the elusive search for large-scale, cookie-cutter solutions, leaving 
aside the important role that individuals, cultures, and societies play in constructing and living out 
an adaptation dynamic” (Nelson et.al., 2009, p. 272). 
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from global models to the practices, events, and material outcomes they are 
expected to generate. As ethnographic and actor-oriented development scholars 
have highlighted, interventions should be understood as socially constructed 
processes that are continuously negotiated on the ground by a wide array of local 
actors with their own interests and perspectives. As Long (1990) explains,  
Although it may be true that certain important structural changes result 
from the impact of outside forces (due to encroachment by the market or 
the state), it is theoretically unsatisfactory to base one's analysis on the 
concept of external determination. All forms of external intervention 
necessarily enter the existing life-worlds of the individuals and social 
groups affected, and in this way are mediated and transformed by these 
same actors and structures (p. 6). 
 
However, how we understand “the internal” or “the local” is also very 
relevant. As development scholars have highlighted, there is a need to demystify 
the existence of a clearly defined unit called “the community” or “the local.” In this 
dissertation, local communities are understood as heterogeneous entities, far 
from being closed and united. As I discussed in the previous chapter, fishermen’s 
perceptions of their social context – their community problems or environmental 
changes – are mediated by political, economic and environmental factors that 
determine fishermens’ natural resource access and control. In this study I 
analyze the perceptions of different fishermen – cooperative members, private 
fishers and freelance fishermen – who by definition have differential access to 
natural resources from the sea and inland lagoons, to local institutions regulating 
access, and to state agencies providing fishing funding and support.  The “local,” 
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then, is a socially, economically, and culturally stratified social space in which 
global interventions land and take different shapes. Such state or non-state 
“external” initiatives then are perceived and negotiated differently by various 
actors who put forward their own agendas as well. 
 
The Projects 
There are two key characteristics of adaptation projects. The first is that they try 
to solve what I identify as old development problems and second, that they 
underscore the importance of social participation. In the past, these kind of 
initiatives occurred under other labels, such as sustainable development. Many 
of these adaptation measures have also long existed as part of national 
policies,53 again only re-labeled under a new name: climate change adaptation. 
For example, the Climate Change Plan in Tabasco lists adaptation projects like: 
a) water conservation and management; infrastructure planning based on the 
natural characteristics of the territory and water dynamics; coastal aquifer 
conservation; b) forest management – reforestation, land-use change from 
livestock to forest, clean energy production, urban forest conservation; or c) 
sustainable productive projects that aim at protecting native species.  
In the promoters’ view – World Bank officials, NGOs, government officials, 
scientists – the success of adaptation initiatives “depends on the degree to which 
                                                 
53 Scientists working on the Wetlands project emphasize that the Mexican government already 
has the institutional capacity to implement adaptation measures through mechanisms and 
institutions like ecological and territorial regulations. They state that Natural Protected Area 
management plans are mechanisms that “allow for greater control and monitoring of implemented 
[adaptation] measures” (Buenfil, 2009, p. 30). Watershed Councils are another example of the 
many mechanisms for public participation and implementation of adaptation initiatives. They 
encourage the effective implementation of these regulations and plans on the ground. 
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the community takes ownership in such actions” (Buenfil, 2009, p. 29). If they are 
embraced by local populations, if fishermen are “actively involved” then the 
initiatives will be successful (World Bank, 2008, p. 5). Therefore, it is through the 
“social participation” ingredient that local authorities, fishing cooperatives, farmer 
cooperatives, and local and regional NGOs members can take part in project 
design and implementation.  
In what follows, I discuss some adaptation actions proposed for coastal 
communities, and the opinions fishermen expressed in interviews about some 
local issues. It is in light of this contextual setting in which adaptation projects are 
going to take place that one is able to critically analyze their viability, as well as 
the extent that these initiatives address structural factors on the ground: 
 
1. Community Relocation. The relocation of settlements currently located in 
vulnerable areas (CICC, 2007), is an adaptation measure proposed in Mexican 
governments’ plans. These narratives recommended the relocation of 
infrastructure and populations that are less than 10m from rivers and lagoons 
(Gama, 2008, p. 73). Examining this type of adaptation option in places around 
the world, climate change researchers have highlighted that “relocation is an 
extremely complex process and often can only be achieved at considerable 
economic, environmental, emotional and social cost” (Campbell, Goldsmith, & 
Koshy, 2005, p. 5). Land tenure, land availability and infrastructure are among 
the many issues that need to be taken into account in elaborating this kind of 
initiative (Campbell, Goldsmith, & Koshy, 2005, p. 5).  
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In my study area, people have already been displaced from their land and 
homes. In some communities, fishers explained that people had moved to other 
places within the same communities but without government or community 
support. In one of the communities, the one most affected by erosion, fishermen 
commented that some government officials have mentioned the possibility of 
relocating their village. Erosion has destroyed the only road that connects the 
village to other places. When I asked the fishers about relocation, they expressed 
concerns, explaining: “the only occupation we have learnt since we were born 
has been fishing, what are we going to do in another place with no job waiting for 
us and without any other skill?”54 The majority of these fishermen stated clearly 
that they would reject moving to another place; there are many concerns 
preventing them from moving, among which lack of jobs and means to make a 
living are the most important.  
Fishers’ risk perception is also an important factor accounting for this 
rejection of relocation. In general, fishermen do not think the problem – coastal 
erosion, flooding – will get worse than it is now, so from their perspective they 
can manage to live as they are, with the water just beside their houses. They 
understand coastline changes as part of a natural dynamic. They explained that 
this condition is part of their life, and recall their ancestors’ accounts about 
different positions the shoreline has had over time, sometimes closer to their 
homes, sometimes farther away. As a result, the process of consultation and 
negotiation that needs to be carried out by government officials in considering 
                                                 
54 Interview with a freelance fisher. June 7, 2012. Tabasco. 
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this adaptation option has to consider local perceptions of risks, and how people 
have historically managed to live with this type of environmental change.  
Other studies have discussed how people’s distrust of government-driven 
adaptation and relocation planning is an important factor accounting for local 
inhabitants’ rejection of moving from their current location (Marino, 2012). As 
some scholars have discussed,  “traditionally marginalized populations, whose 
very marginality contributes to vulnerability, will likely continue to be marginalized 
from adaptation decision-making and continue to distrust governance structures 
that are already in place” (Marino, 2012, p. 379). In my case study, local 
inhabitants are not participating in the decision-making process for the proposed 
climate change initiatives already taking place in Mexico. As I discussed in the 
previous chapter, fishermen’s perception of initiatives such as relocation are 
strongly determined by their long-term struggle against the oil company  
(struggles over space and resources) as well as their relationship with fishing 
authorities (corruption). 
 
2. Aquaculture. The implementation of aquaculture projects “to increase the 
supply, compensate the loss of fishing from climate change, and to promote the 
restocking of wild species” is another adaptation option (CICC, 2007, p. 118). 
The Tabasco Climate Change Plan proposes the implementation of fish farming 
as an option to promote fish auto-consumption and improve the production of 
native fish species. This option is considered an alternative food-production 
system to face the negative predicted climate change impacts on fishing, which 
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will affect production patterns “by shifting production as species move to new 
habitats or as a result of changes in the net marine primary production” (Merino 
et al., 2012, p. 795). Aquaculture is therefore a strategy to produce and stabilize 
fish supply.  
In Mexico, the government promoted this type of economic alternative in 
the rural areas inland and in coastal areas during the 1980s (Delgado et al., 
2011). The implementation of this type of adaptation measure therefore has a 
long history in these case study communities, even though they were not always 
framed as a response to climate change impacts. A fishing government officer 
explained that these projects were implemented by the government as a strategy 
for diversifying the economic opportunities of local people who lack official 
government permits to fish. In the study region and in neighboring communities 
in Tabasco, the first efforts to cultivate oyster began in 1976 with the support of 
the national and provincial governments.55 Other types of aquaculture projects 
implemented in the area are shrimp (litopenaeus vanamei) and tilapia (tilapia 
nilotica).   
 According to one study (Delgado et al., 2011), Tabasco is the province 
with the least-favorable coastal conditions for the development of sustainable 
aquaculture activities in the country. Among the key indicators used in this study 
to determine this activity’s suitability were the presence of oil pollution – impacts 
                                                 
55 Interview with a government official from the Ministry of the Environment (provincial office). 
December 21, 2011. Tabasco.   
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caused by oil spills and leaks that affect the land and water – and a lack of 
capacity to treat wastewater.56  
In the interviews with fishers, they discussed two main issues regarding 
aquaculture projects, drawing attention to the relevance of local politics, 
particularly corruption and struggles over space and resources. The first issue 
concerns social organization, corruption, and lack of government and fishermen 
accountability. A main concern was that, historically, it has been the same group 
of privileged fishermen – with political power – who have benefited from this kind 
of project: they know how to get the funding, they know “the rules of the game.” A 
second related concern was that government officials never follow up on projects’ 
implementation or effectiveness. In interviews, fishermen showed me several 
farming facilities that had been built but never used. Diversion of funds and lack 
of accountability were the main problems fishermen discussed in these 
interviews. From their perspective, the government is just wasting public 
resources. However, from a local fishing official’s perspective, aquaculture 
projects have been successful and are a way to diversify the local economy.  
A second important comment related to this type of project in Tabasco 
was made by a local fisherman leader, who explained that this type of initiative is 
a strategy the government is using against fishermen. He said that “the 
government wants to throw us out of the sea so Pemex can make use of it, can 
                                                 
56 It is also important to evaluate the promotion of this kind of initiative in light of studies that 
criticize the fact that this economic activity converts natural coastal defenses, such as 
mangroves, to aquaculture, and as a result can increase the vulnerability of coastal communities 
to sea level rise (Barnett & Campbell, 2010). However, these particular issues - lack of local 
conditions to produce farming species, mangrove destruction - were not raised as problems 
during interviews with fishermen or fishing authorities. 
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exploit it.”57 As I argued in the previous chapter, struggles over space and 
resources have a long history in this province. Therefore an important dimension 
in considering the promotion of aquaculture in these communities is fishermen’s 
identity and the underlying power relations among fishermen’s groups and 
organizations. A fishermen’s leader stated: “we are fishermen, we are not fish 
farmers, but the government wants us to become farmers.”58 The implementation 
of what in climate change narratives is explained as an “alternative” economic 
activity has different meanings for certain actors – adaptation projects may be 
considered a threat to fishers and their identities – which reflect the contentious 
struggle over the territory and its resources and is clearly exacerbated when 
projects of this type are implemented in these communities. Furthermore, in the 
context of these communities, the introduction of what could be read as an 
adaptation initiative is instead seen as a project to reconfigure actors and 
resources – both natural and financial – with direct implications for fishermen’s 
livelihoods and power. Fishermen’s identity is permeated by this struggle of 
actors and interests that historically have shaped social relations in Tabasco’s 
coastal communities. This case study clearly illustrates Gramsci’s idea that 
“struggles over meaning are every bit as ‘material’ and important as practical 
struggles” (Castree & Braun, 1998, p. 13).  
Finally, along with these criticisms fishermen also complained about the 
lack of government support in terms of marketing and industrializing their 
production, or funding to acquire better equipment. They complained that the 
                                                 
57 Interview with a local fishers’ leader. December 21, 2011. Tabasco. 
58 Interview with a local fishers’ leader. December 21, 2011. Tabasco. 
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fishing sector has been forgotten by the government, and that there is no clear 
strategy to drive this sector and make it competitive.  
 
3. Fishery planning. In a social context of unemployment and economic crisis, 
resource overexploitation and degradation, local social conflicts, lack of state 
support, and reduced local access to fishing resources, adaptation measures 
such as fishery planning are a daunting task. Mexican government narratives 
specified two particular adaptation objectives in terms of fishery planning: to 
protect traditional fishing and to exploit alternative species in a sustainable way 
(CICC, 2007).  
 In interviews, the first concern fishermen raised was the lack of 
government support to find better strategies to market their catch. In addition, 
they discussed the need to learn new technologies and techniques to transform 
their fishery production. They visualized this strategy as the only one that will 
help them survive the many economic pressures they face, particularly lack of 
production and low prices. How this local concern fits into adaptation measures, 
such the one that aims to protect “traditional” fishing, is not clear. I infer that the 
purpose of this adaptation measure is closely related to the need to protect 
fishing resources by using techniques that are not designed for mass production. 
However, an important question remains unanswered in this approach: Is small-
scale production something fishermen conceive of as advantageous for them? In 
interviews, they explained that their lack of motor boats and nets have prevented 
them from going farther distances to find the fish that in the past they were able 
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to find close to the coast. This was explained as something that put them at a 
disadvantage in relation to the group of fishermen – permisionarios – who have 
the financial and political resources to access this type of equipment.  
The second adaptation measure, promoting the sustainable use of 
alternative species, also involves many challenges. An analysis of the underlying 
set of factors determining fishermen's decisions on when and what to fish would 
shed light on the viability of this kind of adaptation measure. The bottom line is 
again the need to consider fishermen’s economic constraints, which to some 
extent are influencing their decision-making in terms of the type of species they 
exploit (markets, value, etc.). But most importantly, these decisions are also 
determined by technological constraints that determine fishermen's degree of 
independence: freelance fishermen for example – who are the majority of the 
population – need to work for private fishers, who are the ones who ultimately 
make decisions about when and what to fish.  
Economic constraints, lack of technology, and subordination are only 
some of the underlying factors determining fishermen’s economic activities. 
Tabasco fishermen face many other important challenges, such as changing 
water temperatures that are causing the emigration of species from the region, 
and the establishment of new fishing regulations that prohibit fishing activities 
close to offshore oil fields, which function as artificial reefs, so that until recently 
fishermen were able to find abundant species around them (Zalik, 2009).59 These 
                                                 
59 This regulation is Mexican Inter-Secretarial Agreement 117, implemented in 2003, that “restricts 
fishing areas surrounding oil platforms through the amplification of a ‘Zone of Exclusion’” (Zalik, 
2009, p. 558). In interviews, fishermen explained that this particular regulation affected fishermen 
from other regions more – the neighbor community of Frontera for example. With this regulation, 
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new conditions increase fishermen’s production costs and time because they 
need to go farther from their coasts; they also increases their risks. The lack of 
access to some fishing areas illustrates struggles over common resources and 
space that fishermen have historically had with the oil company as well. 
 
4. Natural Protected Areas. There are other related adaptation measures, such 
as the establishment of new Natural Protected Areas in coastal regions that 
crosscut the discussion on resource exploitation and social inequality noted 
above. In the Mexican context, problems generated by the imposition of natural 
protected areas are many – for example, people can be displaced from their 
land. In many cases local inhabitants are never informed that their legal land has 
been expropriated by the government, so they continue to use the resources and 
then are penalized for it. Governments lack the capacity to enhance the law that 
prohibits access to some protected resources, because of a lack of human and 
financial resources or because officials engage in practices such as corruption, 
allowing the illegal extraction of species. As other studies have shown, this kind 
of initiative has, however, enhanced the economic power of a few local and 
extra-local actors that benefit from these illegal practices (Paz & Vázquez, 2002). 
 In my case study, two key challenges to implement this resource 
conservation initiative are: i) corruption and lack of enforcement of resource 
                                                                                                                                                 
fishermen need to go farther from their coasts to fish, with the increasing risks this type of 
enterprise implies. A local biologist explained in interviews that this regulation seriously impacts 
the security of fishermen, who until its implementation used to get help such as food and shelter 
from workers on the platforms – such help was especially relevant during sudden storms, 
therefore currently fishermen are facing more risks (Interview with a scientist from a research 
center. December 12, 2011. Tabasco).  
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exploitation laws and, ii) historical struggles for territories and their resources. 
Local government fishing authorities (fishery office) explained in interviews that 
population growth and resource scarcity are the key factors explaining 
overexploitation of local fishing resources. Corruption of both fishers and 
authorities is a major factor preventing accountability: fishermen fish certain 
species without having a formal permit, they take the risk of fishing species that 
have more value on the market without necessarily having a permit. As I explain 
in chapter 3, corruption of authorities and the role of middlemen are key in the 
functioning of the system as it currently exists.  
 A critical challenge in planning a conservation project in this area is the 
history of struggles local communities have faced over their resources: there is a 
lack of consensus among communities about their territorial boundaries for 
common resource exploitation. Fishermen’s rivalries have resulted in murders 
and permanent tensions among local inhabitants. For fishermen, any 
conservation measure to protect their resources is in vain, since authorities do 
not do their job in preventing resource overexploitation and degradation carried 
out by fishermen from “other” communities. Fishermen argued: “Why would I 
protect the resources if the government is protecting – through corruption – other 
fishermen who come to our communities to use our resources without any limit, 
using illegal nets?”60 But most importantly, even if they do want to help protect 
these resources, to do so they must put their personal security at risk – including 
the risk of physical confrontation. 
                                                 
60 Interview with a cooperative member fisher. June 6, 2012. Tabaco. 
217 
 
In sum, the good will to promote the use of “alternative” species and 
protect coastal ecosystems to better face climate change would need to include a 
set of strategies to deal with the wide array of factors that currently determine 
resource exploitation.   
 
5.4 The Crafting of an Adaptive Subject 
In this section I argue that government climate change adaptation narratives 
articulate ideas about specific ways that coastal inhabitants should live and 
produce, but also how they should transform their social relations in order to 
better face climate change impacts – the ultimate moral goal. These narratives 
require the creation or re-creation of certain social representations and practices 
– the crafting of an “adaptive subject” (McNamara, 2006; Felli & Castree, 2012) 
or the rescue of glorious past practices (Fairhead & Leach, 1995). 
In interviews, government officials explained that fishermen need to be 
“aware of” the climate change problem. Government narratives state that 
fishermen and local populations need “to understand” the relevance of the 
problem and the necessity of implementing adaptation strategies to better cope 
with it. The Tabasco Climate Change Plan includes the training of rural 
communities in vulnerable areas. It explains that this strategy aims to “sensitize 
local communities about the relevance of climate change by giving them basic 
information to identify the risks that they are exposed to, and to identify mitigation 
actions” (SERNAPAN, 2007, p. 39).  For example, one manual was designed to 
help local promoters “help rural populations in their reflections and actions about 
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how to adapt”; this type of initiative aims to contribute to the formation of rural 
communities’ values, attitudes, abilities and capacities (SEMARNAT, 2008, p. 8). 
Along with the formation of such values and understandings, there is also the 
need to change a wide range of different aspects of local life, from the subject’s 
way of living to their social relations. Two examples illustrate these efforts: 
 
(i) In interviews with provincial government environment officials, these officials 
expressed the need for the local fishermen to “assume their role” in the climate 
change crusade.61 They stated that “fishermen must adapt” to climate change 
impacts, which can either mean that they need to relocate from highly vulnerable 
residential areas, or that they must make other changes, such as using different 
housing materials to cope with coastal flooding.62 They pointed out the need for 
the fishers to bring back past practices or “traditions” to better face environmental 
changes.63 Fairhead and Leach (1995) explain that one key component of 
degradation narratives is an idealized understanding of “past” practices and 
social relations, ideas that constitute a framework to interpret extant 
environmental changes. In the Mexican case, officials explained that fishers 
should adopt past practices such as building houses with traditional materials 
such as wood palm, and to raise the floor to avoid flooding. These officials 
expressed that fishermen should build their houses like in old times; they should 
                                                 
61 Interview with a government official from the Ministry of the Environment (provincial office). May 
30, 2012. Tabasco. 
62 Interview with a government official from the Ministry of the Environment (provincial office). May 
30, 2012. Tabasco. 
63 Interview with a government official from the Ministry of the Environment (provincial office). May 
30, 2012. Tabasco. 
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build “palafitos,” the kind of houses communities used to build with mangrove 
wood and with an upper floor – where people used to keep their basic staples, 
animals, and children from the flood. When I asked the fishermen about this type 
of construction, only few remembered that their grandparents or even great-
grandparents had this kind of house, but nobody has actually lived in one or can 
remember them clearly. Government officials also explained that the government 
has a new initiative called “green house” in Tabasco, that includes the building of 
such palafitos.  They expressed with confidence that these type of initiatives is 
the kind of “solution” they envision to face climate change impacts in Tabasco. 
However, this line of thought about “environmentally friendly” past 
traditions and practices change when government officials referred to another 
type of adaptation measure. This glorification of past practices is put aside when, 
for example, officials proposed that fishers should change their livelihood activity: 
instead of being fishers, they should shift to fish farming. Formal adaptation 
initiatives have proposed the promotion of fish farming as a way to face the 
environmental changes fishers are experiencing as a result of climate change. 
Other activities were also seen as part of these adaptation measures that local 
inhabitants should adopt: if, due to climate change mangrove swamps overgrow 
pasture fields, then former livestock farmers should shift to mangrove growing. 
 Another task asked of fishermen is to support mangrove conservation 
initiatives. Government officials explained that a few years ago people from the 
Inter-American Development Bank held meetings with municipal authorities, local 
fishermen, and peasants leaders to present a conservation project “to protect the 
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mangroves” in Tabasco.  In the meetings, a Bank officer asked the fishers “if they 
had the will to pay for the environmental services they were receiving from the 
mangrove.” Through these meetings the Bank was looking for local partners – 
and municipal funds – to finance the project. Government officials were not 
surprised at this type of request – a request for funding from the miserly budget 
local governments get from the central government, which is used to cover basic 
needs such as infrastructure, water supply, etc. – but rather at people’s 
responses to this request. Officials were annoyed at the fact that fishermen did 
not want to collaborate in this project. They made comments such as: “as you 
can see, fishermen do not want to do anything to protect their own environment,” 
or, “fishermen always want just to take but not give anything when the 
government asks them to collaborate.”64 Mexican officials did not question the 
fact that the idea and project were conceived somewhere else and was not 
something that local communities proposed, in fact they were not consulted 
about it. Mexican officials, however, thought that fishermen’s role was to 
collaborate for a conservation project that, they thought, would directly benefit the 
fishers and contribute to the meta goal of facing climate change impacts.  
 
(ii) The second case exemplifies how climate change narratives reframe 
contentious social relations in the study communities – relations that have been 
shaped by historic social, economic and political processes. Climate change 
narratives call for the reconfiguration of fishermen’s relationships with Pemex. 
                                                 
64 Interview with a government official, Ministry of the Environment (provincial office). May 30, 
2012. Tabasco. 
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The provincial government commissioned a non-governmental organization to 
conduct climate change workshops in coastal communities. The workshops’ final 
report highlights recommendations to better adapt to climate change impacts. 
After recognizing “the discomfort” that the oil company has caused communities, 
the report calls for the need to reconsider the relationships between fishers and 
the oil company. The report highlights the need to change those relationships so 
that fishers might consider the oil company not as an “enemy” or “benefactor,” 
but rather as a “partner.” The implicit rationale for this recommendation is that the 
oil company is considered one of the most important actors in the development of 
mitigation and adaptation actions; therefore, such an alliance may enhance the 
effectiveness of climate change projects.  
This “narrative of human responsibility” (Hamblyn, 2009, p. 224) calls for 
the accommodation of extant social relations towards the realization of an 
ultimate goal – communities’ adaptation. Governments’ aim to “reshape the 
conduct of fishers conduct” illustrates the profoundly political character climate 
change narratives can take on the ground.  This case also illustrates Li’s 
argument that when governments exclude political-economic relations from their 
diagnoses and prescriptions, they focus more “on the capacities of the poor than 
on the practices through which one social group impoverishes another” (Li, 2007, 
p. 7). This second case can be read in light of the discursive reconciliation 
referred above between the oil company and fishers; however in that case both 
were portrayed as victims of climate change impacts. In this example, both actors 
222 
 
are visualized as partners in their common responsibility to implement adaptation 
measures. 
 
5.5 Discussion  
This chapter illustrates three main features of Mexican government narratives 
about climate change: a) their antipolitics effect when attempting to conciliate 
opposed interests between Pemex and fishers; b) their technocratic approach in 
addressing climate change impacts and; c) their functioning as technologies of 
governance, promoting ideas to shape fishers’ behavior and practices. 
 The first is the reconciliation of opposed interests that are linked together 
in the search of a meta goal, so that natural and human systems can better face 
climate change impacts. The antipolitics machine is at work in this narrative when 
initiatives overlook the contentious historical political issues – such as the 
struggle over contested resources – that are at stake when such initiatives 
involve resource use, access, and management, discuss environmental changes, 
or attribute responsibilities.  
As I discussed, these narratives raise questions about the role of key 
actors in the production of local vulnerabilities, such as the oil industry. However, 
this recognition does not prevent these narratives from framing the climate 
change problem as external, “as a threat to everyone without blaming anyone or 
any sector” (Vink, Boezeman, Dewulf, & Catrien, 2013, p. 96). Felli and Castree 
(2012) argue that: 
Although the existence of ‘poorer' people (defined as those lacking in 
‘social, political, and economic capital’), and who actually happen to be the 
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‘most vulnerable' and the ‘less mobile', is readily acknowledged, this is 
done in a context in which all social actors are presented as having 
basically the same interests, rationality, and aspirations differing only in 
the level of ‘assets' they command (and thus in their ‘adaptive capacity'). 
There appear to be few social divisions and no social classes, nor 
contradictory or conflicting social interests (except for an understanding of 
violent conflicts linked to resource scarcity, environmental degradation and 
the disruption of social cohesion) (p. 2, emphasis added).  
 
In these narratives, fishermen's interests are explained within the broad self-
contained label of “coastal communities.” This simplification of social realities 
erases the multiplicity of local actors, the local politics in which they are 
immersed, and the multiplicity of interests and views about environmental 
changes. In my case study, interlocking processes such as industrial production 
(oil and sugar cane) and resource overexploitation and degradation are 
problematized in light of discussions about the need to reduce local 
vulnerabilities. The logic of these narratives is that if every sector and actor does 
their job – reducing emissions and implementing adaptation measures such as 
conservation – the result would be that these communities would be better 
equipped to face climatic changes. The contradictory interests of both the oil 
industry and fishermen appear to be resolved under the climate change umbrella. 
The second characteristic of the narratives discussed in this chapter was 
the nature of proposed adaptation measures, which reflect a managerial 
approach to climate change impacts. I discussed some of these proposed 
measures in light of the complexities that fishermen raised in discussions of their 
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problems. The generic label of “fishery planning” as an adaptation measure, for 
example, may represent for fishermen a whole array of governance issues that 
are beyond the actual political will and capacity of authorities to address. 
Scholars have criticized these initiatives as band-aid solutions that do not 
address structural issues, which should go along with these types of measures. 
Ribot criticizes narratives that emphasize the need to adapt, since it is a term that 
obscures causality (Ribot, 2011). When we talk of adaptation, he explains, the 
first thought is ‘‘how do people adapt.’’ Therefore, an adaptation framing does not 
automatically draw us to ask ‘‘why do people have to adapt in the first place’’ 
(Ribot, 2011, p. 1161). Adaptation takes attention away from causality by shifting 
the focus from cause to response. 
 Adaptation initiatives “are not found in political or economic 
transformations, but are located at the individual/community level and essentially 
amount to increasing the ‘resilience' of the affected populations to `external' 
shocks” (Felli & Castree, 2012, p. 2). Scholars discussing climate change 
impacts in Mexico have called for the need to “transcend technocratic risk 
management” approaches to climate change, arguing that it is necessary to look 
for more “radical actions that call power relations into question” (Manuel-
Navarrete et al., 2011, p. 250). As I analyzed in four examples of so-called 
adaptation measures – relocation, aquaculture, fishery planning and natural 
protected areas – their implementation may face different political, economic, 
cultural, and environmental challenges that are not currently considered in the 
government's field of vision when they define the climate change problem.  
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Finally, the third key characteristic discussed in this chapter were the  
behavioral, moral and ethical messages that climate change narratives promote. 
Climate change initiatives can also be understood as “technologies of 
government” in the making of environmental subjects (Agrawal, 2005).65  In my 
case study communities, fishermen were asked to be conscious of “the climate 
change problem” as it is understood by government officials or NGO promoters. 
Paradoxically, they are asked to be conscious about a problem with which they 
have coexisted for a long time – coastal erosion. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, fishermen are expected to understand local environmental changes 
such as erosion as they are explained through government narratives; they are 
also asked to improve or change their fishing practices, to protect their 
ecosystems, and to relocate if necessary.66 Finally, they are asked to change 
their relationships with the oil industry so that they can have a cooperative 
partnership for the implementation of better adaptation initiatives.  
All of these statements are divested of politics, of power relations. The aim 
of these narratives is to shape local perceptions to align with what governments 
have defined as the key problems for coastal communities, such as climate 
                                                 
65 Technologies of government are strategies to “shape the conduct.” and are “founded on a 
combination of knowledges, regulations based upon these knowledges, and practices that 
regulations seek to govern” (Agrawal, 2005, p. 220).  
66 The transfer of responsibilities to take measures “to adapt” and the attribution of new 
responsibilities to fishers resemble other initiatives in Mexico. An example is the case of social 
policies implemented in a context of neoliberal economic restructuration, the redefinition of 
governments’ responsibilities and the transfer of state responsibilities to citizens. Social programs 
such as “progresa” and “oportunidades” are characterized as examples of the emergence of a 
new type of social policies that highlight the co-responsibility of the beneficiated population in 
their implementation (González de la Rocha, 2005). Jodar and Gómez (2007) analyze policy 
reforms of the education system and the emergence of a “neoliberal” competitive, adaptable, 
flexible, mutable, and self-responsible subject (p. 393). They define neoliberalism as a “new form 
to govern the social,” where subjects are “dispossessed” from their social background/context, 
they are “de-socialized” subjects (Jodar & Gómez, 2007, p. 399).  
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change. From a Foucaultian approach, the promotion of what government 
narratives called a “climatic culture” is a clear manifestation of the productive 
power of narratives and discourses that are promoting the re-arrangements of 
objects, subjects, and their social relations. As I discussed, these government 
narratives propose an arrangement of objects when they for example, promote 
the conservation of fishers resources and territories, which would imply a re-
definition of what type of species and territories are to be protected; as well as 
when, how and who is entitled to use, access and exploit resources. The 
narratives also are representing subjects and their social relations when they 
promote the adoption of ideas and practices, or when they are asked to re-
arrange their relationships with the oil industry.  
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CHAPTER 6.  VULNERABILITY AND ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I discuss climate change vulnerability and adaptation in national 
government narratives in order to develop two lines of analysis. The first is an 
analysis of the key role that government agencies play in shaping climate change 
discourses, and how national and local scientists are contesting them. My 
discussion analyzes the diversity of ways in which global frameworks are used 
(by government agencies) and adopted on the ground (by scientists), on how the 
“localization” (Hulme, 2008) of global discourses take place. 
The second line of analysis addresses the processes of “simplification” 
(Scott, 1998) and “rendering technical” (Li, 2007) in the making of climate change 
interventions. To illustrate my discussion, I analyze three contentious topics that 
emerged in interviews and that are widely discussed in the climate change 
literature: the issue of uncertainty in predicting climate change impacts, the 
factors accounting for the making of people’s vulnerabilities, and finally, 
strategies to deal with climate change impacts.  
 In this chapter I discuss how government agencies have been 
instrumental in presenting to the public grand climate change narratives, such as 
the one derived from the IPCC and data produced by Mexican scientists. The 
analysis of government’s role is of particular relevance given that the emphasis in 
the literature has been on how global, top-down discourses are producing global 
environmental knowledge, norms and regulations. However, these accounts 
sometimes overlook the key role that government agencies – national and local – 
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have in re-constructing these framings. I argue that government officials shape 
the information to be presented publicly in a form that may be problematic for 
scientists, who point out the need to consider uncertainties (about where and 
how physical processes are going to take place, and their impacts), and for local 
inhabitants that hold different accounts of local environmental changes, as I 
explored in chapters 4 and 5. In contrast, in this research I explore how global 
narratives are mediated by a contextualized, multilayered set of actors and 
processes. 
In my analysis, the concept of coproduction is helpful for understanding 
the role of both scientists and government officials in framing problems. In this 
chapter I question the classic one-way understanding of the science-policy 
interface, particularly the idea that science defines problems and their possible 
solutions, and that its advice is directly translated into policy. In this case study, 
the movement of science to policy is strongly determined by government 
agencies that – by assembling information from different sources – are re-
framing the “what” and “how” of the climate change problem. This analysis also 
questions the relevance of epistemic communities in their efforts to both position 
topics and delineate public policies. 
My second key argument in this chapter is that government narratives 
illustrate two important processes that Li (2007) and Scott (1998) discuss about 
government interventions: the processes of simplification and of rendering 
technical. These analyses illustrate how experts and policy-makers “exclude the 
structure of political-economic relations from their diagnoses and prescriptions” 
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(Li, 2007, p. 7). As I argue, climate change narratives recognize the political, 
social, economic and environmental factors that constitute the sources of climate 
change vulnerabilities; they also recognize that climate change impact is one 
among many risks that local communities are facing. However, the incorporation 
of these factors into climate change narratives does not necessarily mean that 
government agencies propose how to address these structural problems; instead 
the discussion focuses on how to tackle their impacts. This discussion illustrates 
how “simplification” takes shape in the case of climate change initiatives in 
Mexico.   
Finally, in this chapter I aim to illustrate how global knowledge and 
narratives travel. Hulme (2008) explains that: 
Knowledge that is claimed by its producers to have universal authority is 
received and interpreted very differently in different political and cultural 
settings. Revealing the localisation and spatialisation of knowledge thus 
becomes central for understanding both the acceptance and resistance 
that is shown towards the knowledge claims of the IPCC (p. 9).  
 
In this case study, the “localization” of global discourses is illustrated in two ways: 
first, through an analysis of how a heterogeneous state adopts and shapes global 
narratives; and second, by analyzing the concerns and contextual issues that 
local scientists in Mexico incorporate into the climate change problem. This 
discussion also shows the diversity of ways in which “resistance” can take shape 
at the local level, by (i) prioritizing certain methodologies, approaches, or 
strategies over others; (ii) rejecting an uncritical assumption of climate change 
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predictions; or (ii) questioning as problematic the temporal dimension of the 
problem. 
In the first section of this chapter, I analyze the issue of uncertainty 
regarding climate change predictions and impacts. The second section discusses 
how government narratives and scientists explain climate change vulnerability. 
Finally, the third section focusses on the different approaches to deal with climate 
change impacts as they are explained by state agencies and scientists. 
6.2 Uncertainty in Predicting Climate Change Impacts: Planning for an 
Uncertain Future? 
In this section I illustrate how government narratives deal with the issue of 
uncertainty in climate change impacts. I discuss how government agencies are 
instrumental in using and presenting climate change information, analyzing how 
uncertainty is a contentious issue. In my case study, the lack of certainty about 
the types of impacts the country is going to experience is not preventing the 
mobilization of government resources to elaborate climate change initiatives that 
aim to deal with such impacts – e.g. adaptation projects such as the Wetlands 
project, provincial climate change plans and the organization of workshops. I 
argue that in adopting this strategy to actively promote climate change projects 
regardless of the uncertainties about when, where and how climate-related 
impacts are going to occur, Mexican governments are making political and 
economic choices that are important to discuss. In particular, and as I analyze 
further in this chapter, in the context of developing countries the issue of when 
and where to locate limited government economic resources is important to point 
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out since it is an issue of defining what problems are being selected to be 
addressed and included in the government agenda and by whom.  
Government narratives are based on a climatic-risk approach in which 
climate change is framed as an unquestionable phenomenon and an issue of 
public interest that is already having concrete impacts in Mexico. They 
emphasize the “global” dimension of the problem and the “urgency” in attending 
to climate change’s “inevitable” impacts (CICC, 2012a, p. 21). These narratives 
explain that Mexico is highly vulnerable to extreme hydrometeorological events, 
such as hurricanes, droughts, and flooding, phenomena that put both people and 
natural ecosystems at risk. These narratives also include information about other 
side effects, such as migration. Based on what have been called “crisis 
narratives” (Hartmaan, 2010), government narratives argue that climate change 
could increase migration flows, which may affect labor availability in the 
agriculture sector, increasing its vulnerability (CICC, 2012b, p. 146).67  
 The recognition of these risks is followed by the acknowledgment of 
uncertainty in relation to climate change impacts in terms of their magnitude and 
characteristics, uncertainty about “when, where and how these impacts will 
occur” (CICC, 2012a, p. 26). As some scholars explain, “[t]he accuracy of climate 
                                                 
67 In the document, this note is taken from Deheza and Mora’s (2013) study of the implications of 
climate change for national security, commissioned by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office. They argue that climate change “is expected to have profound impacts; reshaping 
resource distribution, creating new dynamics of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, and complicating 
responses to problems of poverty and governance” (Deheza & Mora, 2013, p. ix). The authors 
conclude that “climate change will impact people’s ability to meet their basic needs... climate 
changes will not affect everyone equally, and this has the potential to exacerbate social divisions 
and tensions… climate change will compound existing challenges around governance and 
institutional capacity – increasing demand for disaster response and recovery, and the 
implementation of adaptive measures” (Deheza & Mora, 2013, p. ix). Hartmann (2010) frames 
this type of literature as “crisis narratives,” which elaborate on arguments that link climate change 
with violent conflicts and political stability, “based on old assumptions about relationship between 
environmental scarcity and violence” (p. 239). 
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predictions is limited by fundamental, irreducible uncertainties” (Dessai, Hulme, 
Lempert, & Pielke, 2009, p. 67). The IPCC (2013) defines uncertainty as  
A state of incomplete knowledge that can result from a lack of 
information or from disagreement about what is known or even 
knowable. It may have many types of sources, from imprecision in the 
data to ambiguously defined concepts or terminology, or uncertain 
projections of human behavior (p. 1464). 
 
The level of uncertainty is even greater when it comes to understanding these 
impacts at the regional and local level. In discussing physical and biological 
environmental changes, and their relationship with regional climate changes, the 
IPCC (2007) recognizes “a notable lack of geographical balance in the data and 
literature on observed changes, with marked scarcity in developing countries” (p. 
8).  In discussing global scenarios, Parry et al., (2005) explain that “[w]hile these 
models are useful in depicting general trends and dynamic interactions between 
the atmosphere, biospheres, oceans, land and ice, low resolutions limit their 
ability to tell us about regional and local impacts” (p. 3).68 
Therefore, the IPCC and government narratives highlight as an important 
task: the elaboration of regional scenarios69 that integrate land-use changes as 
                                                 
68 Jasanoff and Wynne (1998) explain that “computer modeling supplies an exceptionally powerful 
tool for reestablishing an authoritative space for science, even in areas of cognitive uncertainty, 
that is, the very domain of transcience” (p. 8-9). Transcience is defined as all “those issues that 
could be asked of science but to which science could not give answers” (Jasanoff & Wynne, 
1998, p. 8-9). In this case, models would enter into the realm of transcience because of the 
uncertain nature of their predictions. However, these authors argue, models in environmental 
science are not assumed to lay within the space of transcience since they are conceived as tools 
that can “provide answers to political questions” (Jasanoff & Wynne, 1998, p. 9). In this way, 
models and modelers in climate change science are challenging the notion of transcience by 
thinking of models as good tools to manage uncertainty (Jasanoff & Wynne, 1998, p. 9). 
69 During interviews, scientists working in the health sector pointed out the need to scale down 
global scenarios because they are looking for municipal indicators. It is the local scale that is 
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key drivers in local and regional climate change impacts (CICC, 2012b, p. 143). 
Government narratives explain that IPCC scenarios do not include land use 
change, which according to scientists represents a problem in cases such as 
Mexico, which has experienced important land-use changes that impact its 
vulnerability (CICC, 2012b, p. 143). Land-use changes, pollution, and invasive 
species are defined as “influential” factors in determining regional temperature 
variability (IPCC, 2007, p. 9). There are also other types of uncertainty – mainly 
with respect to the hydrologic cycle – “due to the extant limitations in the 
formulation of small-scale processes, that frequently are key in the case of the 
climate in Mexico” (CICC, 2012b, p. 141).  
Government narratives explain that between 1970 and 2009, the 
frequency and intensity of hurricanes increased, especially in the Gulf of Mexico 
and the Caribbean Sea. A possible cause of this increment in hurricanes is the 
fact that water temperatures in the Atlantic Ocean have increased, and with them 
the intensity of hurricanes. However, narratives highlight that it is unclear whether 
this phenomenon is caused by climate change or whether there are other factors 
promoting its emergence (CICC, 2012a, p. 40).  
These government narratives state that this uncertainty makes it difficult to 
plan and design adaptation actions; however, they also recognize the need to act 
independently of this uncertainty. This is an interesting position because scholars 
                                                                                                                                                 
useful for them, as they explain: “these models might have an influence on what could be done at 
the local level” (interview with a government official and scientist, Public Health Institute. May 27, 
2011. Morelos). This is a clear example of how policy makers think of models as tools that can 
provide answers to policy, and as such do not form part of transcience but rather through 
technological development and improvements in data collection; they could be a very useful 
device for planning at the local level. Government officials in Mexico are then reproducing 
“complex discursive productions… that uncertainty can be continually reduced and contained 
within manageable bounds” (Jasanoff & Wynee, 1998, p. 10). 
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(Hulme & Mahony, 2010; Barnett & Campbell 2010; Barnett, 2001; Beck 2011) 
have criticized the fact that “uncertainty” has been a factor in preventing action in 
international and national arenas. This idea does not apply for the Mexican case, 
which shows that governments’ translations of global climate change policies and 
recommendations may differ around the world.  
Scholars argue that uncertainty in climate change science – as it has been 
framed by the IPCC – has been a key obstacle in the implementation of solutions 
to climate change impacts. This is a problem with origins in the problem-process 
approach that is rooted in a linear chain of explanation, such as that adopted by 
the IPCC that “promises to deliver a ‘sound’ scientific foundation” to policy (Beck, 
2011, p. 304). This framework produces a trap in which, as Barnett and Campbell 
explain, “as more scientific research is conducted in the name of reducing the 
uncertainties that are purported to impede action, new questions arise and 
further uncertainties can emerge. This further debilitates action” (Barnett and 
Campbell, 2010, p. 3). For scholars analyzing climate change in the Pacific 
islands, this model “impedes planning for climate change and accelerated sea-
level rise” (Barnett, 2001, p. 977). From this perspective, inaction in proposing 
alternatives for facing climate change impacts – such as adaptation measures – 
is the product of a scheme that is more concerned with producing “certainty” as a 
way to legitimize climate change science, than it is with dealing with practical 
knowledge that policy-makers can use to design alternative interventions. And 
this production of certainty is a futile task, since uncertainty “is unlikely to be 
reduced in the near future, and in any event absolute certainty is impossible” 
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(Barnett, 2001, p. 997). From these critical perspectives, and “given the deep-
seated uncertainties involved in predicting climate impacts” (Beck, 2011, p. 304), 
“decisions must be made in the face of uncertainty” (Barnett, 2001, p. 983). To 
highlight the need to reduce uncertainty renders problems “technical,” divesting 
them from their political dimension.  
In looking at local contexts, however, this critical discussion of uncertainty 
can also be problematic. In Mexico, for example, an interesting criticism arose in 
interviews with scientists who discussed uncertainty and other ideas related to 
the topic of planning based on predicted future scenarios. The topic was 
analyzed in light of scientists’ analyses of the different challenges Mexico faces. 
At the core of their analysis was a concern over how to reconcile the idea 
promoted by the government of planning for an unpredictable future, with a 
context like Mexico where more urgent actions are needed in the present. They 
also contextualized this discussion in terms of different governance problems – 
economic, social, political and environmental – that are at the core of present 
climate variability impacts. 
One of the most important Mexican meteorologists that has actively 
collaborated with the government in the creation of regional climate scenarios 
explained that Mexico is very vulnerable to extant climate fluctuations, which 
have had severe impacts. Mexico, he stated, “has not adapted to the present 
state of climate variability.”70 Therefore, he argued, adaptation “is not an easy 
concept, because for example, you have never done anything to adapt to the 
                                                 
70 Interview with a scientist from the Atmospheric Sciences Center (National University of 
Mexico). June 2, 2011. Mexico City. 
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variability of climate that has always existed. And suddenly you are asked to 
adapt to climate change. But you have never shifted to an intermediate stage, 
you have never adapted to today’s variability and now you have been asked to 
adapt to the variability of the future”. First, he argued, it is important “to adapt to 
the variability of the present climate before you ask for adaptation to climate 
variability in the future”.  
Another Mexican expert explained this topic as something related to the 
issue of “how to communicate risks.”71 Mexican government agencies, he 
argued, do not understand what adaptation is in the first place, “they cannot talk 
about immediate things depending on what will happen in the future… you need 
to plan depending on the risks you have today, depending on what you have 
today… not in what it would happen in the future!”. Mexican scientists brought up 
in interviews the question of how to make the issue of future impacts appealing to 
local governments that have a 3-year term in office. The point is “how to 
negotiate initiatives to attend the future when the present is more important for a 
politician.”72  
These conflicting views about the temporal dimensions of the climate 
change problem have been discussed in literature that highlights the need to 
“look at the present” vulnerability, instead of analyses based in the future, on 
uncertain global scenarios (Burton et al. 2002, 154; Parry et al. 2005, Beck 
2011). The shift to “the present” in the analysis of vulnerability and impacts 
introduces a novel lens through which to analyze climate change, an issue that 
                                                 
71 Interview with a private consultant from a private research center. June 29, 2012. Mexico City. 
72 Interview a scientist from the Atmospheric Sciences Center (National University of Mexico). 
June 5, 2012. Mexico City. 
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has been taken up by development scholars who have pointed out the difficulty 
of pondering future impacts especially in developing countries that have limited 
resources (Burton, 2002). This is especially relevant considering that 
governments may actually waste resources if climate change impacts are 
different from the ones predicted under uncertain scenarios (Parry et al., 2005, p. 
3). 
 In interviews, however, government officials did not share this perspective 
on the topic. One official explained that the Ministry of the Environment had 
actively promoted the idea of integrating future predicted impacts into 
government planning, without questioning their reliability. The official criticized 
that risk management programs, for example, are based on the risks that places 
and populations face today, and that result from present climate variability. She 
explained that the Ministry has promoted the idea of integrating future scenarios 
of climate change in order to know what kind of risks Mexico is going to face in 
the future.73 
In sum, “uncertainty” in Mexico has not impeded the mobilization of ideas, 
resources, and projects. Government climate change narratives do not put 
emphasis on climate change uncertainties – on future scenarios and lack of local 
data – but instead emphasize “impacts.” This is an example of how 
“simplification” (Scott, 1998) is at work, when government agencies choose to 
analyze and elaborate on the climate change problem by emphasizing some 
aspects (impacts) and omitting discussions that may question their approaches 
                                                 
73 Interview with a government official from the Ministry of the Environment (federal government). 
July 13, 2012. Mexico City. 
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and frameworks (uncertainty, lack of data, etc.) for dealing with the problem. 
Furthermore, as Cozzens and Woodhouse (2001) explain “government becomes 
the key mediating institution where social actors participate, with varying degrees 
of influence and in a variety of structures, in shaping, interpreting, and using 
scientific knowledge claims” (p. 534). By emphasizing the need to attend to 
impacts, and avoiding a more in-depth discussion about the relevance of 
scientific uncertainty to policy planning and issue prioritization, government 
narratives frame the climate change problem in their own terms. 
Here it is pertinent to take up Roe’s questions on government 
interventions, asking:  What is going on when experts put forward these crisis 
narratives? What is the role of these expert narratives in decision-making? (Roe, 
1995, p. 1066). From this perspective, these narratives allow experts or state 
officials to “claim rights to stewardship over land and resources they do not own” 
(Roe, 1995, p. 1066). In this case study, I argue that crisis narratives that frame 
the climate change problem based on a climatic-risks approach allow officials to 
delimit a “field of visibility,” which allows them to “intervene” in dealing with 
predicted impacts. This is a framework that justifies government interventions 
and determines “who and what is to be governed… what problems are to be 
solved and what objectives are to be sought” (Dean, 1999, p. 30).  
Finally, in this section I have illustrated how local scientists challenge the 
temporal dimension of the climate change problem when they discuss 
government strategies to plan for the future based on uncertain predicted 
impacts, arguing that actions based on present conditions are more needed. The 
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position of local scientists illustrates how they, as key actors in the translation of 
grand narratives, are also continuously contesting them; this also shows the 
diversity of ways in which global frameworks are adopted on the ground. 
 
6.3 Dealing with Complexity? The Underlying Causes of Climate Change 
Vulnerability 
This section discusses how government narratives recognize the existence of 
different factors determining people’s vulnerabilities to climate change. However, 
I demonstrate how despite this recognition, government climate change initiatives 
are not designed to address such structural factors; instead, they focus on how to 
face impacts. I argue that government agencies render technical contentious 
political issues that are at the core of climate change vulnerability. At the end of 
this section I analyze Mexican scientists’ views on vulnerability, that to some 
extent challenge government narratives and point out contextual issues that are 
determining the degree of vulnerability of populations. This discussion illustrates 
the different ways global climate change frameworks are understood and 
challenged on the ground. 
Government narratives recognize the complexity of explaining and 
assessing vulnerability to climate change. In their reports, they state that it is not 
their purpose to provide “recipes” to decision makers, but rather to transmit “the 
emergency” of needing to take into account climate change in government plans. 
These reports also aim to convey the need to understand climate change 
impacts, and to understand the usefulness of incorporating key social actors – 
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especially the most vulnerable – in decision-making processes and policy 
implementation (CICC, 2012a, p. 11).  
These narratives point to the existence of a diversity of social, political, 
economic, and environmental factors as key drivers in determining vulnerability 
to climate change. Accordingly, in order to design adaptation proposals better 
able to respond to climate variability, it is first necessary to understand who is 
vulnerable, and what the sources of such vulnerability are.  
However, government narratives argue that although climate change is a 
factor that “may have caused severe disasters,” such as severe drought in the 
North of the country or one of the most severe flooding events in Tabasco, the 
magnitude of their impacts are contingent on the degree of vulnerability 
populations currently have (CICC, 2012b, p. 127). They argue that the degree of 
vulnerability is determined by the country’s economic stagnation and recurrent 
economic crises that have impacted income distribution and poverty (CICC, 
2012b, p. 127). Government narratives highlight that 68% of the population 
affected by natural disasters are people who live in extreme poverty, “who live in 
precarious households with less resilience to climatic events” (CICC, 2012a, p. 
64). Climate change then is one among other factors causing vulnerability.  
 In the narratives governments recognize that the increasing impacts of 
floods over the last few decades has been exacerbated due to both increases in 
their frequency and because there are more people exposed to these events. 
According to one vulnerability index, 25% of the Mexican population lives in 
areas susceptible to flooding (CICC, 2012a, p. 43). Specifically, about half a 
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million people live in areas classified as highly vulnerable to floods (CICC, 2012a, 
p. 43). Narratives explain that land use change, lack of urban planning, and the 
deterioration of natural ecosystems are factors that play an important role in 
floods’ emergence and potential impacts.  
It is important to notice that the integration of vulnerability into government 
narratives differs significantly from other cases, such as the case of the small 
island states, since according to some scholars:  
Statements about islands and climate change disproportionately focus on 
the environmental drivers of vulnerability – the changes in climate and 
sea levels and the fragility of island ecosystems – with little recognition of 
social factors that can enhance but can also significantly reduce the risk 
of damages arising from climate change” (Barnett & Campbell, 2010, p. 
2). 
 
In the Mexican case, however, the recognition of the existence of contextual 
factors determining climate change vulnerability has not included an analysis of 
how to address these factors. Such a discussion would consequently lead to 
focus on solving the root causes of climate change vulnerability. 
To explain how government narratives integrate vulnerability into their 
analyses, I use the “Climate Change Adaptation in Mexico: Vision, Elements and 
Criteria for Decision-making” (CCAM) text which integrates case studies carried 
out by Mexican scholars as an example. One such case study was about coffee 
producers from two marginal and poor regions of Mexico, where peasants “need 
to adapt to many sources of vulnerability, not only climatic variability” (CICC, 
2012a, p. 30). The author of this case study argued that coffee trade 
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liberalization during the 1980s was a key event in increasing the vulnerability of 
coffee producers, who as a result experienced price drops and variability. 
According to this analysis the insecurity in coffee prices were part of a long chain 
of impacts including a reduction in investments, technology, inputs, training, and 
a lack of access to credit.74 The researcher also argued that it is under this 
scenario that climate change effects – such as rain and temperature variability 
that impact coffee plants due to an increment of pests and illnesses, or the 
increased frequency and intensity of storms and frosts – exacerbate the already 
severe social and economic vulnerability of coffee producers.  
The CCAM report however, does not integrate this wide array of factors 
determining vulnerability into its analysis. Instead, the case study is brought into 
the narrative by highlighting that “social participation and organization” are 
important factors that strengthen peasants’ capacities to adapt. In chapter five I 
discuss adaptation and different criticisms of “enhancing adaptive capacities” that 
stem from a governmentality approach, which describes how these are also 
efforts to produce “adaptive subjects” (Felli & Castree, 2012; McNamara, 2006). 
From a government perspective, then, vulnerability will only be reduced if the 
country develops “adaptive capacities,” defined as the development of a system’s 
                                                 
74 Within the climate change literature, scholars like O’Brien and Leichenko (2000) have 
characterized this situation as “double exposure,” analyzing “how global political and economic 
changes interact simultaneously with climatic risk to affect the livelihoods and development 
opportunities of particular populations” (p. 221). Scholars working on vulnerability in Mexico have 
also highlighted the variety of factors determining people’s vulnerability.  Liverman’s (1990) work 
on drought in Mexico points out the need to look at the multidimensional variables determining 
people’s vulnerability to environmental changes. She states that “the impacts of drought on 
agricultural systems are determined as much by the technological, economic, and political 
characteristics of a region as by the severity of meteorological events” (Liverman, 1990, p. 49). In 
analyzing rural vulnerability to climatic risk in Mexican communities, Eakin (2005) explains the 
relevance of policies and institutional changes in influencing households’ capacity to deal with 
climate changes. 
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social and institutional capacities to adjust to climate change, and these 
adjustments may occur in “practices,” “processes,” or “social structures” (CICC, 
2012a, p. 81). Local peasants should, by this logic, develop adaptive capacities 
to adjust to the different challenges they face, while macro-structural economic 
transformations or other structural changes are outside the field of visibility of 
government narrative framings.  
Finally, the author of the above mentioned case study explained how 
peasants’ cultural practices in resource management – particularly productive 
practices such as multiple uses of grains or agricultural diversification – have 
helped them to be “flexible,” meaning that they have “the capacity to better 
respond to uncertainty” (CICC, 2012a, p. 81). The author highlighted peasants’ 
organizational efforts – through the creation of cooperatives – which have helped 
them get access to credit, information, and training. Government narratives 
integrate this case into the CCAM report to illustrate “how social participation and 
local organization at the community level are prompting adaptation experiences” 
(CICC, 2012a, p. 124). The narrative therefore recognizes people’s abilities to 
adapt, however it does not discuss how to address the structural factors causing 
vulnerability, instead focusing on how people may be able to cope with impacts 
through adaptation practices.  
Government narratives focus on the question of “how” to face impacts 
(through adaptation measures) instead of discussing ways to address the causal 
factors of vulnerability in order to avoid addressing political-economic structures 
that determine the emergence of the climate change problem. As in other 
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development interventions (Li, 2007; Ferguson, 1994), government narratives 
“repose” political questions – the structural political, economic, social, and 
environmental sources of vulnerability – as “technical problems” – impacts that 
can be addressed through adaptation initiatives such as irrigation schemes, 
drought tolerant seed varieties, or infrastructure. 
In these narratives, climate change is presented in all its complexity as a 
transverse problem that has multiple social, cultural, political, economic, and 
environmental dimensions. However, at the same time it is portrayed as a policy 
problem in which “risks are tractable and manageable by practices and 
institutions” (Shackley & Wynne, 1996, p. 280). A key piece of this process is the 
implementation of adaptation measures, represented as a strategy that, as some 
scholars have also stated, can modify climate change impacts, “and hence its 
seriousness or dangerousness” (Barry, Burton, Richard & Wandel, 2000, p. 224).  
This approach contradicts some critical perspectives that argue that since 
there is a lot of uncertainty on climate change impacts, it is difficult to know 
whether adaptation would help reverse climate change impacts. For example, 
government narratives highlight that in order to meet adaptation goals, the 
country needs to acquire “a number of major technical and financial capacities to 
produce climate change data in terms of inventory emissions, climatic and 
economic scenarios, research and identification of technological barriers (CICC, 
2012b, p. 4).75 The National Climate Change Strategy, for example, identifies the 
                                                 
75 Among the strategies outlined by the government to develop adaptive capacities are: (i) 
strengthening government capacities like policy-coordination and the development of legal and 
assessment instruments;  (ii) restoration and conservation of ecological and hydrological 
systems; (iii) reduction of social vulnerability, including the identification of people settled in highly 
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economic costs of adaptation measures as one of the biggest obstacles to their 
implementation (CICC, 2007, p. 116). Some scholars criticize this approach as a 
“global environmental management discourse” (Adger, Benjaminsen, Brown, 
Svarstad, 2001) that “represents the technofix and market solutions” to climate 
change (Sandberg & Sandberg 2010, p. 17).76 As I discuss in the previous 
chapter, this approach “offers the promise that problems are manageable… [it] 
suggests that social groups – communities, nations, all of humanity – can avoid 
the worst consequences of climate change by thoughtful preparation” (Orlove, 
2009, p. 136). 
But the process of “rendering technical” is also visible if we consider the 
social Darwinian origin of the concept of adaptation, which according to Ribot 
(2011), 
evokes a social-Darwinist ethic when applied to people, implying those 
who do not survive (who do not adapt) were not fit. It burdens and 
blames the victim by devolving the onus of adjustment to the organism or 
affected unit. Rather than just helping people who have been pushed to 
the brink of crisis or stopping the social and political-economic processes 
                                                                                                                                                 
vulnerable areas in urban and coastal areas, the reduction of health-related risks, and the 
development of adaptation measures to strengthen food security and to guarantee a health diet 
access, and; (iv) reduction of vulnerability in productive sectors through the creation of a system 
of information and monitoring of climate change risks, vulnerability, and adaptation, to support 
decision-making processes. Finally, the strategies also include the strengthening of international 
cooperation, especially in trans-border issues; the inclusion of adaptation programming into the 
budget; linking knowledge, research, and technological development to decision making 
processes; the development of education policies; and social participation promotion (CICC, 
2012a, p. 133). 
76 The following IPCC statement fully illustrates these criticisms when the institution recognizes 
that: “The array of potential adaptive responses available to human societies is very large, 
ranging from purely technological (e.g., sea defenses), through behavioral (e.g., altered food and 
recreational choices), to managerial (e.g., altered farm practices) and to policy (e.g., planning 
regulations). While most technologies and strategies are known and developed in some 
countries, the assessed literature does not indicate how effective various options are at fully 
reducing risks, particularly at higher levels of warming and related impacts, and for vulnerable 
groups” (IPCC, 2007, p. 19). 
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that are marginalizing them, the term adaptation… suggests that people 
should adjust and help themselves… to circumstances that are not of 
their making (p. 1160). 
 
 
Vulnerability: The Need to Address Structural Factors 
In interviews, scientists highlighted the structural political and economic contexts 
that determine climate change vulnerability in Mexico. One scientist explained 
that in Mexico, productive systems are already very weak – because of soil 
erosion, deforestation, etc. – such that “you do not need to have a great 
disruption to create a big disaster, a small drought or flood might have major 
impacts.”77 This is an important comment that challenges government climate 
change narratives – “nature as the major threat” – since it emphasizes people’s 
current conditions more than the magnitude of any physical event.78 These ideas 
resonate with critiques from scholars who state that vulnerability is “increasing for 
reasons that have nothing to do with greenhouse-gas emissions,” but is instead 
contingent on broader socio-economic changes in societies (Pielke, Prins, & 
Rayner, 2007, p. 597).  
One scientist explained that what has happened is that the government 
and scientists have created climate scenarios, and based on these they have 
                                                 
77 Interview with a scientist from the Atmospheric Sciences Center (National University of 
Mexico). June 5, 2012. Mexico City. 
78 Some scientists commented in interviews that the discussion of climate change in Mexico has 
put more emphasis on impacts on “trees and birds” than on people (Interview with a scientist from 
a local university. May 31. Tabasco). This scientist argued that government programs are not 
considering how fishermen that are not finding fish and need to go much further as a result, 
“maybe because a change of one grade in water temperature would make the fish and nutrients 
move, so fishers need to change their way of life”. He added that we are leaving aside human 
vulnerability, explaining that “it is not very popular to emphasize this, because it is very easy to 
discredit because nobody can see the future, therefore everyone is going to say ‘you are crazy, 
this is not going to happen, it is better to take care of nature instead”. 
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prognosticated possible regional impacts around which they have then proposed 
adaptation measures.79 However, this scientist argued that a previous step 
should be taken before thinking of adaptation:  
“first you need to know what creates vulnerability for fishermen, peasants, 
and you will see that there are many factors promoting vulnerability such 
as lack of government support, the massive importation of grains at very 
low prices. Vulnerability is caused by economic and political factors, and 
what we should do before designing climate change initiatives is to 
understand what policies are creating vulnerability in peoples and 
communities, independently of how the climate would behave in the 
future”.  
These perspectives resonate with the sharp critiques of development 
scholars regarding the question of whether adaptation strategies are addressing 
the underlying factors that cause vulnerability in poor communities, or whether 
these initiatives just focus on responding to the impacts of climate change 
(Schipper, 2007; Christoplos et. al, 2009; Parry et al., 2005). This issue was 
discussed in my interviews. The expert who created the early warning system - 
labeled and implemented by the government as an adaptation measure – 
explained that this tool “is just an emergent measure, but there is a need to 
implement more structural actions like the implementation of sustainable 
development.”80 He explained that these adaptation actions need to be 
                                                 
79 Interview with a scientist from the Atmospheric Sciences Center (National University of 
Mexico). June 5, 2012. Mexico City. 
80 Interview with a scientist from the Atmospheric Sciences Center (National University of 
Mexico). June 2, 2011. Mexico City. 
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accompanied by structural actions; for example that “in relation to prevention 
systems, in the end, the problem is summed up by the need for land use 
planning.” Unfortunately, he added, “economic interests from real state agencies” 
prevent the implementation of more sustainable land use planning. As Eakin and 
Lemos (2006) argue for the case of Latin America,  
As long as inequality persists, it is unlikely that the picture of increased 
vulnerability and low adaptive capacity among the poor in Latin America 
will change. At the heart of the problem may be the inability of the 
reconfigured state to tackle the growing social and political inequality that 
is central to the vulnerability problem.” (p. 16). 
 
 
6.4 How to Deal with Climate Change Impacts? Risk Management and 
Adaptation Approaches 
 
Government narratives and those given by scientists in interviews framed climate 
change adaptation in very different ways, which is important to highlight because 
it questions the science-to-policy linear model. The common understanding of 
science-based policy is one that implicitly emphasizes the existence of a singular 
fact-based diagnosis and solution of posed problems, leaving the role of 
governments as purely managers of science recommendations. S&TS scholars 
criticize such linear model; they understand the science-policy relationship as a 
coproduction, in which both set of actors actively promote and create framings of 
problems and their appropriate solutions. This section illustrates not only the 
active role of policy officials in framing climate change problems, but also shows 
the heterogeneous nature of state institutions using competing approaches to 
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climate change. This case study illustrates the diversity of processes that 
mediate how global knowledge(s) and framings are received and accommodated 
within different state agencies that mobilize their own understandings of the 
climate change problem.  
A case of point is the existence of two main approaches to deal with 
climate change within the government: the risk management approach and the 
adaptation approach. The Ministry of the Environment is in charge of promoting 
climate change adaptation. In interviews, an official from this Ministry explained 
that her office has faced two main challenges in positioning climate change within 
government agencies. The first challenge has been to change the perception 
among government officers that adaptation is only part of the environmental 
policy arena, or an issue that pertains specifically to the Ministry of the 
Environment. When they called for a meeting on climate change, she explained, 
people from other government offices such as the Transport sector “did not really 
understand why they were called to the meeting.”81 Their first task, then, was to 
make officials “become conscious of climate change adaptation as a crosscutting 
issue” of concern to many sectors. The second challenge, she explained, has 
been to approach climate change adaptation as something beyond a disaster risk 
management approach. Climate change adaptation, she explained, “is not only 
about populations at risk, but it has to do with ecosystems, productive systems, 
                                                 
81 Interview with a government official from the Ministry of the Environment (federal government). 
July 13, 2012. Mexico City. 
250 
 
infrastructure.”82 There is a need to position the issue beyond the framework of 
risk, and to integrate adaptation more broadly within development planning. 
Government narratives present inconsistencies and contradictions in both 
written and non-written narratives. In the CCAM report the government explained 
that in Mexico, adaptation is being framed within a disaster risk management 
approach, with the objective of reducing, preventing, and controlling the 
occurrence of disasters in populations, sectors, or regions (CICC, 2012a). A 
Mexican scholar explained that the risk management approach used by the 
Ministry of the Interior has much more political leverage than the framework on 
sustainability promoted by the Ministry of the Environment. Climate change 
transverses many issues, such as health, agriculture and disaster management. 
As a result, the Ministries of the Interior, of Health and of Agriculture are dealing 
with the climate change on their own, with their own priorities and agenda. 
Furthermore, the approach to adaptation used by these government agencies is 
much more practical, in the sense that it is concretely translated into projects to 
attend to populations at risk of natural disasters.  
An example is the Ministry of Agriculture, which created a climate change 
office and has implemented specific measures such as the introduction of crop 
insurance for peasants.83 In the interviews it was explained that the most 
important agency – with both public and private capital – dealing with climate 
change is the Mexican Insurance Association, since it already has climate 
change experts dealing with floods, hurricanes and other climate-related 
                                                 
82 Interview with a government official from the Ministry of the Environment (federal government). 
July 13, 2012. Mexico City. 
83 Interview with a private consultant from a private research center. June 29, 2012. Mexico City.  
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impacts.84 Private insurance corporations then, are part of this new institutional 
configuration of public and private agencies dealing with emergent issues such 
as climate change impacts.  
Other actions include the implementation of an early warning system and 
the Natural Disasters Prevention Fund, promoted by the Ministry of the Interior, in 
charge of the Attention to Disasters office. Another key office that has been very 
important in terms of the research and implementation of climate change 
initiatives is the Ministry of Health that during the last ten years has played a key 
role in analyzing, providing information, and discussing climate change health-
related adaptation measures. In sum, these agencies have much more room for 
action based on their budgets, and also on the nature of the activities they deal 
with (agriculture, health, natural disasters). The Ministry of the Environment lacks 
political power and budget to lead and promote the topic of adaptation more 
broadly, incorporating ecosystems’ conservation and protection. 
The private climate change consultant also explained that in the 
international arena, a disaster risk management perspective has dominated the 
discussion on adaptation, as opposed to a sustainability approach. The difficulty 
posed by the mainstream position of adaptation, he explained, also lies in the 
polemic nature of the term, its Darwinian origin, and in the fact that, as some 
anthropologists have noted, human beings have always adapted to different 
environments (Ibid.).  
It is important to mention that this configuration of government agencies 
and their climate change agendas reflects how government narratives are being 
                                                 
84 Interview with a private consultant from a private research center. June 29, 2012. Mexico City. 
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negotiated within the government. In this dissertation, narratives are 
conceptualized as the result of an ongoing process of negotiation among state 
and non-state actors and agencies that form complex networks of institutions that 
design and implement climate change initiatives. Post-positivist policy studies 
highlight the productive nature of policy-making, where contentious policy values 
are continually negotiated, and policy actors are continually constructing 
competing narratives about public problems (Wesselink et al., 2013). 
State structures are not monolithic. In the case of climate change policies, 
the Ministries of the Environment, Energy, Agriculture, and Health each pursue 
their particular perspectives on the topic and promote their own agendas within 
and outside government spheres. This is very clear in the following example, in 
which the Ministry of the Environment actively promoted the incorporation of 
Mexico into the Kyoto Protocol, while the Ministry of Energy rejected this position.  
Pulver explains that in the negotiation process, the energy sector “voiced a policy 
position that was critical of the international climate negotiations and opposed a 
global treaty mandating binding greenhouse gas reductions” (Pulver, 2007, p. 
241). The interviews confirmed this rivalry between the two ministries, which was 
also reflected in the recently released Climate Change Law, and in many other 
government initiatives. In an interview, a climate change private consultant 
explained that the energy sector “has been repellent, impermeable to the climate 
change discourse.”85 The expert explained that it was senators, and not the 
Executive branch, who promoted the above-mentioned law; he also explained 
                                                 
85 Interview Interview with a private consultant from a private research center. June 29, 2012. 
Mexico City.  
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that the executive branch made promises to reduce emissions during the COP16 
in Cancun, without any structural internal support. This shows some of the 
paradoxes of how governments and other actors are dealing with and negotiating 
climate change meanings in Mexico. 
 
 
6.5 Discussion 
 
In this chapter I have illustrated how global knowledge and narratives travel, 
arguing that their trajectory is highly determined by different actors and 
processes. They do not travel directly from the international/global to the 
national/local, in a top-down direction. Rather, this process is mediated on the 
one hand by government agencies that instrumentally use these discourses, and 
on the other by scientists’ perspectives that question and challenge such 
narratives.  
The transfer of global knowledge(s), values, and perspectives is not linear, 
but takes different forms that are contingent on power asymmetries that 
determine the prevalence of certain frameworks and practices over others. 
Global climate change frameworks are adopted by a heterogeneous state; they 
are negotiated among state agencies that hold different resources and power, 
which are used to mobilize their particular approaches and strategies to the 
problem. Global narratives are not singular, and they do not come from particular 
sources – such as the IPCC – either. Government narratives reflect this diversity 
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of actors, sources, and perspectives, which come from particular sites of 
knowledge production such as North America and Europe.86  
As I explained in this chapter, by assembling climate change data and 
analyses from the work of scientists – as well as by highlighting certain 
knowledge and frameworks – government agencies are re-producing knowledge 
and re-framing the climate change problem on their own terms. The way 
scientific information is presented sidesteps to some extent the discussions of  
“uncertainties” highlighted by scientists. 
Shakley & Wynne (1996) explain that according to a dominant narrative, 
“policy ideally should rest on reliable, robust, and hence certain scientific 
knowledge”; scientific uncertainty could lead to policy uncertainty limiting the 
authority of both scientific knowledge and policy making (p. 276). In their work 
they elaborate on how uncertainties are communicated and how scientists 
negotiate their credibility. In the Mexican case however, climate change 
uncertainty is not an issue to be negotiated. In this case uncertainties pointed out 
by scientists about where, when and how climate-related impacts are going to 
occur are not preventing the government from promoting its projects.   
The role of government illustrates the process of coproduction, in which 
the emergence of climate change knowledge takes place. It also illustrates the 
multilayered context of actors and processes that mediate the science-policy 
                                                 
86 This characteristic incorporates a relevant dimension in the analysis of the production of 
narratives in Mexico; approaches such as the geographies of science and knowledge production 
discuss power relations and who and for whom “scientific knowledge is made, mobilised and 
valorized” (Hulme, 2010, p. 559). 
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interface, which questions classic understandings of this relationship as a one-
way, “pure” process from science to policy, or from knowledge to power.   
Scientists have also been key actors in introducing and promoting climate 
change within the government agenda. They are also active in the processes of 
localizing global narratives by introducing contextual concerns into the debate. 
These scientists challenge government practices and frameworks not only by 
criticizing them but also by demarcating their work and perspectives from that of 
the government. In doing this, they are implicitly promoting a kind of boundary 
work, which in this context is understood “as the attempts by actors to define 
practices in contrast to each other through demarcation” (Hoppe, 2010, p. 111). 
This practice is also a form of legitimizing their work and initiatives, a process of 
“purifying” (Latour, 1993) their actions and activities from those of the 
government. Scientists are then actively legitimating science by establishing a 
separation between science and policy; and by doing that they are also 
reaffirming two classic discourses on the relationship science-policy. On one 
hand they recognize the role of science in policy-making while responding to 
specific public issues of concern – science as mission-oriented or needs-driven 
science (Jasanoff & Wynne, 1998, p. 7). On the other hand, however, they 
sustain the ideas of the role of scientists positioned “apart from politics while 
proffering impartial knowledge to formal policy institutions” (Jasanoff & Wynne, 
1998, p. 8). Gieryn (1995) explains that scientists’ need to separate from politics 
responds to their need “to protect their autonomy and authority from usurpation 
or control by outsiders” (p. 394). 
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A second key argument of this chapter is that government narratives 
illustrate the process of simplification that state governments undertake in their 
task to make societies legible. These narratives are a form of knowledge. They 
allow governments to narrow their definitions of a problem they want to solve. 
Scott (1998) explains that  
“[t]he great advantage of such tunnel vision is that it brings into sharp 
focus certain limited aspects of an otherwise far more complex and 
unwieldy reality. This very simplification, in turn, makes the phenomenon 
at the center of the field of vision more legible and hence more 
susceptible to careful measurement and calculation” (p. 11). 
 
The reduction of the complexity of climate change vulnerability and its transition 
into specific managerial adaptation measures form part of this process of making 
climate problems legible for government agencies. Along with the process of 
simplification comes a depoliticization of contentious political issues that are at 
the core of the climate change problem. As discussed in this chapter, 
government narratives recognize some of the underlying factors causing climate 
change vulnerability; however, they do not analyze how to address these causes. 
Instead of addressing questions such as ‘‘why are people vulnerable or at risk,” a 
problem that implicitly leads to the question of “who’ is responsible”, government 
narratives based on a climate change impact approach discuss the question of 
“what government should do to promote the adaptation of people to risks” (Ribot, 
2011, p. 1160).  This simplification of the problem focuses on how to promote 
adaptation instead of how to address the root causes of vulnerability.  
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As Li (2007) argues, the design of government interventions is a 
“deliberate measure to contain a challenge to the status quo” (p. 8) that in terms 
of climate change would mean the perpetuation of capitalist relations of 
production that induced a specific rationality for the use, exploitation, and 
transformation of the biophysical world. Government interventions contribute to 
the continuity of this system through the implementation of clean technology and 
market mechanisms to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, on one hand; and 
through the implementation of adaptation policies that promote practices to better 
navigate the impacts and changes already taking place on the other. 
Government narratives are illustrative of Li’s argument, when they state that 
adaptation is a “strategy to strengthen the resilience of a society, with the 
ultimate goal of building a model that under a different climate keeps given 
viability to the development model” (CICC, 2012b, p. 127).  
Li’s (2007) ideas resonate as well with critical climate change literature. 
Felli and Castree (2012), for example, argue that climate change narratives are 
consistent with neoliberal views in environmental governance, explaining that 
these frameworks  
might, in the long run, help precipitate yet another ‘neoliberal 
environmental fix'… in this case one focused on producing ‘adaptable' 
human subjects: that is, people able to respond tactically to 
anthropogenic alterations of the biophysical world while becoming ever 
more the subjects of capitalist market relations (p. 1). 
 
From a social justice perspective, scholars have criticized the emphasis 
on adaptation that diverts attention away from underlying causes of climate 
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change such as greenhouse gas emissions, and the different roles of developed 
and developing countries in creating the problem. S&TS scholars that discuss 
critical approaches to climate change have highlighted that 
[t]he specifically global scaling of climate change highlights more general 
concerns about the effects of increasing GHG concentrations on the 
earth’s radiation balance at the expense of other ways of formulating the 
problem, such as the structural imperatives of the capitalist economy 
driving those emissions, and indeed of other problems, such as poverty 
and disease (Demeritt, 2001, p. 313). 
 
As I analyze in previous chapters, Mexican scholars have also criticized 
government narratives by pointing out the problem of attributing to “climate 
change” a wide array of old unsolved governance problems that are at the core 
of different environmental changes – policy implementation, corruption, lack of 
planning, or land speculation. I argue that climate change narratives have been 
instrumental for governments in two ways: first, in veiling structural development 
problems by putting them under the label of climate change risks, and second, by 
reframing the solutions to such problems under the label of “adaptation,” which, 
as I explain in the next chapter, is in many cases just another word to name 
extant policy instruments that have not actually worked on the ground.  
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS: 
DEMOCRATIZING THE IDENTIFICATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 
 
7.1 Introduction  
Political ecologists have stated that through narrative analysis social scientists 
may contribute to the “democratization” of the identification of environmental 
problems by different actors (Batterbury et al., 2007).  My dissertation contributes 
to this discussion by bringing into the analysis and making socially visible 
different perspectives and views – from governments, scientists, and fishers – on 
climate change adaptation and on environmental changes.  In my research, the 
analysis of different interpretations questions issues of problem definition, 
specifically regarding how actors are defining problems (diagnosis and solutions) 
and the type of knowledge used to interpret them.  
The analysis of different narratives allows us to identify the problems with 
using dominant frameworks for explaining local changes. In my case study 
government narratives have a dominant voice in terms of designing, 
implementing and mobilizing resources in climate change projects and initiatives 
in Mexico. Therefore, the relevance of integrating into the discussion other less 
visible perspectives from scientists and fishers allows us to identify how dominant 
frameworks on climate change adaptation convey ideas and assumptions that 
are problematic for local inhabitants experiencing local environmental changes 
on the ground. I argue that accounts of environmental changes should be more 
inclusive and consider the existence of multiple sources of knowledge and 
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understandings about them – specifically local environmental knowledge and the 
political economic context in which it emerges. 
 This research aims at understanding how climate change adaptation is 
understood and explained and how these interpretations are translated into 
different kinds of initiatives and projects. I conducted a close inquiry into how 
written and non-written narratives define problems, attribute responsibilities, 
explain solutions, and elaborate on ideas about the role of subjects of 
government. A broad question this research addresses concerns the implications 
of promoting global frameworks to explain local environmental changes. The 
questioning of predominant narratives is important since they are producing and 
legitimizing policies and projects that have an impact on people’s lives.  
The research is based on a case study constituted by five coastal 
communities in the Southern Mexican state of Tabasco, located in the Gulf of 
Mexico. It draws on qualitative analysis based on the implementation of 133 
interviews and participant observation with government officials, scientists and 
fishers, at national and provincial levels. In this chapter I discuss the research 
questions of this dissertation and at the end of the chapter I explain the main 
contributions and limitations of my research. 
 
7.2 What are the Implications of Promoting Global Frameworks to Explain 
Local Environmental Changes?  
I have discussed two interrelated implications that climate change adaptation 
frameworks have in this case study. The first is ontological and epistemological in 
character, since it concerns government officials, scientists and fishers’ views 
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and assumptions about coastal changes and how they elaborate on that using 
different types of scientific and non-scientific knowledge. The second interrelated 
implication is political; it elaborates on how certain explanations ignore local 
contentious issues.  
 
a) Scientific and Non-scientific Interpretations of Environmental Changes 
I have discussed the existence of various scientific frameworks that explain the 
emergence of coastal erosion. These come from climate change frameworks 
used by government narratives, and from geology and coastal ecosystems 
studies. I also analyzed fishers’ views of environmental changes that are based 
on local environmental knowledge and the political economic context from where 
they emerge.  
Government climate change narratives draw attention to issues such as 
coastal erosion, which is explained as a climate change impact resulting from 
sea level rise caused by melting glaciers. Coastal erosion is framed as a clear 
manifestation of the urgent need to act, to implement projects or policies to 
address climate change impacts in coastal communities. Government narratives 
use IPCC frameworks that are based on what is referred to as climate change 
science, a cluster of different sciences such as atmospheric sciences, marine 
and costal sciences, physics, etc. 
 In my case study, geologists have studied the area since the 1940s, and 
their conclusions are different from the ones derived from government climate 
change narratives. Geologists have concluded that in Tabasco the main driver of 
262 
 
coastal erosion is land subsidence, which has mainly been induced by the 
extraction of ground water, gas and oil. Geologists also highlight that there are 
other factors counting for the emergence of erosion in Tabasco, in particular the 
building of artificial openings along the coast and the building of breakwaters, 
jetties, and deepwater ports. Furthermore, as I discuss in chapter four, scientists 
argue that coastal processes are very complex, which makes it very difficult to 
establish a causal one-dimensional relation between sea level rise and coastal 
erosion.  However, in this case governments did not use geologists’ diagnoses to 
mobilize resources or justify government interventions to prevent or propose 
solutions to coastal erosion in Tabasco.   
There are also others scientific explanations of coastal erosion. Scientists 
studying coastal systems – biologists, engineers, morphologists, marine-science 
scientists – explain erosion as both a natural phenomenon and a human-induced 
problem. A clear example is the building of infrastructure and urban 
developments in areas that otherwise would serve to accommodate natural 
physical coastal changes. Furthermore, other types of infrastructure such as 
seawalls built as a preventive “solution” to erosion are, instead, having adverse 
effects by shifting erosion problems to other locations.  
 As I discuss in this dissertation, fishers – cooperative members, private 
and freelancer fishermen – agree with this latter group of scientists studying 
coastal dynamics, in identifying infrastructure built by the state-owned company 
Pemex as the main driver of erosion in their coasts. There was also one fisher 
who mentioned that erosion could be caused by the fact that the land is sinking – 
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what scientists explained as land subsidence – and he ventured the idea that 
maybe this was happening because there was a lot of oil being extracted from 
the underground. Fishers also discussed the role of urban and industrial 
infrastructure – houses, roads, and oil pipelines – that have caused deforestation 
in their coasts, which they explained as an important factor in the emergence of 
erosion. I also found other views on this phenomenon, which do not entirely 
define this coastal phenomenon as a problem in the first place, but as part of a 
natural cycle. 
Scoones (1985) explains that some interpretations of environmental 
change ignore non-linear, multi-directional, reversible, dynamic and non-
equilibria possibilities for processes of transformation (1985, p. 162). A close 
inspection of the above-mentioned scientific and non-scientific explanations 
shows how they differ fundamentally in their interpretations of the variables in 
environmental changes.  
The existence of these interpretations of coastal erosion highlights 
important questions in Science and Technology Studies, such as: What science 
counts? Why do certain approaches generate the mobilization of ideas and 
resources while others are overlooked? Why and how do governments endorse 
particular frameworks? In this dissertation I have partially pointed out to some 
issues that shed light on these questions. I highlighted the role of epistemic 
communities in promoting certain issues in the government agenda. I also 
discussed how states are constituted by different agencies that have their own 
climate change agenda, some of them holding more financial resources than 
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others, which help them to mobilize their ideas by creating climate change 
related offices, designing projects, or engaging in collaboration with the private 
sector such as the case of insurance companies that are instrumenting initiatives 
on climate change impacts on crops. The prospective of getting financial 
resources for either their agencies (government) or research initiatives 
(scientists) is another factor to consider. The fact that climate change adaptation 
is underfinanced, and in the case of Mexico, the decision to accept financial 
resources that will indebt the country pose important issues. 
In privileging certain frameworks over others, Mexican governments are 
also making political choices that endorse certain positions and voices, and that 
brings up the question of how knowledge is produced, and by whom. A critical 
issue highlighted in the literature is, for example, the overrepresentation of 
Northern scientists and scholars from developed countries in the scientific 
committees and fora in which climate change frameworks are produced. Another 
related concern is the type of disciplines that are informing climate change 
frameworks. As I mentioned in the case of Mexico, climatologists have a key role 
while social scientists are excluded from the discussion. Mexican governments 
engage in a more fundamental political endorsement when they support climate 
change frameworks produced within international organizations such as the 
IPCC. I am referring for example, to the ethical dimension of the climate change 
problem which points at inequality and responsibility, as well as about the role of 
the economic world system as a main driver determining human-nature 
relationships.  
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b) Depoliticizing Environmental Changes 
I have demonstrated how government climate change adaptation narratives 
depoliticize and dehistoricize environmental change. Climate change government 
narratives that explain coastal erosion in Tabasco have specific ways of framing 
the origin of the problem, of attributing responsibilities and causes, as well as 
posing possible solutions of the problem. I have discussed how government 
narratives obscure the existence of local politically contentious issues. 
Government narratives avoid attributing responsibilities to the oil industry in 
producing local environmental and physical changes that have impacted fishers’ 
ways of life and livelihoods; they fail to recognize other governance issues that 
have deteriorated people’s environment and resources; and finally, they also 
overlook the existence of power relations among different actors, which 
determines people’s access, control and resource management. 
Using a climate change approach allows governments to frame the 
problem in specific temporal and spatial dimensions. In framing the issue as 
“external” to the local setting, and a result of “global” process such as 
greenhouse gas emissions that cause glaciers to melt and produce sea level 
rise, governments divert discussion of their responsibilities. These would include 
enforcing environmental and planning laws to prevent deforestation that, 
according to some perspectives, are among the factors that have generated 
beach erosion in some communities. Therefore, a problem that could be 
explained as a governance issue, which is closely intertwined with economic and 
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political issues, is explained as external, part of a global process, which requires 
common efforts to be solved. 
 Marston argues that in analyzing public policies, “we need to pay due 
attention to the everyday struggles over policy meanings and deeply held 
convictions – stories of conflict and contestation that are often missing from 
textbooks on how policy development ‘should’ happen” (Marston, 2004, p. 5). In 
my study fishers disclosed competing problems that are the product of past state 
interventions in the region, in particular the imposition of an oil exploitation 
strategy which has given rise to struggles over people’s lands and their marine 
and coastal resources. Fishers’ views of environmental changes have been 
shaped by their long-standing conflict with the oil industry that has had 
catastrophic environmental impacts on this region, affecting people’s livelihoods. 
In this context, it should also be noted that the interaction between fishers and 
the government has been characterized by the corruption of both the authorities 
and the fishers’ leaders, by the negotiation of certain privileges for some groups 
and leaders, and by problems such as the lack of enforcement of fishing norms 
like the restrictions about use of nets and about the closed season. 
 It is in light of their conflict-ridden relationship with the government that 
local fishers have also developed their understanding of the causes of many of 
their problems, which they attribute to decisions by the Mexican government and 
the state-owned oil industry – as opposed to problems caused by nature or 
climate change. There, coastal erosion is perceived not as a consequence of 
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changes in the environment, but as a phenomenon caused by the effects of the 
infrastructure that was built to support the oil industry.  
Government officials from national agencies may not be aware of the 
existence of competing views about environmental changes that challenge their 
climate change narratives. Therefore, one can hypothetically argue that 
overlooking such local issues could not be a deliberate strategy. In that respect, 
fishers are out of the lens. In government narratives fishers are not conceived as 
active subjects sustaining particular views about their environment. They are 
instead conceived as victims of a global process – climate change – in which, 
however, they are asked to collaborate and change their practices in order to 
better face climate change impacts.  
This, however, is not the case for provincial government officials. In an 
interview with a provincial government agent I asked him explicitly about fishers’ 
views regarding the fact that Pemex caused erosion in their beaches. He 
disregarded fishers’ positions explaining that they have always complained about 
everything, that their only concern is to blame Pemex and to look for strategies 
so they can get economic resources from the oil company. As I discuss in this 
dissertation, he also mentioned the “claim-making business” in which fishers 
have been engaged for decades with the oil industry. If in the first case national 
government officials may overlook local issues due to ignorance, in this latter 
case where local officials are aware of local politics, fishers’ positions and local 
struggles are overlooked by government narratives precisely for being 
contentious political issues. 
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7.3 How Are Climate Change Adaptation Narratives Shaping New 
Development Discourses? 
I have discussed how government narratives are “disposing” things, events and 
people, in particular ways that may be problematic for local inhabitants 
experiencing climatic and non-climatic stresses. Government narratives about 
adaptation a) propose forms of "adaptive" action that replicate and reinforce 
problems historically associated with critiques of “development”; b) necessitate 
the crafting of an “adaptive subject” and c) attempt to reconfigure social, political, 
and economic relations in the region – making fishermen/oil into allies against 
climate change. 
 I argue that climate change narratives resemble past development 
interventions in relation to, for example, who is determining what problem is 
important for local inhabitants. In my case study, concerns about climatic 
changes as they are framed in climate change frameworks – e.g. 
hydrometeorological events explained as the result of climate change – come 
from actors and institutions external to coastal communities – such as NGOs and 
state agencies. In my interviews, fishers noticed certain changes in how these 
meteorological events manifest: in the past they experienced less severe 
hurricanes and storms, but lasted long periods (weeks); now they experience 
short-term (hours) events but with the particularity that they are much more 
aggressive in nature. However, local concerns over the impacts of hurricanes 
and storms focused on the lack of state support in emergency events, when they 
are isolated without power or supplies. Fishers did not identify this type of 
problem as the most important for them and their communities. In fact, as I 
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discussed in this dissertation, fishers’ perceptions about local challenges and 
immediate problems were determined by the specific economic constraints they 
experience in a context of economic crisis and poverty.  
In light of this finding I might argue that fishers’ opinions resonate with 
scholars’ arguments suggesting that climate change is “essentially a Northern” 
issue, because many actors in Third World contexts are more concerned with 
daily local immediate basic needs – health, employment – than with long-term 
global threats  (Demeritt, 2001, p. 313). However, interviews with fishers suggest 
that this type of generalization does not necessarily reflect the complexity of 
peoples’ views and concerns about their lives in particular, and about their world 
in general. For example, when some of them talked to me about what they have 
learned from television reports about the melting of glaciers, they manifest their 
awareness of the magnitude of the problem. To frame the discussion in terms of 
what is more or less important for local inhabitants is not useful. In my case I 
show how fishers identified their problems, and which ones they overlooked or 
highlighted. My argument goes in the direction of how a problem is presented, for 
whom, and the type of implications this framing brings in terms of addressing or 
dismissing local concerns about it. 
 As with past development initiatives, government climate change 
narratives promote particular ideas and practices, which are envisioned as 
mechanisms to face impacts. One of them is, for example, to create awareness 
about the “climate change problem” as it is defined by government agencies; to 
make visible and explain a problem that “fishers do not understand.” This 
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strategy relies upon a particular conception of “others,” as subjects that need to 
be instructed, oriented and guided. Even though coastal erosion has been part of 
fishers’ daily life, state officials believe in the need to make them “conscious” 
about erosion as it is framed in government narratives: erosion as a climate 
change impact.  
These efforts to raise consciousness about the problem form part of many 
other steps to be taken in order to face impacts. There is an ideal conception of a 
better future where conscious people implement adaptive strategies to cope with 
climatic changes, an ideal where an adaptive world would make it possible to 
stay on the path towards “development.”  
The making of an adaptive subject involves people’s adoption of particular 
ideas and new practices. As some scholars have criticized, at the core of the 
problem is the fact that people are “forced to bear the burden of environmental 
damage, expected to ‘deal with it’ internally, and find local coping mechanisms” 
(McNamara, 2006, p. 165). The adaptation initiatives analyzed in this dissertation 
promote a set of practices moving towards a more sustainable fishery sector. 
However, this is a list of good intentions that fail to consider the political economy 
of those coastal communities – identities, local ideas and perceptions, power 
relations.  
My research findings demonstrate how struggle and conflicts over 
resource access and control also involve “struggles over social identities, 
discourses, values and concrete practices” (Marston, 2004, p. 4). The 
emergence of adaptation ideas such as the promotion of aquaculture for 
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example, is seen by fishers as a threat, an attempt to change their identities as 
fishers, to throw them out of the sea, lagoons and rivers so other powerful actors 
(the oil company) could make use of their territory and resources. I argue that 
government initiatives that are presented as “neutral,” promoting strategies to 
help people and coastal ecosystems face climate changes, are however highly 
contentious since they have to do with resource use, control and access. A close 
analysis of social perceptions of environmental changes, and the controversies 
around some issues, illustrates that efforts to position climate change may be a 
contested process on the ground.   
Some climate change criticisms revolve around the issue of how the 
climate change problem is presented in a managerial mode, sometimes in terms 
of cost-benefit analysis. I have discussed problems associated with such 
technocratic perspectives on adaptation. Even though they integrate issues of 
vulnerability and the recognition of social and economic problems, the solutions 
proposed in such initiatives are not structural in character. The framing of the 
climate change problems based on vulnerability analysis does not convey ideas 
about how to solve the problems that are generating such vulnerabilities. These 
narratives, I argue, are the product of processes of simplification undertaken by 
state agencies in their effort to grasp the complex reality in which they want to 
intervene. As I have demonstrated, through simplification governments 
depoliticize historical events and processes that at are the core of the type of 
problems adaptation measures try to address.  
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This dissertation discusses how some adaptation measures proposed are 
in fact old policies that are already part of existing laws and regulations. The 
problem that such climate change initiatives avoid discussing and addressing is 
precisely how to overcome the diversity of problems that are preventing state 
agencies to actually implement such regulations. It is the lack of implementation 
of already existing plans and programs that constitutes the core of the problem. 
Historically, Tabasco has been a province where governments have 
tested different development “experiments” that have resulted in a “harmful 
development” for people and their environments. It is in this context where the 
analysis of new state interventions that are emerging under the label of climate 
change initiatives becomes particularly relevant. Through this research we 
already know that climate change adaptation initiatives that claim to look for 
strategies to restructure existing human-nature relationships are not designed to 
address existing environmental problems in Tabasco, nor to deal with the 
different struggles over the territory and its resources. How such interventions 
would make a change without addressing structural issues on the ground is not 
clear. In Tabasco, it is still a pending task to trace the trajectory of these 
emergent climate change interventions; of special concern is, for example, 
whether they will potentially impact fishers’ control, access and use of their 
coastal resources, or if these initiatives will ameliorate or reinforce social 
inequalities and exclusion. 
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7.4 Thesis Contributions  
In the context of Mexico, my most immediate contribution is the critical analysis 
of a concept that conveys apparently straightforward ideas about (a) the need to 
promote practices so people become conscious of the many climate change risks 
they are going to experience; and (b) what people should do to face climatic 
changes. Although critical analysis by anthropologists and geographers has 
emerged during the last decades, in Mexico critical discussion of adaptation is 
almost nonexistent – scholars have mostly focused on politics of mitigation such 
as REDD (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) initiatives. 
The dissemination of preliminary findings in conferences in Mexico, among 
researchers working on topics such as vulnerability and adaptation, was received 
with surprise. In their studies, assumptions and ideas about climate change 
adaptation were used uncritically, as a neutral concept. This study introduces a 
critical perspective to Mexican scholarship, as well as contributes to the larger 
discussion already taking place in other contexts around the world – which has 
been mostly focused on Northern communities and the Small Island Developing 
States.  
Furthermore, and as it was noted in this dissertation, the overarching 
research question I discussed related to the implications of using global 
frameworks to explain local environmental changes, is not novel. Political 
ecologists have examined this question in relation to a variety of topics - 
deforestation, desertification, soil erosion – and locations – Africa, South 
America. However, this dissertation’s primary contributions lies in offering a 
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critical sociological perspective on climate change adaptation (rather than 
mitigation) in the Mexican context.   
 More specifically, I identify three contributions of my research to the field 
of environmental sociology. First, it contributes to sociological analysis of how 
environmental problems are constructed, and specifically to sociological criticism 
of global narratives that emphasize the existence of normative “common” 
interests and views on problems and their solutions (Yearly, 2002; Taylor & 
Buttel, 1992; Timmons & Parks, 2006). At the core of this critique is the 
examination of apolitical technocratic approaches to environmental problems. 
Taylor and Buttel (1992) explain that in global environmental discourses two 
allied views of politics have been privileged: the moral and the technocratic. My 
dissertation is based on a detailed analysis of contentious local issues related to 
the use, access, and management of resources and on historical struggles for 
fishers’ lands and marine resources with the state-own oil company. I have 
demonstrated how normative technocratic adaptation measures proposed in 
government narratives, “are distanced from the resource users” (Adger et al., 
2001, p. 681). I discuss how government narratives do not account for power 
relations embedded in highly contentious political issues among and within 
coastal communities, and between actors with differentiated political and material 
resources. In sum, my dissertation problematizes the abstract idea of the 
existence of common interests and views of environmental problems and their 
solutions contained in global climate change narratives.  
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Second, my research brings into the analysis the implications of inequality 
in the study region. It discusses the harmful effects of development, that in the 
region have been translated into differentiated environmental impacts on coastal 
communities. In particular, my account of the political economy of local 
communities helped us to understand the long-term environmental changes state 
interventions have had on the region. Pellow and Brehm (2013) argue that 
“environmental sociology’s promise is to expand our understanding of inequality 
by making sense of the often tense and violent relationships among humans, 
ecosystems, and nonhuman animal species” (p. 231). This dissertation 
contributes to analyses on these conflicting relationships among powerful (oil 
industry) and less powerful human actors, as well as the differentiated impacts 
state projects have on the ground. Overall my research contributes to political 
economy perspectives on environmental sociology that have problematize “the 
effects of capitalism and modernity on socioecological well- being” as well as on 
how this system “works for the benefit of some groups and to the disadvantage of 
others” (Pellow & Brehm, 2013, p. 231-2). 
 The third contribution to the field of environmental sociology is that my 
research shed light on the role of states in shaping global narratives. It 
emphasizes states’ agency in shaping the norms, discourses and information 
emanating from world environmental regimes. In doing so, it criticizes accounts 
(e.g. world polity theories) that analyze how the climate regime constructs and 
propagates environmental norms, values, cultures, and how it “diffuses these 
models to nations, as it encourages states to adopt new environmental laws and 
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policies” (Pellow & Brehm, 2013, p. 234). A nuanced analysis of concrete 
mechanisms how state officials and agencies deal with the “climate change 
problem” gives us insights about global discourses’ problematic and contested 
trajectories as they are adopted in national or local settings. 
 My study also contributes to the field of development studies by identifying 
characteristics of an emergent narrative that conveys new goals, ideals, social 
representations and ways of framing existing governance problems under a 
climate change adaptation approach. This research critically analyzes the 
implications of re-oriented development narratives that frame and attempt to 
address what I call old unsolved development problems, now under the label of 
climate change adaptation. It also discusses how these narratives expose ideas 
characterizing what has been described as an “adaptive subject,” a subject who 
will be well-equipped to face climate change impacts. I discuss the anti-political 
nature of these development narratives that through a process of simplification 
render technical complex political issues. 
 
7.5 Research Limitations 
This dissertation would have been benefited from having a more comprehensive 
analysis of global narratives generated directly by organizations such as the 
IPCC. Although I use direct sources, I do not explore in depth these 
organizations’ assumptions and the analysis scholars have conducted of different 
controversies regarding the IPCC and themes such as problem definition, 
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conceptual definitions, and interest groups, among others. I mostly discuss these 
global frameworks as they have been explained by the Mexican government.  
A key international actor that is also constructing a power/knowledge 
global regime is the World Bank (Goldman, 2005). This dissertation analyzes a 
climate change adaptation project financed by the World Bank in the study area. 
However, my research does not specifically discuss the role of the Bank in 
shaping adaptation narratives; neither does it analyze the Bank’s interactions 
with national professionals, scientists and epistemic communities that are closely 
collaborating with this institution in constructing climate change narratives. These 
are in themselves research topics that would require a deep analysis of the 
global political economy in which the World Bank is rooted, a topic that is beyond 
the aim of my own research project. However, this analysis would definitely make 
my research much more comprehensive.  
 A close inquiry of how local actors, such as local or regional NGOs and 
grassroots organizations, take up climate change claims would have provided a 
more comprehensive understanding of how other types of actors relate to these 
global framings in different ways. This would allow me to analyze how they are 
appropriating climate change frameworks to make their own local claims. An 
example of this type of grassroots organization is the "Group of Local 
Communities Impacted by Oil and Climate Change" that identifies and blames 
governments’ poor decisions – e.g. corruption and protection of hydropower 
private interests – among the many human factors causing the recent flood 
disaster in Tabasco discussed in this dissertation. They criticize narratives that 
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explain this disaster as a climate change impact caused by increasing rain 
storms. This type of organization also relies on criticisms against the corporate 
world and global capitalism as drivers of the climate change crisis. Finally, the 
pairing of climate change and oil claims is interesting since this organization 
blames the oil industry for building coastal infrastructure that is changing the 
environment but at the same time refers to sea level rise as an important climate 
change event that is threatening Tabasco coasts. 
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